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1 
Introduction 
William Kern 
Western Michigan University 
Throughout history mankind has been subject to disasters produced 
by “Mother Nature” as well as the man-made variety. Only recently, 
however, have economists understood disasters as economic phenom-
ena to be formally analyzed. Given the magnitude of many recent 
disasters, their impact on local, regional, and national economies, and 
the coverage of their consequences in the popular press, it is puzzling 
that the attention of economists was for so long largely diverted from 
analysis of these events. Perhaps George Stigler has already provided 
the answer to this puzzle in his Nobel lecture, where he observed that 
economists have frequently neglected the study of important current 
events. He points out, for example, that “during the Industrial Revolu-
tion, economists adopted the law of diminishing returns but ignored the 
most widespread growth of output that the world had yet observed.” 
The explanation that he offered, perhaps tongue in cheek, was that “the 
scholars who create economic theory do not read the newspapers regu-
larly or carefully during working hours” (1992, p. 61). 
We are now observing, happily, a reversal of this practice, as more 
economists have begun to study the economics of disasters during the 
past several decades. Although the number of economists who study di-
sasters is still small, the economics of disasters appears to be well on the 
road to establishing itself as an important subdiscipline in economics. 
Why are economists now more likely to pay attention to disasters? 
As Howard C. Kunreuther and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan report in their 
chapter, “Market and Government Failure in Insuring and Mitigating 
Natural Catastrophes: How Long-Term Contracts Can Help,” disasters 
were, for much of history, regarded as low-probability events. How-
ever, they argue that we are now entering “a new era of catastrophes” 
in which disasters occur with greater frequency and the losses are of 
1 
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a much greater magnitude than in the past. Why are disasters occur-
ring more frequently and why are the losses increasing? Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan offer several reasons for the greater magnitude and 
greater frequency of disasters. One prominent change in recent decades 
is a significant increase in the population concentrated in urban areas on 
coasts, which puts more people at risk of losses due to hurricanes and 
tsunamis. The greater level of economic development in coastal areas 
has also increased the magnitude of losses. Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan suggest that global climate change may be at work as well. They 
point out that of the 20 biggest catastrophes occurring between 1970 
and 2004, more than 80 percent were weather-related. 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan therefore suggest that the time has 
come to develop a better strategy for coping with disasters. In their 
opinion, the recent losses suffered in these catastrophic events suggest 
that inadequate preparation and inadequate mitigation efforts have been 
the norm. This, they argue, is due in large part to myopia and misper-
ception of the actual risks, both by potential victims and policymakers. 
What do they suggest should be done? Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan offer several guiding principles designed to stimulate greater 
mitigation efforts and minimize insurance losses while still offering 
protection against catastrophe. The primary guiding principle is that 
insurance should be priced in accordance with risk. They argue that 
such pricing will create incentives to invest in mitigation efforts, citing 
substantial evidence for the significant benefits of mitigation. Unfortu-
nately, typical property owners will be unlikely to bear the high up-front 
cost of mitigation efforts in light of the uncertainty of short-run cost 
savings. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan therefore argue for the devel-
opment of long-term insurance contracts designed to induce property 
owners to take a long-run view of the problem. However, they recog-
nize that forces on both the supply side and the demand side militate 
against the emergence of markets for this type of insurance contract. 
They therefore suggest government action to help create such markets. 
They argue that the National Flood Insurance Program might offer the 
best opportunity to create long-term insurance markets and demonstrate 
the usefulness of long-term insurance policies and thus encourage their 
development. 
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While Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan are able to demonstrate the 
potential benefits of long-term insurance arrangements, doubt remains 
regarding the political will to undertake what is necessary to make them 
viable. As they point out, private long-term insurance contracts have 
failed to emerge in part because of government policy. State govern-
ment insurance regulators have, unfortunately, largely resisted efforts 
by insurance companies to raise premiums to reflect risks. In fact, there 
is increasing pressure on state insurance regulators in high-risk states 
such as Florida to reduce insurance rates rather than increase them. 
The general public often believes that insurance companies have made 
enormous profits at their expense and that current insurance rates are 
unnecessarily high due to the greed of insurance executives. It will be a 
hard sell to convince the public, as well as politicians, who depend on 
public support, of the necessity of raising rates to reflect risks. While 
pricing insurance to reflect risks is good economics, such a strategy 
would entail a high likelihood of loss for politicians who support it. 
Anthony M. Yezer’s chapter, “Expectations and Unexpected Con-
sequences of Public Policy toward Natural and Man-Made Disasters,” 
focuses on the significance of changes in the expectations of disasters 
for our understanding of their economic impact. He points out that the 
infrequency of disasters, the spatial concentration of their effects, and 
the size of disasters all raise the possibility that the expectations of di-
sasters will change as a consequence of their occurrence. He cites this as 
a distinguishing feature of disasters in comparison with hazards gener-
ally considered. In fact, he claims that this is the most underresearched 
aspect of the economics of disasters. 
Yezer’s analysis of the impact of disasters on disaster expectations 
reveals several possible models of response. His analysis is based on 
the assumption that disaster expectations are formed on the basis of a 
comparison of recent disaster occurrences with the historical record. 
An increase in the frequency of disasters thus raises the expectations 
of disasters. From this model of disaster expectation he draws conclu-
sions about the relations between economic growth and disasters, the 
incentives to develop land in disaster-prone areas, and the significance 
of disaster expectations for insurance markets and public policy toward 
disasters. Several puzzles regarding the relations between disasters and 
economic growth, the optimal development of land in hazardous areas, 
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and the market for disaster insurance can be better understood once one 
considers that the occurrence of disasters will also change the expecta-
tions of disasters. 
One of the important lessons he derives from his analysis is the need 
to distinguish between expected and unexpected disasters in consider-
ing the economic impact of disasters. The magnitude of the economic 
losses a disaster produces depends crucially on the difference between 
expected losses and unanticipated losses. Among the conclusions Yezer 
derives from this analysis is that the economic effects of a disaster are 
dependent not only on the physical severity of the event but also on the 
extent to which the event and its damage were anticipated. He therefore 
concludes that government aid to disaster areas should be concentrated 
on unanticipated disasters. While he recognizes that politically this may 
not be feasible, he does find evidence that several federal disaster relief 
policies adhere in some respects to this principle. 
Hal Cochrane’s chapter, “The Economics of Disaster: Retrospect and 
Prospect,” provides an overview of the development of the economics 
of disasters. Its insights into reasons underlying the development of the 
field will be of particular value to readers new to this subject. Cochrane
demonstrates that the analysis of disaster mitigation efforts was devel-
oped largely as an application of water resource economics combined 
with insights from the economics of information. He provides an 
excellent survey of the nature of the cost-loss trade-offs involved in 
managing hazards as well as a very useful discussion of the value of 
disaster forecasts in this framework. His application of this model to 
the case of rising CO
2 
emissions and the uncertainty of the forecasts of 
global warming is a simple but powerful example of the insights that 
can be derived from the cost-loss model. 
Cochrane points out that a correct estimate of losses is a key ele-
ment in the cost-loss framework. In contrast to Yezer, Cochrane holds 
the opinion that the housing markets provide little good evidence about 
the extent to which hazards and particularly disasters are capitalized 
in housing and land values. As a result he concludes that analysis of 
housing and land market values offers an inadequate measure of the 
willingness to pay for safety. He also points out that disasters yield 
several distinct sorts of losses that are contentious and difficult to mea-
sure, including the loss of cultural community and assets of a historical 
nature. 
 Introduction 5 
The chapter concludes with a discussion about the use of input-
output analysis as a means of measuring the impact of disasters on local 
and regional economies. In Cochrane’s opinion, input-output analysis, 
while a useful tool in the right context, has a fatal flaw in its application 
to disasters, in that it is incapable of addressing the impacts of the sup-
ply-side bottlenecks in local and regional economies that occur in the 
aftermath of disasters. Input-output analysis does not account for insuf-
ficient capacity. It is driven by variations on the demand side and thus 
is inadequate to analyze the supply-side shocks so common in disaster 
situations. Other techniques such as computable general equilibrium 
models and econometric analysis are also found wanting in important 
respects. Cochrane concludes with the advice that the unique nature of 
these events implies that it might be difficult to draw general lessons 
about the impact of disasters and to predict the pace of recovery, when 
such analysis is often based on factors present in the predisaster setting 
but absent in the postdisaster environment. 
While much of the literature in the economics of disasters focuses on 
market failures and the role of government in postdisaster relief efforts, 
Peter Boettke and Daniel Smith, in their chapter, “Private Solutions to 
Public Disasters: Self-Reliance and Social Resilience,” examine the 
much-neglected role of the private sector and markets in the postdisas-
ter recovery process, using post-Katrina New Orleans as an example. 
They point out that while most of the discussion is focused on the role 
that government should play, one needs to consider the important role 
that private entities—both for-profit and nonprofit—can and do play 
in the recovery process. Furthermore, they argue that one should also 
consider that the attempts by private entities to cope with the recovery 
process are often thwarted by government actions both pre- and postdi-
saster. For example, in New Orleans, government policies encouraged 
people to locate in flood-prone areas and left them vulnerable to loss 
because of inadequately constructed levees. In the aftermath of Katrina, 
occupational and building code regulations thwarted private recovery 
efforts and distorted the set of price signals necessary to ensure efficient 
use of the available resources. 
Boettke and Smith argue that the price system and private efforts 
must be and have been an integral part of disaster recovery. However, in 
disaster situations we are likely to want to suspend the use of the market 
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and distort the price signals necessary to help with the recovery pro-
cess, perhaps out of public concern to keep someone from profiting at 
the expense of others. But Boettke and Smith argue that the pursuit by 
entrepreneurs of profitable opportunities created by the disaster is the 
basis of the economic recovery and that efforts to thwart those pursuits 
are misguided and delay the recovery. Ironically, for-profit entities often 
were the most civic-minded, responsive, and generous to the commu-
nity in the aftermath of Katrina. 
Daniel Sutter and Kevin M. Simmons, in their chapter, “The So-
cioeconomic Impact of Tornadoes,” point out that tornadoes constitute 
one of the most common and frequent forms of disaster; they occur in 
all 50 states and throughout the year. The authors concentrate on three 
issues: the trend of losses due to tornadoes, the role of the National 
Weather Service’s tornado warning program, and the cost-effective-
ness of several tornado loss-mitigation strategies. Their research yields 
some surprising results. They estimate that the largest segment of losses 
caused by tornadoes—approximately two-thirds of the total—is the op-
portunity cost of time spent under tornado warnings. That so much of 
the cost can be attributed to time spent under warnings is partly ac-
counted for by the steady decrease in the losses attributable to tornado 
fatalities during the past half-century. 
The paper devotes considerable discussion to the factors contrib-
uting to tornado losses, including the time of day, the severity of the 
winds, the location of the storm, and even the day of the week. How-
ever, of greatest interest to economists will be the authors’ discussion 
of potential ways to minimize tornado losses and their estimates of the 
cost-effectiveness of several mitigation strategies. Sutter and Simmons 
find that attempts to minimize the time spent under warning have the 
greatest potential, given that this time is the largest component of costs. 
They claim that the recently adopted use of Storm-Based Warnings by 
the National Weather Service has the potential to reduce losses by as 
much as $1 billion per year. In addition, increasing the lead time of 
warnings also appears to be a cost-effective strategy, up to a point. 
Conversely, Sutter and Simmons find that tornado shelters are rarely
cost-effective means of reducing casualty losses, in that the cost to save 
a life exceeds the value statistically assigned to a life. They estimate 
that even with the widespread use of shelters in a tornado-prone area 
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like Oklahoma, it would cost about $57 million per life saved. However, 
they do find that significant value has resulted from the more stringent 
regulation of manufactured home construction mandated by HUD in 
1994. They find that these regulations have reduced losses stemming 
from casualties significantly and in a relatively cost-effective manner, 
especially when compared to the cost of building shelters. 
The chapters presented here give the reader a sample of the sort of 
research now being undertaken on the economics of disasters. Several 
themes long dominant in this literature are thoroughly discussed. These 
include the ability of potential disaster victims to accurately assess the 
risks they face, the role of incentives in ensuring that mitigation ef-
forts are undertaken, the adequacy of our evaluation of the impact of 
disasters on economies, and discussion of the effectiveness of current 
government policies toward disaster prevention and relief. These will 
in all likelihood continue to be topics of discussion in the future as well. 
I hope the following chapters will give readers insight into the current 
state of debate on these issues. 
Reference 
Stigler, George. 1992. “The Process and Progress of Economics.” In Lectures, 
Economics 1981–1990, Karl-Göran Mäler, ed. Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Co., pp. 57–76. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/ 
laureates/1982/stigler-lecture.pdf (accessed October 27, 2009). 

 
 
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
 
 
2 
Market and Government 
Failure in Insuring and 
Mitigating Natural Catastrophes 
How Long-Term Contracts Can Help 
Howard C. Kunreuther 
Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Insurance plays a vital role in America’s economy by helping 
households and businesses manage risks . . . When insurance 
prices reflect underlying economic costs they can encourage a 
more efficient allocation of resources. Efforts to keep premiums 
for insurance against catastrophe hazards artificially low, whether 
through regulation or through subsidized government programs, 
can encourage excessively risky behavior on the part of those who 
might be affected by future catastrophes. 
—Council of Economic Advisers (2007)1 
Given the hundreds of billions of dollars in economic losses due 
to catastrophes in the United States since 2001, it is difficult to real-
ize that when Hurricane Hugo hit the country in 1989, it was the first 
catastrophe to inflict more than $1 billion in insured losses. But times 
have changed because of a series of unprecedented large-scale natural 
disasters in the United States during the past few years. Times have 
changed because of the increased terrorism threat worldwide, includ-
ing the potential for nuclear attacks. Times have changed because of 
the possibility of international pandemics and world cyber-failure, and 
because of the financial crises we are currently experiencing. In other 
words, we have entered a new era of catastrophes. 
9 
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While all of the above risks are different in character, they share 
two important features: 1) uncertainty regarding their occurrence and 
2) wide variance in losses from one year to the next. Experts and deci-
sion makers face challenges in assessing the risks associated with these 
extreme events, in developing strategies for reducing future losses, and 
in facilitating the recovery process following a major catastrophe. 
As for natural disasters, the world has experienced large-scale 
losses and fatalities because of the increasing concentration of popula-
tion and activities in high-risk coastal regions. In Southeast Asia, the 
tsunami in December 2004 killed more than 280,000 people residing 
in coastal areas. Cyclone Nargis, which made landfall in Myanmar in 
May 2008, killed an estimated 140,000 people, making it the deadliest 
natural disaster in the country’s recorded history. The same month, the 
Great Sichuan Earthquake in China is estimated to have killed nearly 
70,000 people, injured 374,000, and made almost 5 million homeless 
(Munich Re 2008). Deaths from the Haitian earthquake in January 2010 
are estimated at 200,000 (European Commission 2010). 
But even in a developed country like the United States, which has 
both extensive experience with natural catastrophes and the resources to 
adequately prepare for them, the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons dem-
onstrated a lack of adequate loss reduction measures and emergency 
preparedness capacity to deal with large-scale natural disasters. Hurri-
cane Katrina, which hit Louisiana and Mississippi at the end of August 
2005, killed 1,300 people and forced 1.5 million people to evacuate 
the affected area—a record number for the country. Economic damages 
were estimated in the range of $150 billion to $200 billion. 
After two relatively quiet hurricane seasons in 2006 and 2007 in 
the United States, a series of hurricanes made landfall in 2008, causing 
billions of dollars in direct economic losses along the Caribbean Basin 
and in the United States. Hurricane Ike was the most expensive indi-
vidual event in 2008, with an estimated privately insured loss of $16 
billion, followed by Hurricane Gustav, with insured losses estimated at 
$4 billion. Based on these figures, Hurricane Ike ranks as the third most 
devastating weather-related disaster in U.S. history, after Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Andrew, which hit southeast Florida in August 
1992 (Swiss Re 2008). 
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These recent catastrophes highlight the challenges of mitigating the 
effects of natural disasters and financing recovery from them, issues 
that are now high on the business and policy agendas of many coun-
tries. The question is not whether other large-scale catastrophes will 
occur, but when and how frequently they will strike, and the extent of 
the damage and fatalities they will cause. Now is the time to develop 
and implement economically sound policies and strategies for manag-
ing the risk and consequences of future disasters. It is important for 
us to take a longer-term view of these issues, given the tendency of 
individuals to be myopic in their thinking and to misperceive risks. A
coherent strategy is necessary to ensure a sustainable recovery from 
large-scale disasters and the appropriate future development of hazard-
prone areas. But these issues are complex. They challenge our capacity 
as a nation to work together despite different agendas of key stakehold-
ers and legislators regarding the role and responsibilities of the private 
and public sectors in dealing with catastrophic risks. Absence of lead-
ership in this area will inevitably lead to unnecessary loss of lives and 
economic destruction in the devastated regions. 
This chapter complements other analyses in this volume by focus-
ing on the risk of large-scale natural disasters, although we believe the 
concepts and proposals for managing these risks more effectively have 
relevance to other types of extreme events such as terrorism and cata-
strophic accidents.2 The chapter is organized as follows: in the next 
section we discuss the evolution over the past four decades of economic 
and insured losses due to major catastrophes and the key drivers of this 
change. We then propose four guiding principles for developing sus-
tainable insurance and mitigation programs and analyze the behavioral 
biases, notably myopia, that discourage individuals from investing in 
cost-effective protective measures. To overcome these biases, we pro-
pose long-term insurance contracts combined with long-term loans. We 
then demonstrate how the National Flood Insurance Program is a natu-
ral candidate for these contracts. The chapter concludes with a brief 
summary and suggestions for future research. 
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A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 
Recent Changes in the Impacts of Extreme Events 
The economic and insured losses from great natural catastrophes 
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods worldwide have increased 
significantly in recent years, as shown in Figure 2.1. (Each vertical bar 
represents the total economic losses, and the darker zone represents 
the insured portion of it.) A comparison of these economic losses over 
time reveals a huge increase: $53.6 billion (1950–1959), $93.3 billion 
(1960–1969), $161.7 billion (1970–1979), $262.9 billion (1980–1989), 
and $778.3 billion (1990–1999). Between 2000 and 2008, losses totaled 
$620.6 billion, principally as a result of the 2004, 2005, and 2008 hur-
ricane seasons, which wrought historic levels of destruction. 
Figure 2.1  Evolution of Great Natural Catastrophes Worldwide, 
1950–2008 
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NOTE: In billions of U.S. dollars, indexed to 2008. Dotted line indicates trend in over-
all losses. Solid line indicates trend in insured losses. 
SOURCE: Munich Re (2009a). 
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Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers since 
1990 than in the entire history of insurance. Between 1970 and the mid-
1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters (including forest 
fires) were in the $3 billion to $4 billion range. The insured losses from 
Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall in Charleston, South Carolina, 
in September 1989, exceeded $4 billion (in 1989 dollars). There was a 
radical increase in insured losses in the early 1990s, as Hurricane An-
drew struck Florida ($23.7 billion in 2007 dollars) and the Northridge 
earthquake hit California ($19.6 billion in 2007 dollars). The four hur-
ricanes that struck Florida in 2004 (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) 
collectively totaled almost $33 billion in insured losses. Hurricane Ka-
trina alone cost insurers and reinsurers an estimated $46 billion, and 
total losses paid by private insurers resulting from major natural ca-
tastrophes in 2005 reached $87 billion.3 Figure 2.2 depicts the upward 
trend in worldwide insured losses from catastrophes between 1970 and 
2008.4 
Table 2.1 reveals the 25 most costly insured catastrophes from 1970 
to 2008 (in 2008 dollars). Of these 25 major events, 14 occurred after 
2001, and 12 of happened in the United States. Hurricane Andrew and 
the Northridge earthquake were the first two catastrophes that the in-
dustry experienced with losses greater than $10 billion (designated as 
super-cats), and they caused insurers to reflect on whether risks from 
natural disasters were still insurable. To assist them in making this de-
termination, many firms began using catastrophe models to estimate the 
likelihood and consequences to their insured portfolios from specific 
disasters in hazard-prone areas (Grossi and Kunreuther 2005). With 
the exception of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, all of the 
events in the top 25 were natural disasters. More than 80 percent of 
these were weather-related events—hurricanes and typhoons, storms, 
and floods—and nearly three-quarters of the claims were made in the 
United States. 
Losses resulting from natural catastrophes and man-made disasters 
in 2006 were far below the losses in 2004 and 2005. Of the $48 billion 
in catastrophe-related economic losses, $16 billion was covered by in-
surance ($11 billion for natural disasters and $5 billion for man-made). 
During the past 25 years, only 1988 and 1997 had insured losses lower 
than those in 2006. According to Munich Re (2008), there were 960 
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Figure 2.2  Worldwide Evolution of Catastrophe-Insured Losses, 
1970–2008 
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NOTE: Man-made catastrophes include major fires and explosions (e.g., in a chemical 
plant or refinery), aviation/rail/shipping-related losses (fires, crashes, collisions), 
mining accidents, and collapse of infrastructure. The bar for 2001, because it 
includes the terrorist attacks of 9/11, is broken down into two additional categories 
that represent all the various types of insurance, including not only liability and life 
but also property and business interruption (BI). Losses are shown in billions of U.S. 
dollars indexed for 2007, except for 2008, which is current. 
SOURCE: Wharton Risk Center, with data from Swiss Re and the Insurance Information 
Institute. 
natural catastrophes in 2007, the most since 1974. They inflicted nearly 
$27 billion in insured losses. Swiss Re estimates that insured losses 
soared to $50 billion for the industry in 2008, making it one of the 
three costliest years ever. Natural catastrophes accounted for $43 bil-
lion of these losses, with man-made disasters making up the remaining 
$7 billion (Swiss Re 2008). In 2009, insured losses from catastrophes 
amounted to $22 billion, a lower figure due to a very benign North At-
lantic hurricane season (Munich Re 2009b). 
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The occurrence of damaging hurricanes is highly variable and 
uncertain from year to year. However, it is almost certain that in the 
coming years more catastrophic hurricanes will strike the Atlantic and 
Gulf coasts. Other parts of the nation will experience severe floods (as 
occurred in the Upper Midwest in 2008) and earthquakes, causing ex-
treme damage to residential and commercial property and infrastructure. 
There is a very clear message from these data. Only 20 or 30 years 
ago, large-scale natural disasters were considered low-probability 
events. Today, not only are they causing considerably greater economic 
losses than in the past, they also appear to be occurring at an accelerat-
ing pace. In this context, it is important to understand more fully the 
factors influencing these changes so as to design more effective pro-
grams for reducing losses from future disasters. 
The Question of Attribution 
At least two principal socioeconomic factors directly influence 
the level of economic losses due to catastrophic events: 1) degree of 
urbanization and 2) value at risk. In 1950, approximately 30 percent 
of the world’s population lived in cities. In 2000, about 50 percent of 
the world’s population (6 billion) resided in urban areas. Projections 
by the United Nations (2004) show that by 2025, that figure will have 
increased to 60 percent, based on a world population estimate of 8.3 
billion people. 
In the United States in 2003, 53 percent of the nation’s population, 
or 153 million people, lived in the 673 U.S. coastal counties, an increase 
of 33 million people since 1980, according to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). And the nation’s coastal popula-
tion is expected to increase by more than 12 million by 2015 (Crossett 
et al. 2004).5 Yet coastal counties, excluding Alaska, account for only 
17 percent of the land area in the United States. 
In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of population 
also translates into greater concentration of exposure and hence a higher 
likelihood of catastrophic losses from future disasters. Insurance density
is another critical socioeconomic factor to consider when evaluating 
the evolution of insured loss due to weather-related catastrophes. These 
factors will continue to have a major impact on the level of insured 
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Table 2.1  The 25 Most Costly Insured Catastrophes in the World, 1970–2008 
Victims (dead 
Event $ billions or missing) Year Area of primary damage
Hurricane Katrina 48.1 1,836 2005 U.S., Gulf of Mexico, et al. 
9/11 attacks 36.8 3,025 2001 U.S. 
Hurricane Andrew 24.6 43 1992 U.S., Bahamas 
Northridge earthquake 20.3 61 1994 U.S. 
Hurricane Ike 17.6 348 2008 U.S., Caribbean, et al. 
Hurricane Ivan 14.6 124 2004 U.S., Caribbean, et al. 
Hurricane Wilma 13.8 35 2005 U.S. , Gulf of Mexico, et al. 
Hurricane Rita 11.1 34 2005 U.S., Gulf of Mexico, et al. 
Hurricane Charley 9.1 24 2004 U.S., Caribbean, et al. 
Typhoon Mireille 8.9 51 1991 Japan 
Hurricane Hugo 7.9 71 1989 Puerto Rico, U.S., et al. 
Winter Storm Daria 7.7 95 1990 France, UK, et al. 
Winter Storm Lothar 7.5 110 1999 France, Switzerland, et al. 
Winter Storm Kyrill 6.3 54 2007 Germany, UK, the Netherlands, France 
Storms and floods 5.9 22 1987 France, UK, et al. 
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Hurricane Frances 5.8 38 2004 U.S., Bahamas 
Winter Storm Vivian 5.2 64 1990 Western/Central Europe 
Typhoon Bart 5.2 26 1999 Japan 
Hurricane Gustav 5.0 153 2008 U.S., Caribbean, et al. 
Hurricane Georges 4.7 600 1998 U.S., Caribbean 
Tropical Storm Allison 4.4 41 2001 U.S. 
Hurricane Jeanne 4.4 3,034 2004 U.S., Caribbean, et al. 
Typhoon Songda 4.0 45 2004 Japan, South Korea 
Storms 3.7 45 2003 U.S. 
Hurricane Floyd 3.6 70 1999 U.S., Bahamas, Columbia 
NOTE: Dollar amounts are indexed to 2008. 
SOURCE: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009), with data from Swiss Re (2009) and the Insurance Information Institute in New York. 
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losses from natural catastrophes. Given the growing concentration of 
exposure on the Gulf Coast, another hurricane like Katrina hitting that 
area is likely to inflict significant property damage unless strong mitiga-
tion measures are put in place.6 
In order to better understand this new vulnerability, it is possible to 
calculate the total direct economic cost of the major hurricanes in the 
United States in the past century, adjusted for inflation, population, and 
wealth normalization. More specifically, one can estimate what each of 
these hurricanes would have cost had it hit today. This exercise has been 
done in several studies. The most recent one, by Pielke et al. (2008), 
normalizes to the year 2005 mainland U.S. hurricane damage for the 
period 1900–2005. 
Table 2.2 provides estimates for the top 20 most costly hurricanes 
if they had occurred in 2005, using two approaches for normalizing 
these losses, each of which gives a cost estimate. The table indicates the 
range of costs provided by these two estimates, the year the hurricane 
occurred, the states that were most seriously affected, and the hurricane 
category on the Saffir-Simpson scale. The data reveal that the hurricane 
that hit Miami in 1926 would have been almost twice as costly as Hur-
ricane Katrina had it occurred in 2005, and the Galveston hurricane of 
1900 would have had total direct economic costs as high as those from 
Katrina. This means that independent of any possible change in weather 
patterns, we are very likely to see even more devastating disasters in the 
coming years because of the ongoing growth in value located in risk-
prone areas. 
There is another element to consider in determining how to ade-
quately manage and finance catastrophic risks: the possible impact of 
a change in climate on future weather-related catastrophes. Between 
1970 and 2004, storms and floods were responsible for over 90 per-
cent of the total economic costs of extreme weather-related events 
worldwide. Storms (hurricanes in the U.S. region, typhoons in Asia, 
and windstorms in Europe) contributed to over 75 percent of insured 
losses. In constant prices (2004), insured losses from weather-related 
events averaged $3 billion annually between 1970 and 1990 and then 
increased significantly to $16 billion annually between 1990 and 2004 
(Association of British Insurers 2005). In 2005, 99.7 percent of all cata-
strophic losses worldwide were due to weather-related events (Mills 
and Lecomte 2006). 
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Table 2.2  Top 20 Hurricane Scenarios, Ranked Using 2005 Inflation, Population, and Wealth Normalization
(1900–2005) 
Cost range ($ billion)
Rank Hurricane Year Category in 2005 
1 Miami (southeast FL/MS/AL) 1926 4 140–157 
2 Katrina (LA/MS) 2005 3 81 
3 North Texas (Galveston) 1900 4 72–78 
4 North Texas (Galveston) 1915 4 57–62 
5 Andrew (southeast FL and LA) 1992 5–3 54–60 
6 New England (CT/MA/NY/RI) 1938 3 37–39 
7 Southwest Florida 1944 3 35–39 
8 Lake Okeechobee (southeast Florida) 1928 4 32–34 
9 Donna (FL/NC/NY) 1960 4–3 29–32 
10 Camille (MS/southeast LA/VA) 1969 5 21–24 
11 Betsy (southeast FL and LA) 1965 3 21–23 
12 Wilma 2005 3 21 
13 Agnes (FL/CT/NY) 1972 1 17–18 
14 Diane (NC) 1955 1 17 
15 4 (southeast FL/LA/AL/MS) 1947 4–3 15–17 
16 Hazel (SC/NC) 1954 4 16–23 
17 Charley (southwest FL) 2004 4 16 
18 Carol (CT/NY/RI) 1954 3 15–16 
19 Hugo (SC) 1989 4 15–16 
20 Ivan (northwest FL/AL) 2004 3 15 
SOURCE: Data from Pielke et al. (2008). 
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Numerous discussions and scientific debates have centered on 
whether the series of major hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 might be 
partially attributable to the impact of a change in climate.7 One of the 
expected effects of global warming is an increase in hurricane intensity. 
This has been predicted by theory and modeling, and substantiated by 
empirical data on climate change. Higher ocean temperatures lead to 
an exponentially higher evaporation rate in the atmosphere, which in-
creases the intensity of cyclones and precipitation. The results to date 
raise issues with respect to the insurability of weather-related catastro-
phes, given that an increase in the number of major hurricanes over a 
shorter period of time is likely to translate into a greater number hitting 
the coasts, with a greater likelihood of damage to a much larger number 
of residences and commercial buildings today than in the 1940s. 
The combination of increasing urbanization, concentration of value
in high-risk areas, and the potential impact of a change in weather pat-
terns raises questions as to how the insurance industry will provide 
protection against catastrophic risks in the future. Traditional insurance 
relies on geographical and time diversification, both of which are some-
what compromised by these recent trends. The appropriate adoption of 
roles and responsibilities by the private and public sectors (as a source 
of financial support or as a market regulator) is critical in this regard. 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MITIGATING AND INSURING 
AGAINST CATASTROPHES 
To help ascertain the roles the private and public sectors can play 
in addressing these issues, we propose the following four guiding prin-
ciples for using the insurance infrastructure to deal more effectively 
with natural disasters: 
Principle 1—Premiums should reflect risk. Insurance premiums 
should be based on risk in order to provide signals to individuals as to 
the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective 
mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes. Risk-
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based premiums should also reflect the cost of capital that insurers need 
to integrate into their pricing to ensure adequate return to their investors. 
The application of Principle 1 provides a clear signal of likely dam-
age to those currently residing in areas subject to natural disasters and 
those who are considering moving into these regions. Risk-based pre-
miums would also enable insurers to provide discounts to homeowners 
and businesses that invest in cost-effective loss-reduction mitigation 
measures. If insurance premiums are not risk-based, insurers have no 
economic incentive to offer these discounts. In fact, they prefer not to 
offer coverage to these property owners because it is a losing proposi-
tion in the long run. 
Principle 2—Deal with equity and affordability issues. Any spe-
cial treatment given to homeowners currently residing in hazard-prone 
areas (e.g., low-income uninsured or inadequately insured homeown-
ers) should come from general public funding and not through insurance 
premium subsidies. 
Principle 2 reflects a concern for some residents in high-hazard 
areas who will be faced with large premium increases if insurers are 
permitted to adhere to Principle 1. As discussed in the next section, 
regulations imposed by state insurance commissioners keep premiums 
in many regions subject to hurricane damage artificially lower than the 
risk-based level. 
Note that Principle 2 applies only to individuals who currently 
reside in a hazard-prone area. Those who decide to move to the area 
in the future should be charged premiums that reflect the risk. If they 
were provided with financial assistance from public sources to pur-
chase insurance, the resulting public policy would directly encourage 
development in hazard-prone areas and exacerbate the potential for 
catastrophic losses from future disasters. 
Principle 3—Have sufficient demand for coverage. The demand 
by individuals and firms for insurance coverage with risk-based premi-
ums should be sufficiently high that insurers can cover the fixed costs 
of introducing a program for providing coverage and spreading the risk 
broadly throughout their portfolios. High demand for insurance would 
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also reduce the level of state and federal relief to uninsured or underin-
sured homeowners in the aftermath of the next disaster. 
Principle 4—Minimize likelihood of insolvency. Insurers and 
reinsurers should determine how much coverage to offer, and what pre-
mium to charge against the risk so that the chances of insolvency are 
below some predefined acceptable level. 
Insurance regulators should play an important role in ensuring that 
insurers providing coverage in high-risk areas have a solid financial 
basis for doing so. 
THE BEHAVIORAL CHALLENGES: THE DEMAND 
FOR INSURANCE AND MITIGATION 
How effective can mitigation be in reducing exposure to future di-
saster? To shed some light on this question, we undertook an analysis 
of the impact that mitigation would have on reducing losses from hur-
ricanes in four states: Florida, New York, South Carolina, and Texas 
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). In our analysis we consider two 
extreme cases: one in which no one has invested in mitigation, and 
one in which everyone has invested in predefined mitigation measures. 
From the U.S. Hurricane Model developed by the catastrophe modeling 
firm Risk Management Solutions, losses were calculated on a ground-
up and gross basis, assuming an appropriate mitigation measure across 
the insured portfolio. The mitigation measures were selected based on 
various assumptions for the different regions. For example, in Florida, 
the requirements were those defined by the Institute for Business and 
Home Safety’s “Fortified . . . for safer living” program. As this program 
is only for new construction, when we describe an analysis using these 
recommendations, it is the retrofit techniques that are aligned with the 
features of the Fortified program. In New York, South Carolina, and 
Texas, mitigation means the application of the latest building codes to 
the residential structures.8 
Table 2.3 indicates the differences in losses and savings from adop-
tion of mitigation measures for hurricanes with return periods of 100, 
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Table 2.3  Money Saved in Reduced Losses from Full Mitigation for Different Return Periods 
100-year event 250-year event 500-year event 
Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings 
Savings in in reduced in reduced in reduced in reduced in reduced 
Unmitigated reduced losses losses from Unmitigated losses from losses from Unmitigated losses from losses from 
losses from mitigation mitigation losses mitigation mitigation losses mitigation mitigation 
State ($ billions) ($ billions) (%) ($ billions) ($ billions) (%) ($ billions) ($ billions) (%) 
FL 84 51 61 126 69 55 160 83 52 
NY 6 2 39 13 5 37 19 7 35 
SC 4 2 44 7 3 41 9 4 39 
TX 17 6 34 27 9 32 37 12 31 
SOURCE: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009). 
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250, and 500 years for each of the four states we are studying when 
these loss-reduction measures are in place. The analyses reveal that 
mitigation has the potential to reduce losses from future hurricanes by 
amounts ranging from 61 percent in Florida for a 100-year return period 
loss, to 31 percent in the state of Texas for a 500-year return period loss. 
In Florida alone, the use of mitigation leads to a $51 billion reduction in 
losses for a 100-year event and $83 billion for a 500-year event. These 
findings are important given the cost of capital needed to cover the tail 
of the distribution of extreme events. Adoption of mitigation measures 
on residential structures significantly reduces, if not eliminates, this tail 
in each of these four states. 
The challenge, however, lies in making sure residents in hazard-
prone areas invest in these mitigation measures. Indeed, recent extreme 
events have highlighted the challenges associated with reducing losses
from hurricanes and other natural hazards due to what one of us has 
termed the natural disaster syndrome (Kunreuther 1996). Many home-
owners, private businesses, and public sector organizations in hazard-
prone areas do not voluntarily adopt cost-effective loss-reduction mea-
sures, making these areas highly vulnerable and unprepared should a 
severe hurricane or other natural disaster occur. The magnitude of the 
destruction following a catastrophe often leads governmental agencies 
to provide disaster relief to victims even if prior to the event the govern-
ment claimed that it had no intention of doing so. This combination of 
underinvestment in protection prior to the catastrophic event and partial 
financing of the recovery by the general taxpayer can be critiqued on 
both efficiency and equity grounds. 
A range of informal mechanisms explain this natural disaster syn-
drome. One relates to framing the problem imperfectly: experts focus 
on the likelihood and consequences as two key elements of the risk. 
Several studies show, however, that individuals rarely seek out prob-
ability estimates in making their decisions. When these data are given 
to them, decision makers often do not use the information. In one study, 
researchers found that only 22 percent of subjects sought out probabil-
ity information when evaluating several risky managerial decisions. 
People have particular difficulty dealing with probabilistic information 
for small-likelihood events. They need a context in which to evaluate 
the likelihood of an event occurring. They have a hard time gauging 
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how concerned to feel about a 1 in 100,000 probability of death without 
some comparison points. Most people just do not know whether 1 in 
100,000 is a large risk or a small risk. In one study, individuals could 
not distinguish the relative safety of a chemical plant that had an annual 
chance of experiencing a catastrophic accident that varied from 1 in 
10,000 to 1 in 1 million (Kunreuther, Novemsky, and Kahneman 2001). 
There is also evidence that firms and residents tend to ignore risks 
whose subjective odds are seen as falling below some threshold. Prior 
to a disaster, many individuals perceive its likelihood as sufficiently 
low that they contend, “It won’t happen to me.” As a result, they do 
not feel the need to invest voluntarily in protective measures, such as 
strengthening their houses or buying insurance. It is only after the disas-
ter occurs that these same individuals express remorse that they didn’t 
undertake protective measures. 
Individuals also do not invest in protective measures because they 
are highly myopic and tend to focus on the returns for only the next 
couple of years. In addition, there is extensive experimental evidence 
showing that human temporal discounting tends to be hyperbolic, so that 
events in the distant future are disproportionately discounted relative to 
immediate ones. As an example, people are willing to pay more to have 
the timing of the receipt of a cash prize accelerated from tomorrow to 
today than from the day after tomorrow to tomorrow (Loewenstein and 
Prelec 1991). The implication of hyperbolic discounting for mitigation 
decisions is that residents are expected to invest a tangible fixed sum 
now to achieve a future benefit that they instinctively undervalue—and 
that, paradoxically, they hope never to see at all. The effect of placing 
too much weight on immediate considerations is that the upfront costs 
of mitigation will loom disproportionately large relative to the delayed 
expected benefits from loss mitigation over time. 
Extensive evidence indicates that residents in hazard-prone areas 
do not undertake loss-prevention measures voluntarily. A 1974 survey 
of more than 1,000 California homeowners in earthquake-prone areas 
revealed that only 12 percent of the respondents had adopted any pro-
tective measure (Kunreuther et al. 1978). Fifteen years later, there was 
little change despite the increased public awareness of the earthquake 
hazard. In a 1989 survey of 3,500 homeowners in four California coun-
ties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 to 9 percent of the respondents in 
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these areas reported adopting any loss reduction measures (Palm et al. 
1990). Burby et al. (1988) and Laska (1991) have found a similar reluc-
tance by residents in flood-prone areas to invest in mitigation measures. 
In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides compelling 
evidence that actions taken by the federal government, such as con-
structing levees, make residents feel safe, when in fact they are still 
in harm’s way should the levee be breached or overtopped. This prob-
lem is reinforced by local public officials who fail to enforce building 
codes or to impose land-use regulations to restrict development in high-
hazard areas. If developers do not design homes to be resistant to di-
sasters and individuals do not voluntarily adopt mitigation measures, 
one can expect large-scale losses following a catastrophic event, as evi-
denced by the property damage to New Orleans caused by Hurricane 
Katrina. 
Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a 
large number of residents had still not invested in relatively inexpen-
sive loss-reduction measures for their property, nor had they undertaken 
emergency preparedness measures. A survey of 1,100 adults living 
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts conducted in May 2006 revealed that 
83 percent of the responders had taken no steps to fortify their homes, 
68 percent had no hurricane survival kit, and 60 percent had no family 
disaster plan (Goodnough 2006). As noted above, homeowners’ failure 
to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures or to purchase adequate 
insurance coverage if not required to do so stems from behavioral and 
psychological biases. As a means to address these issues, we suggest 
the use of long-term contracts. 
A NEW CONCEPT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-TERM 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
We propose moving from the standard one-year insurance con-
tracts for homeowners and flood insurance for residential properties to 
long-term insurance (LTI) to encourage property owners to invest in 
cost-effective mitigation measures.9 In the case of homeowners cover-
age (which includes protection against the effects of wind damage, but 
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not flood losses), some insurers have recently restricted the sale of new 
homeowners policies in hurricane-prone areas. Policyholders cannot 
help but worry that their existing coverage might be subject to unex-
pected cancellation or very significant premium increases, particularly 
if severe hurricane damage occurs in the near future. 
Need for Long-Term Insurance 
Short-term insurance policies foster significant social costs. 
Evidence from recent disasters reveals that consumers who fail to ad-
equately protect their homes or even insure at all create a welfare cost 
to themselves and a possible cost to all taxpayers in the form of govern-
ment disaster assistance. Under the current U.S. system, the governor of 
a stricken state can request that the president declare a “major disaster” 
and offer special assistance if the damage is severe enough. The num-
ber of presidential disaster declarations has dramatically increased over 
the past 50 years: there were 162 during the period 1955–1965, 282 
during 1966–1975, 319 during 1986–1995, and 545 during 1996–2005 
(Michel-Kerjan 2006). 
The development of LTI should also encourage individuals to in-
vest in cost-effective mitigation measures. As previously pointed out, 
many homeowners do not invest in such measures due to myopia and 
budget constraints. They are unwilling to incur the high upfront cost 
associated with these investments relative to the small premium dis-
count they would receive the following year reflecting the expected 
reduction in annual insured losses (Kunreuther, Meyer, and Michel-
Kerjan, forthcoming). If an LTI policy was coupled with a long-term 
home improvement loan tied to the mortgage, the reduction in insur-
ance premiums would exceed the annual loan payment. LTI coupled 
with long-term mitigation loans over a number of years could yield 
significant social welfare benefits: less damage to property, reduction in 
costs of protection against catastrophic losses by insurers, more secure 
mortgages, and lower costs to the government for disaster assistance. 
Why Does a Market for Long-Term Insurance Not Exist Today? 
In his seminal work on uncertainty and welfare economics, Ken-
neth Arrow defined “the absence of marketability for an action which is 
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identifiable, technologically possible, and capable of influencing some 
individuals’ welfare . . . as a failure of the existing market to provide a 
means whereby the services can be both offered and demanded upon the 
payment of a price” (Arrow 1963). Here we shall discuss several fac-
tors that have contributed to the nonmarketability of LTI for protecting 
homeowners’ property against losses from fire, theft, and large-scale 
natural disasters. We discuss elements that affect both the supply and 
demand sides. 
Supply side 
Today, due to political pressure, insurance rates are frequently re-
stricted to be artificially low in hazard-prone areas, as illustrated by 
Florida’s actions in recent years. As a result, the risks most subject to 
catastrophic losses also become the most unattractive for insurers. This 
premium regulation also results in a second stumbling block: insurers 
are uncertain how much they will be allowed to charge in the future. 
Uncertainty regarding costs of capital and changes in risk over time 
may also deter insurers from providing long-term insurance. In prin-
ciple, of course, insurers could add a component in their premiums to 
account for the costs created by these factors. However, insurance regu-
lators, presumed to be representing consumers’ interests, may not allow 
these costs to be embedded in the approved premiums. Furthermore, it 
is unclear what the voluntary demand for coverage will be, given the 
resulting premiums. In a real sense, a new and less intrusive format 
for government regulation of insurance markets may be required if the 
private sector is to be successful in dealing with time-varying risks and 
capital costs. 
Insurers might also be concerned about possible changes in the level
of risk over time. For example, global warming could trigger more 
intense weather-related disasters, or local environmental degradation 
might change the risk landscape in the next several decades. One way 
to address this concern would be to make contracts renegotiable at a 
specified interval based on new information validated by the scientific 
community, much like renegotiable loans with adjustable rates (e.g., 
every five years). 
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Demand side 
Some homeowners may worry about the financial solvency of their 
insurers over a long period, particularly if they are concerned about 
being locked into an LTI contract. Consumers might also fear being 
overcharged if insurers set premiums that reflect the uncertainty associ-
ated with long-term risks. Furthermore, those who have not suffered 
a loss for 10 years but have a 25-year LTI may feel that the premiums 
are unfairly priced. It is thus essential that the design of an LTI contract 
anticipate these concerns and be transparent to the policyholder. 
Developing an LTI Policy 
Jaffee, Kunreuther, and Michel-Kerjan (2008) have developed a 
simple two-period model in a competitive market setting, where premi-
ums reflect risk, to compare the expected benefits of annual contracts 
versus LTI. The authors show that an LTI policy reduces the marketing 
costs for insurers compared with single-period policies, and also re-
duces the search costs to consumers if their insurer decides to cancel its 
policy at the end of period 1. If an LTI policyholder can cancel at the end 
of period 1 on learning that the cost of a 1-period policy is low enough 
to justify paying a cancellation cost (C), then it is always optimal for 
the insurer to offer an LTI policy and for the consumer to purchase one. 
The insurer will set C at a level that enables it to break even on those 
policies that are canceled before the maturity date. We should note that 
if one is going to develop any type of LTI policy that would be mar-
keted by the private sector, then premiums need to reflect risk (Principle 
1). If insurers can charge prices that enable them to break even, they 
will have incentives to develop new products. Under the current state 
regulatory arrangements, where many insurance commissioners have 
limited insurers’ ability to charge risk-based premiums in hazard-prone 
areas, no insurance company would even entertain the possibility of 
marketing an LTI policy. Insurers would be concerned that the regulator 
would clamp down on them now or in the future regarding what price 
they could charge, so that a long-term contract would be infeasible from 
a financial point of view. 
  
  
 
30 Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 
A NATURAL CANDIDATE FOR LONG-TERM INSURANCE: 
FLOOD INSURANCE THROUGH THE NFIP 
Given the existing tension between state insurance regulators and 
the insurance industry, we feel that it is best politically to introduce 
LTI by focusing on flood insurance, since this coverage is provided by 
the federal government here in the United States. The National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in 1968 as a result of insurers’
refusal to cover this risk because they viewed it as uninsurable. In 2007, 
the NFIP sold over 5.5 million policies (compared to 2.5 million in 
1992) and covered over $1.1 trillion in assets (compared to only $237 
billion in 1992). These figures were stable in 2008 (Michel-Kerjan and 
Kousky, forthcoming). 
It would be useful to consider whether one could make flood in-
surance policies long-term by tying them to mortgages. This practice 
would connect insurance directly to the property, rather than to the
homeowner. One might also consider requiring everyone in flood-prone 
areas to take out the insurance, just as those who own a car are required 
to take out automobile insurance today whether or not they are financ-
ing the purchase of their car. If a homeowner moved to another location, 
the flood insurance policy would remain with the property. 
Why Have a Long-Term Flood Insurance Policy? 
A long-term flood insurance program would offer homeowners cur-
rently residing in flood-prone areas a fixed rate for a fixed period of 
time (e.g., 5, 10, or 20 years). If the homeowner moved away from 
the area before the end of the policy period, then the insurance policy 
would automatically be transferred to the new property owner at the 
same rate. For those homeowners being charged subsidized rates be-
cause their homes were constructed before their community joined the 
NFIP, these rates would be maintained for the length of the policy pe-
riod. For homeowners who constructed homes after their community 
joined the program, rates would be actuarially based. 
For a number of reasons, such a long-term flood insurance policy 
would be a great improvement over the current annual policies from 
the perspective of the relevant stakeholders: homeowners, the Federal 
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Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), banks and financial institu-
tions, and the general taxpayer. Assigning a fixed rate to flood insurance 
would provide financial stability to homeowners. They would also 
know that they are protected against water damage from floods and 
hurricanes. This would reduce the legal problems that have stemmed 
from recent hurricanes (such as the Florida hurricanes of 2004, Katrina, 
and Ike). 
Long-term flood insurance would also ensure the spread of risk 
within the program, since most homeowners in flood-prone areas would 
be covered. Requiring flood insurance for all homeowners residing in 
hazard-prone areas would provide an even larger spread of risk. This 
larger policy base would provide much-needed financial revenue for the 
program over time. 
Long-term policies would prevent individuals from canceling their 
policies after they have not experienced a flood for several years. Some 
individuals currently do this even if they are required to hold the policy 
as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. The banks and financial 
institutions have often not enforced this regulation because few of them 
have been fined or because the mortgages are transferred to banks in 
non-flood-prone regions of the country that have not focused on either 
the flood hazard risk or the requirement that homeowners may have to 
purchase this coverage. Consider the flood in August 1998 that dam-
aged property in northern Vermont. Of the 1,549 victims of this disaster, 
FEMA found 84 percent of the homeowners in Special Flood Hazard 
Areas (SFHAs) did not have insurance, even though 45 percent of these 
individuals were required to purchase this coverage (Tobin and Calfee 
2005). 
If banks offered long-term loans for mitigation, individuals with 
long-term flood insurance policies would be encouraged to invest in 
cost-effective risk reduction measures. To highlight this point, consider 
the following simple example. Suppose a property owner’s investment 
of $1,500 in floodproofing would reduce by $30,000 the water damage 
from a future flood or hurricane with an annual probability of 1 in 100. 
The NFIP should be willing to reduce the annual premium by $300 (i.e., 
1/100 × $30,000) to reflect the lower expected losses that would occur 
if a flood or hurricane hit the area. If the house was expected to last for 
10 or more years, the net present value of the expected benefit of invest-
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ing in this measure would exceed the upfront cost at an annual discount 
rate as high as 15 percent. 
In the current system, many property owners would hesitate to make 
the $1,500 expenditure, because they would get only $300 back next 
year and might consider the benefits over only the next few years when 
making their decisions. If they underweight the future, the expected 
discounted benefits would likely be less than the $1,500 upfront cost. 
In addition, budget constraints could discourage them from investing 
in the mitigation measure. Other considerations that could play a role 
in the decision not to invest in these measures include uncertainty as to 
how long the family will reside in the house and whether their insurer 
would reward them again when their policy is renewed. There may also 
be a failure to appreciate the interdependencies associated with floods, 
earthquakes, and other disasters. That is, investing in mitigation mea-
sures can reduce not only the potential losses to one’s own property but 
the damage to neighboring structures. 
If a 20-year flood insurance policy was tied to the property, then the 
homeowner could take out a 20-year, $1,500 home improvement loan 
linked to the mortgage at an annual interest rate of 10 percent, resulting 
in payments of $145 per year. If the insurance premium was reduced by 
$300, the savings to the homeowner each year would be $155. Alterna-
tively, this loan could be incorporated as part of the mortgage at an even 
lower interest rate than 10 percent. 
Long-term insurance and mitigation loans would constitute new fi-
nancial products. A bank would have a financial incentive to provide 
this type of loan, since it would be better protected against a catastrophic
loss to the property, and the NFIP would know that its potential loss 
from a major disaster had been reduced. Moreover, this scenario would 
reduce the likelihood of large tax-dollar expenditures for disaster relief. 
Indeed, prior to the 2005 hurricane season, which inflicted nearly $18 
billion in flood claims, the NFIP had a cumulative deficit of about $3 
billion after 37 years of operation (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, forth-
coming). LTI thus offers a win-win situation for all. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the 1990s, a series of large-scale catastrophes have inflicted 
historic economic and insured losses. More than half of the 25 most 
costly insured catastrophes worldwide between 1970 and 2008 occurred 
after 2001, and all were natural disasters except for the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks. The United States has been particularly challenged, since 12 of 
these 25 disasters for insurance occurred in this country. The growing 
concentration of population and structures in high-risk areas, combined 
with the potential consequences of global warming, are likely to lead 
to even more devastating catastrophes in the coming years unless cost-
effective risk reduction measures are put in place. 
The challenge facing the United States and many other countries 
is ascertaining how to encourage residents and businesses to invest in 
loss-reduction measures and insurance in advance of a disaster so as to 
avoid the need for large-scale governmental disaster relief after a catas-
trophe occurs. Indeed, even when risk reduction measures are available 
and are cost-effective, many people are still not investing in them. Fol-
lowing a disaster, government agencies provide assistance to the area. 
We term this the natural disaster syndrome. 
Several instances of the natural disaster syndrome have occurred 
in recent years. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many victims 
suffered severe losses from flooding because they had not used mitiga-
tion measures in their homes and did not have flood insurance to cover 
the resulting damage. The affected individuals and communities conse-
quently received an unprecedented level of federal disaster assistance. 
There are many reasons why those in harm’s way have not undertaken 
protective measures in advance of disaster. Many individuals believe 
that the event will not happen to them. In the case of New Orleans, 
some residents may have believed that they were fully protected by 
flood control measures such as the levees.10 Such beliefs have led to 
increased development in hazard-prone areas without appropriate land-
use regulations or properly enforced building codes. In addition, budget 
constraints and short time horizons may limit people’s ability and desire 
to invest in hazard mitigation measures and to purchase insurance. Such 
a dynamic has been observed in many countries around the world. 
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We propose a new initiative that could address these issues: long-
term insurance contracts coupled with long-term loans to encourage 
the adoption of cost-effective mitigation measures and provide stability 
to homeowners. Given the benefits and potential difficulties of imple-
menting such a program, we conclude that flood insurance would be 
a natural candidate for such a long-term program. Given, too, that the 
NFIP is up for renewal in 2010, there may be the political will to de-
velop more effective solutions. 
There is an opportunity for the Obama administration and Congress 
to take steps now to reduce these losses and protect the nation against 
extreme events in a more systematic way than the government has to 
date. We need a more coherent national strategy for managing these 
risks in a new era of catastrophes. 
Notes 
This chapter was originally prepared for the American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research’s conference “Private Markets and Public Insurance Programs,” 
held at the Wohlstetter Conference Center, Washington, DC, January 15, 2009, and 
appears in Public Insurance and Private Markets, Jeffrey R. Brown, ed., AEI Press 
(2010). We would like to thank Jeffrey Brown, David Torregrosa, and other participants 
in the AEI conference for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. We ac-
knowledge support from the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center 
and a grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Office of Preparedness 
Policy, Planning, and Analysis, a division of the National Preparedness Directorate, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Grant #2008-GA-T8-K004). The views and 
opinions expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as represent-
ing the U.S. government or FEMA. 
1. It is quite remarkable that 2007 was the first year that the Economic Report of the 
President devoted a chapter to catastrophic risk insurance. 
2. For a detailed analysis on terrorism insurance by the authors, see Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan (2004), Wharton Risk Center (2005), Michel-Kerjan and Pedell 
(2006), and Michel-Kerjan, Raschky, and Kunreuther (2010). For a detailed analy-
sis of the question of natural disaster insurance and mitigation in the United States, 
see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009). 
3. This figure excludes payment by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) for damage due to 2005 flooding (over $20 billion in claims). 
4. Munich Re and Swiss Re, the two leading reinsurers in the world, do not use the 
same definition of catastrophic losses. Natural disasters inflicting insured losses
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above $38.7 million or total losses above $77.5 million are considered major ca-
tastrophes by Swiss Re. Munich Re uses a higher threshold, which explains the 
difference between Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. For example, when Munich Re esti-
mated insured loss from natural disasters at about $42 billion in 2004, Swiss Re’s 
estimate was over $52 billion. 
5. These numbers vary depending on the definition of “coastal counties” one con-
siders. The less restrictive definition, the one used for the figures in the text and 
applying to 53 percent of the U.S. population, includes lakes. Taking a more re-
strictive definition (i.e., any county that has a coastline bordering the open ocean 
or associated sheltered water bodies or a county that contains V zones—velocity 
flood zones, or areas likely to have floodwaters of great velocity—as defined by 
the National Flood Insurance Program), one still finds that the proportion of the 
population living in such counties is 30 percent (Crowell et al. 2007). 
6. For additional data on the economic impact of future catastrophic hurricanes, see 
Rust and Killinger (2006), sec. 1:13–1:26. 
7. For more details on the scientific evidence regarding climate change and its im-
pact, see Stern (2007). 
8. We are assuming that because these measures are incorporated in building codes 
they are cost-effective. In other words, the discounted long-term expected benefit 
from the mitigation measure over the projected life of the house is greater than its 
upfront costs. By obtaining detailed cost estimates for specific mitigation mea-
sures incorporated in building codes or Florida’s “Fortified . . . for safer living” 
program, one could rank their relative cost-effectiveness. 
9. This section draws heavily on Jaffee, Kunreuther, and Michel-Kerjan (2008). 
10. FEMA clearly thought that the levees would provide this protection. Otherwise it 
would have designated the Lower Ninth Ward as a hazard-prone area and residents 
would have been eligible for flood insurance. 
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Expectations and Unexpected
Consequences of Public 
Policy toward Natural and 
Man-Made Disasters 
Anthony M. Yezer 
George Washington University 
For the purposes of this chapter, I define disasters very generally as 
large, sudden, infrequent occurrences that are difficult to forecast and 
that result in significant economic loss in the form of output, income, 
property, and life. Particular attention is given to disasters that are geo-
graphically concentrated as opposed to events like global depressions. 
This definition is broad enough to cover such disparate events as a re-
gional recession, earthquake, hurricane, drought, oil spill, or terrorist 
attack. 
A general approach to disasters has three advantages. First, the 
principle of parsimony holds that it is desirable to explain as many 
phenomena as possible with a single theory. Second, generality allows 
results developed for one type of disaster event to inform our think-
ing about the economic effects of other disaster types.1 Third, models 
that claim to explain the effects of many different types of disasters are 
much easier to refute than those with few testable implications or with 
narrow predictive power. Theories that are easily refuted should inspire 
the strongest beliefs in other theories where there is an absence of suc-
cessful refutation. Put another way, if someone advances a theory of the 
effects of Hurricane Katrina and claims that it is uniquely appropriate 
for the U.S. Gulf Coast, the theory is not likely to be generally useful 
and, because it is based on a single data point, its ability to account for 
the effects does not indicate that the findings on which it is based are 
statistically significant. 
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Literature on the economic effects of disasters concentrates on mea-
sures of direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are losses associated 
with observable damage to property, production, and persons. Indirect 
effects are costs of recovery and mitigation efforts. Indirect costs are 
more difficult to observe but can be and have been well measured. This 
chapter concerns itself with effects that arise through changes in ex-
pectations. Direct observation of expectations is generally either not 
possible, too expensive, or not precise. Accordingly, expectations mod-
els must generate a number of implications that can provide indirect 
validation of the underlying theory. 
Three disaster expectations models are examined in this paper. First, 
and most direct, is the effect of disaster expectations on local property 
values and economic development. Particular attention is given to the 
possibility that recent disaster experience changes local disaster expec-
tations. This model implies that economic effects of disaster events are 
based on the unanticipated component of disaster events, or on the dif-
ference between actual and expected disaster losses. Second, the effect 
of disaster expectations on incentives to develop land is considered. 
Using models taken from urban economics, it is possible to demon-
strate circumstances under which private returns from development of 
land in hazard-prone areas are less than social returns. Third, disaster 
expectations of property owners should include not only direct damage 
to their own assets but also the possibility of asset revaluation due to 
the external effects of disasters on surrounding property. The findings 
demonstrate that expectations regarding these external effects make 
disaster insurance different from other forms of hazard insurance and 
explain some puzzles about behavior of property owners in disaster-
prone areas. 
The next four sections of the chapter discuss these three models 
of disaster expectations (the direct effect of disaster expectations is 
analyzed in two sections). The final section summarizes the major find-
ings and develops implications of these models for understanding the 
likely effects of changes in public policy toward natural and man-made 
disasters. 
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INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET RESPONSES TO
DISASTER EXPECTATIONS 
There is ample evidence that disaster expectations are priced into 
markets. The most obvious example is insurance against disaster events, 
where pricing is based on sophisticated models of the likelihood that 
events will occur and the estimate of damage, conditional on the event 
happening. Those insurance companies that do not price insurance and 
accumulate reserves using statistical models of disaster expectations do 
not remain solvent for long and can generally be dismissed as curiosi-
ties that have no long-term importance.2 
There is a strong argument that competitive pressures force most 
firms to form and act upon efficient disaster expectations, because they 
must purchase hazard insurance in order to secure capital investment. 
However, the case for household responses to disaster expectations is 
not so obvious. Indeed, there is evidence that households are reluctant 
to purchase insurance against disaster events even when the insurance 
is subsidized. Before discussing models that trace the effect of disasters 
on the economy through their effect on disaster expectations, it is worth 
reviewing the evidence on household responses to disaster expectations. 
Because disasters are infrequent and difficult to forecast, households 
will have difficulty forming expectations regarding their likelihood and 
severity. However, the literature on individual responses to other large, 
low-frequency hazards appears to conclude that the implied value of 
life based on household mitigation behavior is consistent and not unrea-
sonable.3 This suggests that households may have reasonable disaster 
expectations. Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1985) find that house-
holds, confronted with different hazard insurance rates associated with 
location within or near a floodplain, require a compensating differential 
in housing prices to live in areas where the expected cost of flood dam-
age is larger. MacDonald, Murdoch, and White (1987) carry the analysis 
further by modeling the relation between house price discounts and the 
discounted present value of future insurance payments and conclude 
that, at reasonable discount rates, housing price differentials reflect dif-
ferences in expected future insurance premiums. 
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Thus far the evidence discussed deals with cases in which static 
differences in disaster expectations influence household behavior. 
Research has also been done on the effects of changes in disaster ex-
pectations due to the provision of expert information. Brookshire et al. 
(1985) examined the effects on housing prices of the requirement that 
home sellers in California reveal proximity of the housing unit to earth-
quake fault lines. The regulation was passed based on the belief that this 
information was not available to buyers. The natural experiment, with 
observations before and after the information and for houses in and out 
of the fault areas, indicated that the proximity to the fault line affected 
price after the announcement was made.4 
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the economic ef-
fects of disaster information was the response to federal government 
notices of earthquake hazards in the resort community of Mammoth 
Lakes, California, from 1980 until 1984. The unique feature of this 
incident was that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) recog-
nized that making public announcements of changes in the probability 
of seismic events could have serious consequences and implemented 
an experimental design around the pronouncements. The USGS ad-
opted a three-level index of potential hazard and, from 1980 to 1984, 
announced seismic risks for Mammoth Lakes that began with the low-
est and ended at the highest risk level. The results of this experiment, 
as reported in a detailed study by Bernknopf, Brookshire, and Thayer 
(1990), were dramatic. Surveys of the resident population showed that 
there was a substantial increase in perceptions that a seismic event was 
likely after each announcement of increasing risk. Recreational use of 
the area did not fall. However, new construction and house values fell 
significantly. The market response was so dramatic that the USGS de-
cided to abandon its three-level seismic hazard announcement policy.5 
Overall, there is substantial empirical evidence that firms and 
households have significant market responses to information on the 
likelihood of hazard events, whether that information is presented in 
the form of insurance rates or government announcements. This should 
not come as a surprise, and the economic effects of these reactions 
are easily understood and consistent with economic efficiency. When 
increased hazard expectations are capitalized into the asset price of 
real property, construction in hazard-prone areas is discouraged and 
 Public Policy toward Natural and Man-Made Disasters 43 
property owners have an incentive to adopt designs that mitigate the 
likely damage should a disaster occur. All this is unsurprising and well 
established in the literature. Indeed, there is nothing in the foregoing 
discussion that distinguishes market reactions to disasters from the eco-
nomics of hazards generally. 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
DISASTER EXPECTATIONS 
Because disasters are infrequent, large, spatially concentrated, and 
difficult to forecast, there is a possibility that disaster events change 
disaster expectations, and, of course, that failure to experience disasters 
changes expectations in the opposite direction. This is a distinguishing 
characteristic of disasters. 
Hazards that are not infrequent, large, spatially concentrated, or dif-
ficult to forecast have expectations that are not significantly influenced 
by individual hazard events. The fact that a house in a neighborhood 
burns down has zero effect on insurance models or public expectations 
of fire damage hazards. This is true because home fires are frequent, im-
pose modest losses, are not spatially concentrated, and can be forecast 
with great precision. Individual occurrences of an event that is fairly 
likely to happen have little effect on the expected probability of that 
event. 
Because disasters are infrequent and difficult to forecast, firms and 
individuals should use recent history to update their expectations of the 
stochastic process generating the disasters. This was very evident in the 
reaction to hurricane losses in Florida during the 1990s when property 
insurance companies raised rates or withdrew from the market, neces-
sitating the formation of a government-sponsored Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund. This is one of many examples in which it appears 
evident that an increase in the frequency or extent of disaster events 
causes insurance companies to modify stochastic models of disaster 
loss and substantially raise insurance premiums. The natural presump-
tion is that firms and households behave similarly and that in addition 
to the direct and indirect effects of disasters, disaster events have an 
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expectations effect due to the consequences of the modified estimates of 
disaster losses. Such effects might well have negative implications for 
recovery and growth of income, output, population, and so on. 
There is contradictory evidence regarding the effect of disasters 
on expectations based on the relation between disaster experience and 
economic development. In a very influential statistical analysis of di-
saster events, Wright et al. (1979) concludes that the rates of growth are
higher after disasters than before and that long-run growth is higher in 
areas that experience disaster events. An extensive literature has com-
pared economic outcomes in areas with and without disaster events. 
Most recently, Belasen and Polacheck (2008) apply a generalized dif-
ference in difference estimator to counties in Florida over the 1988 to 
2005 period, when the state experienced 19 major storms. They find 
that employment fell by about 4.8 percent and total earnings rose 4.4 
percent in counties experiencing direct hits, while total earnings fell 4.5 
percent in neighboring counties. These differences dissipate over time. 
Studying international disasters, Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner 
(2008) find evidence that countries with higher disaster rates experi-
ence higher rates of subsequent economic growth.6 Further evidence 
presented by Worthington (2008) indicates that natural disaster events 
have no significant effects on overall stock market returns. These and a 
large number of other statistical studies of cross-section and panel data 
on areas with and without disaster events tend to produce evidence that 
disasters are not associated with significant negative effects on output, 
earnings, and employment. One or more of these variables may decline, 
but the type of general negative implication for economic growth that 
would be expected from an upward revision in disaster expectations has 
not been observed. 
There is a parallel literature consisting of case studies conducted in 
the aftermath of disasters. Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) contend that the 
rush of aid in response to the great Alaskan earthquake of 1964 gave an 
area in long-term decline a chance to reverse its falling employment. 
Other case studies have reached similar conclusions. Recently Smith 
et al. (2006) found that the recovery pattern from Hurricane Andrew 
varied by income group, with the numbers of high- and low-income 
households growing in the aftermath of the storm while the number of 
middle-income households fell. While case studies of the aftermath of 
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Katrina are not available yet, it appears certain that income, output, and 
employment will not recover. Still, the general sense of the literature 
reviewed above is that the answer to the question, “Are disasters bad 
for economic growth?” could be “no” or at least “not necessarily.” This 
leads to the subsequent question, “Is postdisaster relief too generous?” 
There is a problem with both of these questions as well as the pro-
posed answer. Understanding the problem and formulating an answer 
will require development of a formal model of the likely effects of 
changed disaster expectations on economic growth. The model begins 
with an understanding of real estate values in an urban land market. 
Because real estate is immobile, differences in future expectations for 
regional economic activity tend to be capitalized in land and housing 
values. There is a well-developed literature on quality of life stemming 
from the work of Rosen (1974) and Roback (1982, 1988) that suggests 
a relation among amenity, house prices, and wages in a labor market 
area. Decreases in amenity are associated with increases in wages and 
decreased house prices in order to keep households from leaving an 
area. A rise in disaster expectations makes an area less attractive to both 
firms and households. Under these circumstances the change in wages 
is ambiguous because there is a spatial no-arbitrage condition for firms 
based on profits and for households based on indirect utility.7 However, 
the theory unambiguously predicts that land and real estate prices will 
fall in response to an increase in disaster expectations. 
Rubin and Yezer (1987) provide a general empirical test of the rela-
tion between disaster events and local economic activity by examining 
the change in house prices in areas experiencing different numbers of 
disasters. For a panel of U.S. cities in 1983, they analyzed the partial 
effect on the asset prices of housing, as reported in the American Hous-
ing Survey for a cross-section of cities, in relation to differences in the 
number of disaster events during the previous 20 years.8 The estimated 
coefficient of disasters was positive, and its magnitude implied that go-
ing from an annual disaster rate of zero to one increased the value of 
owner-occupied housing in the city by 26 percent.9 The authors point 
out that such an interpretation of the estimated coefficient of disasters is 
absurd, and they argue from these results that something is very wrong 
with models that relate the incidence of disaster events to local eco-
nomic development. 
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The literature has documented the effects of information from in-
surance pricing, scientific evidence, and government pronouncements 
on disaster expectations. It is much more difficult to determine the ef-
fect of disasters themselves on disaster expectations. This is perhaps the 
most underresearched aspect of the economics of disasters. A disaster 
event might lower, raise, or leave unchanged disaster expectations of a 
rational agent, depending on the nature of the disaster. Some seismic 
events occur periodically and, given the slow pace of geologic time, 
an eruption today may mean that the next eruption is hundreds of years 
in the future. Alternatively, recent storm damage may lead individuals 
to expect that the underlying frequency of storms has increased due to 
global climate change. 
This paper is particularly concerned with the case in which, given 
the complexity or lack of information on the process generating the 
disaster, agents update their expectations of the frequency distribution 
of disasters based on a comparison of recent disaster experience with 
the historical record. Such updating may occur for two reasons. First, 
individuals may believe that the disaster-generating process varies over 
time and may be trying to estimate the parameters of a stochastic process 
with drift.10 Alternatively, they may believe that disasters are generated 
by a stationary stochastic process and simply use recent experience to 
improve their estimates of the parameters of that distribution. Because 
this second case is easier to describe and has been analyzed in the litera-
ture, it will be considered in some detail here. 
In considering the case of a stable stochastic process, the Poisson 
process is quite attractive because it requires individuals to estimate a 
single parameter, and the probability of a disaster event is independent 
of the time since the last disaster. Cox and Lewis (1966) first suggested 
fitting the Poisson process to disaster events, and Brown (1972) adapted 
it to the case of flooding. Analysis of Bayesian updating of expecta-
tions regarding the Poisson process is mercifully simple. The process 
is based on a single parameter: the expected disaster frequency, f. The 
expected time between disasters, T, is the reciprocal of f; that is, T = 
1/f. Assume that the historical record available at time t indicates that 
α disasters were observed over the previous τ years. Then the estimate 
of f at time t is simply the ratio ft = α / τ. Now assume that, in the next 
X years, β additional disasters occur. Then the Bayesian estimate of f at 
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time t + X is ft + X = (α + β) / (τ + X). The change in estimated disaster 
frequency between t and t + X is given by 
f  f x  f  [(  ) /(  X)]  [ / ] 
 [ /(  X)]  [ /(  X)](X / ) 
 [ (X / )]/(  X). 
This final expression has a very intuitive interpretation. The change 
in expected disaster frequency is equal to the difference between actual 
disaster experience during the recent period of X years, β, and expected 
number of disasters based on the previous τ years, α(X / τ), divided by 
the total number of years under consideration, X + τ. Thus this change 
represents the difference between actual and expected disasters per year 
of disaster history available to the individual making the estimate. 
Rubin and Yezer (1987) discuss whether the difference between ac-
tual and expected disasters could help explain the more rapid increase 
in house prices in cities that had more disasters. Dividing the 20-year 
period over which presidential disaster declarations were observed in 
their cross-section of cities into a 16-year “history” that served as the 
basis for estimates of disaster expectations and a subsequent 4 years of 
recent experience, they computed the difference between the number of 
actual and expected disasters in the recent period and reestimated the 
model of house price change discussed above. The disaster rate for the 
entire period still had a positive sign, but the difference between actual 
and expected disasters (i.e., the number of unexpected disasters) had a 
substantial negative effect on house values. 
How should these results be interpreted? It appears that during this 
period, cities where disaster expectations were higher were growing 
faster than those where disaster expectations were lower. Given that cit-
ies with higher disaster expectations have more disasters, this produced 
a positive association between house price growth and the disaster rate. 
This association is of no particular significance unless there is further 
evidence that the growth of cities in areas with higher disaster rates is 
being subsidized. Put another way, the literature on the relation between 
area economic growth and disaster frequency does not reveal the effects 
of disasters on growth because most disasters are anticipated. Develop-
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ment takes place in high-disaster areas only in anticipation of future 
damage, and that expected damage is part of the cost of doing business 
in those areas. “What is the effect of disasters on economic growth?” 
is a vexed question. The appropriate question is, “What is the effect of 
unanticipated disasters on economic growth?” 
The effect of unanticipated disasters on house values found by 
Rubin and Yezer (1987) is substantial. Consider an area that had no 
previous disaster experience and then had one disaster during the four-
year event window; that is, it had one unanticipated disaster. This would 
lower house values by 2 percent. This change may not seem large; how-
ever, in a city with 500,000 housing units with an average value of 
$200,000, the change in expectations due to the single unanticipated 
disaster event lowers total house values by $2 billion! This is only one 
example of how the effects of unanticipated disasters can be large com-
pared to the direct damage and indirect recovery costs. 
The implications for public policy of these substantial effects on 
local economies of changes in disaster expectations based on disas-
ter events will be discussed in some detail in a subsequent section. It 
should be clear that disasters that have the same direct and indirect ef-
fects in terms of damages to property, income, output, and individuals 
have very different long-term local effects depending on the extent to 
which they were anticipated. Furthermore, while it is possible, at least 
in theory if not in practice, to insure against direct and even some indi-
rect losses due to disaster events, insuring against losses due to changed 
expectations is impossible. Indeed, it is likely that firms and households 
in areas with high disaster expectations are well insured against direct 
and indirect losses, whereas those in areas where expectations are low 
are unlikely to insure against these insurable losses. Thus the overall 
uninsured losses from unanticipated disasters are likely to be very large. 
It should also be obvious that the economic effects of man-made di-
sasters, particularly acts of terrorism, are best understood in terms of 
changes in expectations.11 Other things being equal, those terrorist acts 
that produce damages of a type or in a location where expectations were 
low have the largest economic effects. These considerations will prove 
very important in the discussion of policy implications. 
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Disaster Expectations and Efficient Land Use and Mitigation 
Most of the literature on disaster expectations and efficient eco-
nomic development deals with excess development and insufficient 
mitigation efforts in areas where disaster frequencies are high. This 
problem has been the object of congressional testimony and reports as 
well as academic inquiry.12 Once disaster relief became a regular and 
mandated part of federal policy, there was an incentive for states, lo-
calities, and individuals to self-insure development in hazardous areas. 
The normal disincentives to such development—namely, the prospect 
of loss and the cost of insurance—were mitigated by the prospect of 
postdisaster relief.13 Concern over this problem has led to a number 
of initiatives, including the National Flood Insurance Program, which 
dealt with excess development and inadequate mitigation by combining 
disaster relief provisions with mandatory insurance and design require-
ments. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 promoted state 
and local planning efforts to control and direct development, and the 
Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 attempted to deter development 
by cutting off federal funding to designated areas that had high disaster 
probability and environmental sensitivity. 
The general sense of the literature appears to be that government 
policy for disaster relief is subject to the Samaritan’s dilemma: these 
efforts create major problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
time inconsistency that encourage development and discourage miti-
gation in disaster-prone areas.14 Mandatory insurance, design controls, 
mandatory mitigation, and even designation of areas in which govern-
ment assistance will not be provided are generally seen as the proper 
response to the distortions produced by disaster relief programs. 
This section focuses on an issue that has attracted negligible inter-
est in the literature: spatial land market models suggesting that there is 
too little development in areas where disaster expectations are high. The 
overdevelopment literature discussed above tends to ignore issues of 
space and location that are governed by the functioning of the land mar-
ket. Because land subject to high disaster risk is spatially concentrated, 
the development of significant areas is contingent on the treatment of 
disaster losses. Frame (1998, 2001) has considered this issue explicitly, 
as follows. Take the land market in a standard urban model in which 
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land at a particular location has special value based on unique locational 
advantages, such as the central business district of a city or a shoreline 
location. For simplicity’s sake call this the high-productivity area. Land 
rents will peak at such points and decline with distance. What happens 
if some of the land at or near the peak of this land rent surface is not 
developed because it is subject to flooding or some other hazard that 
would inflict substantial damage on real property? Frame demonstrates 
that this undeveloped land yields a general loss of community welfare 
because the area as a whole is less efficient at providing developed sites 
with access to the high-productivity area. This result holds even if the 
high-hazard area does not impede through access; for example, if the 
area lacks housing but highways can be built through it to transport 
workers or consumers from distant points to the high-productivity area. 
More recently Liu (2008) has examined the relation between the 
private and social returns from developing land in and around high-
productivity areas. The private gain from developing land in hazardous 
areas is the difference in value between undeveloped and developed 
land. Part of the development process is the opportunity for mitigation, 
and the assumption is that insurance markets are available or that de-
velopers are risk-neutral. His results are quite intuitive. If there are no 
externalities associated with the functioning of a perfectly competitive 
land market, private benefit from development of land subject to haz-
ards is equal to the social benefit, and private land market allocations are 
socially efficient. However, if there are externalities in the operation of 
the land market, particularly problems of traffic congestion, social ben-
efit can be significantly larger than private benefit. Using a numerical 
urban simulation model with congestion calibrated to Kansas City, Liu 
finds that the social value of development near central city areas is ap-
proximately twice the private benefit realized by the land owner.15 This 
means that land subject to hazards could have too little development. 
McDonald (2009), in a similar model calibrated to Chicago, confirms 
the general result that, in the presence of congestion, private benefits to 
development of land near the central business district are significantly 
below social benefits. While he does not relate these results to effects of 
hazards, the arguments made here would hold in his model also.16 
Nothing in this discussion of the land market models and the pos-
sibility of underdevelopment of high disaster risk areas should be seen 
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as a contradiction of the literature on incentives for excess development 
due to moral hazard arising from federal disaster relief programs.17 
However, land market efficiency considerations do suggest that, in 
some circumstances, there are countervailing forces that tend to restrict 
development below optimal levels in areas that are prone to disasters. 
Accordingly, such areas should be given careful attention to determine 
which of the conflicting forces is larger. 
Disaster Expectations, External Effects, and Disaster Insurance 
One puzzle in the disaster literature involves the reluctance of 
households in high-risk areas to purchase insurance even if the price 
appears to be below expected losses. The failure to use subsidized in-
surance has troubled many observers. Kunreuther (1978) noted that, 
in the first four years of the National Flood Insurance Program (1968– 
1972), only 3,000 of 21,000 eligible communities with substantial 
flooding history participated in the program, and fewer than 300,000 
homeowners voluntarily purchased a policy. Even though the NFIP was 
subsidized, participation was initially achieved only by threatening to 
withhold federally assisted or guaranteed construction from nonpartici-
pating communities, and by denying mortgage loans to property owners 
in nonparticipating communities that were identified as special flood 
hazard areas.18 Palm et al. (1990) documented a similar failure of home-
owners and mortgage lenders to seek earthquake insurance in high-risk 
areas. Kunreuther and Kleffner (1992) and Kunreuther (1996) have 
even argued that homeowners do not behave as if they are maximizing 
expected utility in their decisions to purchase insurance or engage in 
private mitigation efforts. 
The discussion of disaster insurance is generally conducted using 
models standard in the insurance literature. A household owns an asset 
whose current value is A which is subject to expected damages of D
A 
so that its expected value in the next period is A − D
A 
with variance V
D
. 
The variance in A − D
A 
is due to the possibility that the hazard event 
might occur during the current time period. Given that the expected 
value of damage due to the hazard is generally known to be D
A
, the 
household can purchase hazard insurance at a price of D
A 
+ F, where 
F is the normal fee associated with providing this insurance product 
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under perfect competition. Households have a choice of purchasing full 
insurance or no insurance. What are the consequences for wealth in the 
next period? Expected wealth under full insurance is A − (D
A 
+ F), with 
certainty compared to expected wealth of A − D
A 
with variance V
D 
with-
out insurance. Insurance reduces the variance in return to zero because 
the insurance payment is perfectly correlated with the damage to asset 
value. Households that are moderately risk averse will choose insur-
ance, and there is no reason to assume that households owning property 
in disaster-prone areas are not moderately risk averse.19 This line of 
argument has treated disaster risk the same as other risks to property, 
such as fire, liability, collision, or theft. 
One distinguishing characteristic of disasters, as defined in this es-
say, is the extent and spatial concentration of damage. In terms of the 
simple example above, any damage to asset value A is likely associated 
with damage experienced by the full alphabet of asset values owned by 
other households in the area. In this case, the fall in wealth experienced 
by the household is equal to A − (D
A 
+ E
A
), where E
A 
is the external ef-
fect of disaster damage to other properties in the area on the value of the 
asset. Assume that V
E 
and r
ED 
are the variance of E and the correlation 
between E and D respectively. A household that purchases insurance 
has expected wealth of A − (D
A 
+ F + E
A
) with variance V
E 
, and the 
household that self-insures has expected wealth of A − (D
A
+ E
A
) and 
)0.5variance of (V
D 
+ V
E
)/2 + r
ED 
(V
E
V
D 
. The variance in second-period 
wealth of those who purchase insurance depends crucially on r
ED
. Con-
sider the stylized but not unreasonable case in which V
D 
is equal to V
E 
and r
ED 
equals one, so that the external damage is perfectly correlated 
with the damage to the structure. Then the variance becomes 2V
D 
and 
the risk of self-insuring has doubled. In this case, the household has the 
choice between two risky alternatives but, again abstracting for other 
opportunities for risk diversification, the moderately risk-averse house-
hold is likely to have a risk premium greater than F and will choose to 
purchase insurance. Now consider the other extreme, in which V
D 
is 
equal to V
E 
and r
ED 
equals −1. The household that self-insures has ex-
pected second-period wealth of A − (D
A
+ E
A
) and variance of zero. This 
household thus will rationally self-insure unless insurance is heavily 
subsidized. Indeed, there is a separating equilibrium for r
ED 
sufficiently 
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small that even very risk-averse households switch from buying to not 
buying insurance. 
The incentive to purchase insurance and the effects of mandatory 
insurance depend on the relative sizes of D
A 
and E
A 
and particularly on 
the sign and size of r
ED
. Given that the indirect effects of disasters take 
the form of a local public good, it may appear that this correlation is 
positive and close to one. However, one line of argument suggests r
ED 
is negative. If a structure is damaged but the damage is less than that of 
surrounding structures, then the rental price of its services may well rise 
because the disaster reduces the supply of real property for a significant 
period after the event. Furthermore, the reduction in real property may 
be permanent. 
Perhaps the most obvious case for a negative r
ED 
is that of beach 
property located in the third or fourth row of homes from the shoreline. 
In most beach communities, there is a sharp decline in value as distance 
from the shoreline increases: that is, value varies inversely with row. In 
storm events, most damage is experienced by the first and second rows. 
In some cases, the first row cannot be rebuilt due to shoreline erosion, 
and each subsequent row then moves up the value gradient. Put another 
way, the third row is one large hurricane away from being beachfront 
property. 
This simple model illustrates that, if there are significant external 
effects that are negatively correlated with private damages, the effect of 
insurance on economic development becomes rather complex. As noted 
above, many property owners will fail to insure even if insurance pric-
ing is based on shared expectations of future damages. The provision of 
such insurance benefits those owners whose expected external effects 
are either small or positively correlated with private damages. It does 
not benefit owners with large external effects that are negatively cor-
related with damages. Therefore, mandating disaster insurance for all 
property owners imposes net costs on owners of properties with signifi-
cant external effects that are negatively correlated with damages. This 
leads to the surprising result that mandatory purchase requirements for 
insurance that is priced based on expected damages distorts asset prices 
and property development by lowering asset prices for properties with 
large external effects that are negatively correlated with damages. 
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The example noted of beach property in different rows may offer a 
test of the theoretical arguments made above. The nature of external ef-
fects should vary significantly with distance from the shoreline. Given 
that the hazard is storm damage by wind and waves, it is likely that 
private damage in the first row will be much larger than any external 
effects and that external effects will be positively correlated with dam-
ages.20 Moving back to the second and third rows of property, these 
relative effects are likely to be reversed. Shoreline erosion may imperil 
the first row, but it simply makes inland areas more proximate to the 
beach. Damages to interior areas are very likely to be smaller than in 
the first row. Overall it appears that shoreline areas provide an excellent 
natural experiment to assess the varying importance of private damages 
versus external effects for economic activity. 
The difficulty with testing the effects of private damage and external 
effects on investment in beach property is that the test requires differ-
entiating among rows of beach development: that is, the geographic 
scale is very small. Testing for insurance effects is further complicated 
because the current NFIP has been in place in most beach communities 
since the mid-1980s, so insurance coverage has not varied significantly 
in recent years. The most direct way to measure effects of insurance 
coverage is to look for capitalization in asset prices by monitoring the 
variation in house values by row and over time. Some research on the 
effects of government policy on beachfront residential development 
has been done using hedonic house value equations (Keeler, Kriesel, 
and Landry 2003), repeat sale house price indexes (Cordes, Gatzlaff, 
and Yezer 2001), and building permits issued (Cordes and Yezer 1998). 
Unfortunately, none of these techniques is suitable for tracking devel-
opment effects on shoreline property based on distance in feet from the 
water’s edge in beach communities over the period extending from be-
fore the NFIP through its current form. Such an analysis would require 
price or permit data going back to 1968 differentiated by row from the 
shoreline. No such data are available. 
Cordes, Yezer, and Asadurian (2008) found another way to test 
for the differential effects of flood insurance by row from the beach-
front. Property records include the number of square feet of interior 
space of dwellings and the date that the housing was built. Using aerial 
photographic maps, they were able to divide beach developments into 
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rectangles corresponding to development rows whose land area is fixed 
and measurable. Using building records that gave the number of square 
feet of interior space in each dwelling in a rectangle, it was possible to 
construct a time series going back to 1968 of the square feet of interior 
space per square foot of land area, commonly known as the “floor/area 
ratio.” The result of this effort was a 40-year time series of the capital/ 
land ratio in each rectangle for the period from 1968 to 1997. The maps 
also facilitated calculation of distance of each row from the water’s 
edge and, together with information on erosion rates, this allowed com-
putation of estimated time until erosion undermined the structures in a 
given rectangle.21 
Each beachfront community entered into the NFIP in two stages. 
First it entered the emergency program, where flood insurance was 
heavily subsidized, and then, after completion of a flood insurance map 
(FIRM), it entered the regular program, in which insurance subsidies 
for new construction were much smaller or nonexistent.22 Given that 
the various communities entered these two phases in different years, 
the data include observations of communities with and without each 
of the programs in any given year as well as before and after infor-
mation for each community. The estimation results demonstrated that 
entering both the emergency and regular NFIP had the effect of tilting 
real property development toward the shoreline. The rate of growth in 
density, measured as floor/area ratio, increased the most in the first row, 
but this positive effect fell off rapidly, reaching zero at a distance of 
350 feet from the water’s edge. The effect was large, statistically sig-
nificant, and congruent with the theoretical prediction that programs 
mandating insurance encourage development in areas where the exter-
nal effects of hazards are negligible or positively correlated with the 
private damage—the first rows of shoreline development. At the same 
time, mandatory insurance programs discourage development in areas 
where the external effects of hazards are large or negatively correlated 
with private damage—rows located inland. 
Thus it appears that the existence of expectations that disasters 
are associated with both private damage and external effects creates 
the paradoxical possibility that mandating universal purchase of insur-
ance based on expected private damage estimates distorts the location 
of economic activity toward areas where expected hazard losses are 
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higher. While this may appear counterintuitive, it does explain the dif-
ficulty in getting some households in high-risk areas to participate in 
the NFIP. 
IMPLICATIONS OF DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
Formal models of the economic effects of natural and man-made 
disasters should include careful modeling of expectations, because 
the prior level of disaster expectations, and any resulting changes in 
the expectations, are very important determinants of those economic 
effects. This essay has developed some of the pathways relating expec-
tations and economic effects, but other important linkages in need of 
research may exist. Nevertheless, the analysis presented here is suffi-
cient to demonstrate some important principles whose implications for 
public policy toward disasters will be discussed, including the effects 
of changed disaster expectations, efficient land use considerations, and 
potential distortions due to mandated insurance and mitigation. 
Changes in Disaster Expectations 
The economic effects of disasters depend on the relation between 
prior expectations and actual disaster experience. This is illustrated in 
the literature on the effects of earthquakes on property values and di-
saster expectations. Beron et al. (1997) find that property values near 
fault lines actually rose after the Loma Prieta earthquake and argue that 
prior expectations were too high. In contrast, Naoi, Seko, and Sumita 
(2009) report that for earthquakes in Japan, surveys show that quake 
expectations double after an event and property values fall significantly. 
If actual disasters reflect disaster expectations, then those expectations 
will be unchanged and negative expectations’ effects on economic de-
velopment should be minor. The economic effects of a disaster depend 
not only on how much damage it does but also the extent to which the 
disaster event and the associated damage were anticipated. Furthermore, 
it is not possible for firms and households to insure against the eco-
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nomic losses associated with changed expectations after unanticipated 
disasters. What does this imply for public policy? First, it suggests that 
insurance markets are inherently incomplete and that there is a role for 
postdisaster aid. However, the aid should be focused on areas experi-
encing unanticipated disaster events. 
While such selective targeting of disaster relief to unanticipated di-
sasters is likely politically impossible, some elements of disaster relief 
policy seem consistent with a focus on events that raise expectations. 
First, there is a scale effect in disaster declarations, so larger disasters 
get proportionally greater postdisaster compensation.23 To the extent 
that unusually large disaster events are unanticipated, making federal 
participation a nonlinear function of the size of the aggregate losses is 
appropriate. Furthermore, NFIP aid diminishes for repeated flooding 
events. The subsidized insurance for grandfathered structures can be 
withdrawn after repeated losses. Finally, the amount of publicity and 
attention given to disaster events may decrease to the extent that the 
event is regular and anticipated. This may lower the amount of public 
and private aid following such events. Certainly, more could be done 
with formal policies toward postdisaster aid to concentrate public funds 
on unanticipated disaster events, but in this case political expediency 
likely will triumph over economic logic. 
Another implication of the losses associated with unanticipated 
disasters is that terrorists who wish to inflict maximum total damage 
for a given amount of physical damage will concentrate their actions 
where damage is not anticipated. There are many other considerations in 
selecting targets, but areas where disaster expectations are low have two 
advantages. First, victims will likely not be taking precautions. This 
makes success in inflicting damage more likely, and perhaps also lowers 
the probability of apprehension and sanction if that is a consideration. 
Second, the unexpected component of the disaster event is largest in 
areas where prior expectations are lowest. In this case the implications 
for public policy are clear and, fortunately, the politically expedient 
course does not tend toward moral hazard. Provision of generous relief 
from damages lowers the expectation of loss from man-made disasters. 
This lowers the economic effects because the economic reaction will 
depend both on the change in expectations of the probability of loss and 
on the expectation of the size of loss conditional on the act taking place. 
  
 
 
 
58 Yezer 
Relief can do nothing about the change in probability, but it can lower 
the conditional expectation of loss and hence the economic effects pro-
duced by the change in expectations.24 
Incentives for Efficient Land Use and Mitigation 
The moral hazard and time inconsistency problems associated with 
federal provision of disaster relief are well understood.25 Indeed, the 
cornerstone of disaster policy since the passage of NFIP has been to re-
solve the Samaritan’s dilemma by forcing those developing property in 
hazardous areas to face an insurance price that reflects expected future 
losses and required mitigation to control those losses. Insurance and 
mitigation costs, in turn, discourage development. 
Because hazards are spatially concentrated, public policy toward 
disasters has an important effect on when and how densely significant 
tracts of land are developed. When this issue is considered in terms of a 
continuous land market model, it is important that the private incentives 
to develop land in hazardous areas be consistent with the social benefits 
from such development. If land is homogenous, private benefit equals 
social benefit and private landlords should develop land only when the 
private returns to development are sufficient to compensate for the cost 
of development, including any expected disaster losses. However, all 
land is not homogenous, and there may well be externalities associated 
with land development, particularly in an urban setting where acces-
sibility is important and transportation systems are congested. Under 
such circumstances the social benefit from developing sites may exceed 
the private benefit, and landlords may fail to develop land or may do so 
at a density that is below the social optimum. In these circumstances, 
public action to subsidize mitigation or insurance can be justified. 
There are many examples of public policy efforts to subsidize 
development of hazard-prone land in an urban context. Many com-
munities have used general public funding for flood control and land 
reclamation efforts.26 The arguments made in this essay suggest that 
there is an economic rationale for these actions and that public subsidy 
calls for a demonstration of social benefits in excess of private benefits. 
In cases where subsidized mitigation is not feasible or not economical, 
provision of subsidized insurance can also align private and social ben-
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efits from development. Such policies must be implemented with some 
care, because political abuse by subsidizing development where there is 
no externality is also possible. 
External Effects and Disaster Insurance 
Because disaster effects are spatially concentrated, the usual insur-
ance model should be applied cautiously in developing the economic 
effects of disaster insurance. When disaster strikes, owners of prop-
erty suffer private damage and insurance compensates for those losses. 
Insurance is also available for some of the disruption following the 
disaster—that is, for the indirect effects of the disaster. It is easy to con-
struct an argument for mandatory participation in an actuarially sound 
disaster insurance program, particularly when the government is com-
mitted to providing relief services. 
This argument ignores external effects of disasters on asset prices 
in an area. One can easily identify situations in which these external ef-
fects are positive and offset the private losses. This explains why some 
property owners in hazardous areas rationally fail to purchase hazard 
insurance, even when the insurance is subsidized. Public policies that 
mandate purchase of actuarially fair insurance in such cases will distort 
the pattern of economic development toward areas where expected pri-
vate losses are high compared to any external effects. These may well 
be the areas where disaster damage expectations are highest. The end 
result could be to encourage the movement of economic development 
into harm’s way. 
This does not mean that it is necessary to abandon public policies 
of mandating the purchase of disaster insurance. It does suggest that 
the case for mandating purchase should be very strong. In such cases, 
it should be possible to provide insurance at rates that are higher than 
actuarially fair in areas where external effects are positively correlated 
with private losses and at a discount to fair rates where external effects 
are negatively correlated with private losses. Identification of these 
areas need not involve substantial economic analysis: they should be 
apparent based on patterns of participation in voluntary insurance pro-
grams or even in our current “mandated” programs by observing areas 
where actual participation rates are either very high or very low. 
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Overall, models that integrate expectations of natural and man-
made disasters into the body of economic theory suggest that public 
policy toward these events needs to be carefully considered. The great 
difficulty facing the federal government is the general presumption that 
programs and policies need to be nationally uniform. Considerations of 
economic efficiency appear to run counter to this presumption. 
Notes 
1. There is currently a national need to understand the effects of terrorist events. In 
the absence of the ability to extend results from other types of disasters to terror-
ism, this understanding would have to wait for a significant number of terrorist 
incidents to accumulate to provide a database suitable for testing. This is not a 
happy prospect. 
2. This is not to say that the consequences of failure to price risk correctly are unin-
teresting or unimportant. Surely the credit default insurance industry of the past 
decade has had large negative economic effects, and so the “solution” to risk can 
itself result in a disaster event if that solution is unsound. These issues are beyond 
the scope of this paper, which assumes that insurance pricing is based on the latest 
and best estimates of risk. 
3. See, for example, the recent discussion by Hakes and Viscusi (2007). 
4. In this case proximity to a fault line was not indicated by insurance rates in ways 
that would make it apparent to home buyers. Indeed, the provision of earthquake 
insurance in California has been problematic for some time now for reasons that 
would easily justify an essay of considerable length. 
5. The subsequent absence of a seismic event of any size proved embarrassing to the 
USGS, and there were threats of litigation by property owners. 
6. The conclusion is somewhat more nuanced, as the authors find that the higher growth 
rate postdisaster depends on the initial economic circumstances of the country. 
7. A rise in disaster expectations lowers expected profits or raises insurance costs for 
firms, which then require compensation in the form of lower wages and/or lower 
rents. The same rise lowers indirect utility of households, and they require com-
pensation in the form of higher wages and/or lower rents. The change in wages is 
ambiguous but rents, and hence property values, must fall. 
8. Specifically, they estimated a standard hedonic model for the logarithm of house 
value explained by a variety of housing characteristics standard in the literature but 
with area disasters added. 
9. A disaster event is defined as one that resulted in a presidential disaster declara-
tion. The disaster variable is the number of disaster declarations in the previous 15 
years divided by 15 to produce an annual rate. 
10. Recent attention to climate change may lead individuals to believe that the fre-
quency of disasters is changing. Whether this belief is scientifically valid or not, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Public Policy toward Natural and Man-Made Disasters 61 
those who hold it will be updating based on an underlying stochastic model that 
allows for drift. Further research on this possibility is warranted. 
11. These statements are based on an implicit model in which the supply of terrorist 
acts is elastic. Models with a fixed supply of terrorist events, such as those de-
scribed in Barker (2003), may result in different implications than those discussed 
in this paper. 
12. For an extensive discussion see Congressional Research Service (1992). 
13. See, for example, the analysis in Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1985). 
14. Moral hazard arises in the form of the Samaritan’s dilemma. Individuals fail to 
insure or mitigate because they expect government postdisaster relief. Adverse 
selection problems occur if individuals with unrealistic expectations for disaster 
probabilities selectively migrate to hazardous areas. The time inconsistency prob-
lem arises when individuals believe that, by moving to a hazardous area, they 
can prompt public expenditures to mitigate the hazard by governments anxious to 
conserve on disaster relief cost. In other words, move onto the floodplain and the 
government will be forced to build a dam or levee at public expense. 
15. Congestion in commuting is endogenous in this model. Given highway capacity, 
the model generates congestion based on the number of individuals choosing to 
commute through a particular segment of the city. 
16. Chicago presents an interesting historical case because the portion of the city north 
of Lake Street is built on fill land that was created to realize the high social return 
of filling in the shore of Lake Michigan. 
17. In addition to the standard arguments about excess development in high-risk ar-
eas already discussed, there is a more general literature on excess investment in 
real property, particularly second homes, based on the tax preference for owner-
occupied housing; see Poterba and Sinai (2008). 
18. While the subsidy component of NFIP insurance for new construction is not large, 
the subsidy for existing units built before the insurance was implemented is very 
large. Furthermore, lenders are required to check for flood insurance in connec-
tion with mortgage servicing. Kriesel and Landry (2004) report survey evidence 
indicating that the participation rate is only 49 percent in spite of the mandate that 
mortgage servicers require evidence of insurance in force. 
19. Evidence for the degree of risk aversion could be gleaned from portfolio behavior 
of households based on property ownership. It has been argued that perception of 
risk from hazards is selectively faulty or that households owning property in areas 
with high disaster probability are selected to be those who systematically under-
estimate the hazard. 
20. Damages in interior areas may impede recovery and repair in shoreline areas as 
well as raise the cost of these activities. 
21. Obviously, beach erosion can sometimes be zero or even negative, i.e., the beach is 
accreting. In such cases estimated erosion time is infinite. The areas considered in 
this study are all beaches and subject to erosion. They are not protected by natural 
or man-made barriers. The potential for storm damage is substantial in these areas. 
22. New construction was also subject to special construction requirements designed 
to raise vulnerable structures above flood surge levels. 
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23. Note that there is an element of size needed even to qualify for a presidential di-
saster declaration. 
24. To the extent that the object of terrorism is to produce the greatest economic dis-
location possible through the expectations effect, lowering the expectations effect 
reduces the returns to terrorism. 
25. For an early discussion of these issues along with an estimate of the wealth redis-
tribution effects of the NFIP, see Shilling, Sirmans, and Benjamin (1989). 
26. The reclaimed land is then sold back to the private sector at a loss. Policy toward 
urban brownfields follows a similar pattern. 
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The Economics of Disaster 
Retrospect and Prospect 
Hal Cochrane 
Colorado State University 
In preparing this chapter, I initially wrote that the economics of 
hazards and disaster is a subfield of environmental economics. Upon re-
flection, I crossed that out, replacing it with “the economics of hazards 
is a subfield of no less than five major fields, including behavioral eco-
nomics, finance, regional economics, public finance, and environmental 
economics.” This of course made the retrospective a bit daunting, espe-
cially for a chapter of this length. So, in looking back over the last 40 
years, I culled a few key ideas that were influential in shaping disaster 
research over this formative period. 
When it came to providing a prospective view, I took the easy path. 
I limited my coverage to the field that has absorbed my efforts over the 
past 30 years: that is, the regional and national economic consequences 
of disaster. 
SOME HISTORY 
The beginnings of this field can be traced back as far as John Stuart 
Mill, who, I am embarrassed to admit, preempted much of what I will 
present in the second half of the paper. Nearly 150 years ago Mill re-
marked about the economics of disaster, commenting on “what has so 
often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover 
from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all 
traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the 
ravages of war” (quoted in Hirshleifer 1987, p. 79). 
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Almost a century later, John Kenneth Galbraith corroborated Mill’s 
observations. As director of the Strategic Bombing Survey, Galbraith 
investigated the impact of Allied bombing raids on the German war 
machine. The survey concluded that the raids had had little impact. 
Hamburg recovered nearly 80 percent of its productive capacity within 
several months after a series of devastating attacks. The bombing raids 
virtually decimated the city’s infrastructure, killed nearly 40,000 people 
and destroyed 50 percent of the city’s buildings (Hirshleifer 1987). De-
spite these losses, production was only modestly affected. 
These early roots provide a glimpse of the field’s beginnings. How-
ever, it wasn’t until the 1960s that four publications helped launch the 
field: The Economics of Natural Disasters: Implications for Federal 
Policy (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969), Design of Water-Resource Sys-
tems (Maass et al. 1962), A Unified National Program for Managing 
Flood Losses (U.S. Congress 1966), and “Losses from Natural Haz-
ards” (Russell 1970). Dacy and Kunreuther provided key insights into 
the economic consequences of disasters (in this case the 1964 Alaskan 
earthquake). Design of Water-Resource Systems set down the proce-
dures for conducting benefit-cost studies of water projects. A Unified 
National Program for Managing Flood Losses encouraged the adop-
tion of a wider range of flood mitigation measures (at least wider than 
the system of levees and reservoirs the Corps of Engineers had pro-
moted prior to that time) and introduced the idea that flood insurance 
might serve as a mechanism to promote an efficient means of coping 
with flood hazards. The word might is emphasized since the document 
was wary about insurance, for it was pointed out that an improperly 
structured insurance program could make things worse. These three 
publications provided enough starter material to employ a (very) small 
army of economists for the next 40 years. 
From what I gather, Cliff Russell’s classic “Losses from Natural 
Hazards” grew out of his association with the Harvard Water Resources 
Program and his collaboration with Bob Kates. This association was 
key since Bob Kates, Gilbert White, and Ian Burton are widely rec-
ognized as the field’s pioneers. Russell’s piece served to convert the 
basics of water resource economics into the economics of hazard man-
agement. In short, he showed that protection from natural events should 
be adopted so long as the expected marginal benefit (the loss avoided 
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due to protection) exceeded the expected marginal cost of that protec-
tion. In hindsight this is not a startling finding, and a direct line can be 
drawn back to Harvard, particularly the work of Arthur Maass, May-
nard M. Hufschmidt, Robert Dorfman, Harold A. Thomas Jr., Stephan 
A. Marglin, and Gordon Maskew Fair. Despite its simplicity, the idea 
proved to be a powerful reminder that hazards management involves a 
balance between costs and losses. 
It could be said that Russell’s work was foreshadowed by two ear-
lier papers, one by Lester Lave (1963) and the other by Richard Nelson 
and Sidney Winter (1964). Although their work did not address haz-
ards in the way that Russell did, the framework developed served as a 
foundation for later work in managing a wide range of hazards. There 
is of course much more to the story. But a recurring theme in all these 
works is the interplay of costs and losses, either objective or perceived. 
The retrospective segment of the paper will thus focus on a few key 
ideas that grew out of this early body of work. The second part, the pro-
spective view, will concentrate on new avenues of research involving 
disaster loss. This, in my view, is perhaps the most important yet least 
understood aspect of the problem. 
RETROSPECT 
As indicated earlier, there is a vast body of literature to plow through 
in order to come up with a set of key ideas. Much of what I am about 
to present is based on the works of Lave (1963), Nelson and Winter 
(1964), and Howe and Cochrane (1976). All three investigate whether 
to mitigate losses from a potentially damaging event. They conclude 
(as did Russell) that the interplay of event probabilities and subsequent 
consequences shapes that choice. The framework about to be presented 
draws upon a highly stylized example, one where floods are of a dichot-
omous nature, and costs, losses, and event probabilities are well known. 
The presentation assesses the merits of taking action (or not) in view 
of a short-term flood forecast. It then entertains the possibility that it 
might be economically advantageous to adopt a more permanent flood 
mitigation strategy, one that is tied to the probability of flooding alone, 
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ignoring forecasts altogether. Finally, the framework is tweaked to ad-
dress very long-run changes in climate. 
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the power of these 
simple models. Although not very complex, nor pathbreaking, they of-
fer policymakers valuable insights into how to value meteorological 
forecasts and even climate change research. 
The Value of Forecasts 
Should one heed a flood forecast? The answer to this question hinges
on the cost of doing something, the loss incurred if a flood occurs (and 
insufficient protection is afforded), the climatological record, and the 
accuracy of the forecast. To illustrate, let’s begin by characterizing 
flooding as a dichotomous event: it either occurs or it doesn’t (Figure 
4.1). Four combinations of flood forecasts and events are shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. When forecasts are perfect, P3 and P4 equal zero. But forecasts 
may be in error; predicted floods fail to materialize, and unpredicted 
Figure 4.1  Decision to Adopt Forecast-Sensitive Protection 
Probabilities 
Flood forecast 
od
 
No P1 P2 
F
lo
Yes P3 P4 
Consequences 
Flood forecast 
od
 
No 0 C
short-run 
F
lo
Yes Loss Loss,
C
short-run 
NOTE: Adopt short-run protection if C × (P2 + P4) + Loss × P3 < Loss × (P3 + P4). 
short-run
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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floods occur. The situation can be visualized as one where sandbags 
can be added to the levee provided that sufficient lead time is afforded. 
Whether such a forecast should be used hinges on the expected sum of 
costs and losses. It makes economic sense to adopt protection and use 
the forecast if the expected cost of sandbagging, C(P2 + P4), is less than 
the expected loss, L(P3 + P4). 
The Value of Long-Term Protection 
One might wonder whether there is a better way to deal with the 
hazard; a more permanent form of protection might be more efficient. 
In this case flood forecasts are disregarded in favor of probabilities 
dictated by the climate. Here the cost of protection is certain and the 
expected loss is the probability of flooding times loss. Note that these 
losses and costs are likely to be different from those shown in Figure 
4.1, but the interplay of cost and loss is key to adopting protection none-
theless: that is, adopt long-run protection if C
long-run
 < L(P3 + P4). 
A Simple but Powerful Way of Conceptualizing the
Hazard Problem 
This highly simplistic framework provides some very useful in-
sights into the value of information. One is that it is not always wise 
to act on a forecast. Errors might be too costly, and doing nothing may 
be the most economical path. This point is easily demonstrated by ask-
ing what a hail forecast is worth to a wheat farmer. Since there are no 
technically feasible ways of protecting the crop from damage, it follows 
that the forecast would be worthless (perhaps less than worthless since 
the farmer would worry about the fate of the crop). The framework also 
raises the issue of perceptions versus objective measures. If the decision 
maker is ill equipped to assess the probabilities (as Howard Kunreuther 
has often pointed out) or does not take into account the full magnitude 
of losses and costs, then the choice observed will not be the optimal 
choice. Finally, the value of improving disaster forecasts is a dynamic 
metric: it hinges on how losses and cost change over time. This may 
seem a bit abstract, but consider that the current climate change debate 
revolves around escalating losses observed along the nation’s coastline. 
At first blush, rising losses could be interpreted to mean that the prob-
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abilities have shifted. However, it is just as likely that both the coastal 
population and the wealth at risk have risen over the past 50 years. The 
framework just presented allows for either or both. Roger Pielke Jr. 
(2005) performed a careful analysis of hurricane losses and concluded 
that rising losses are tied to population and wealth and not to increased 
frequency and severity. Although there is still a healthy debate about 
the issue (Emanuel 2005), the cost-loss framework has proven useful in 
pointing research in the right direction. 
A Deeper Look at the Economics of Climate Change 
The cost-loss model also lends itself to a deeper analysis of climate 
change. Although the problem still involves cost, loss, and the probabil-
ity of disaster, the interpretations are different. The cost of mitigating 
the effects of climate change is the reduction in economic growth re-
sulting from curtailing CO
2 
emissions. The economics of cap-and-trade 
are pretty clear: investments in cleaner-burning fuels and higher-cost 
renewables will ratchet growth downward. The cost to GDP is open to 
debate, but few will argue that the difference in growth paths is the cost 
of capping emissions. The loss incurred in the event of climatic warm-
ing is just as contentious. But much of the debate revolves around the 
magnitude of loss. There is considerable disagreement regarding the de-
gree to which the climate will change, and predictions of the economic 
impacts are therefore equally murky. Despite this, no one is arguing 
that climate change will be benign. If we assume for argument’s sake 
that climate change losses will be disastrous and that anthropogenic 
CO
2 
is in fact the chief culprit, a case can be made for controlling emis-
sions now. Assume that P
anthropogenic 
is the current assessment regarding 
the likelihood that anthropogenic CO
2 
is the chief cause. Assume too 
that if emissions are curtailed now, future losses would be mitigated. 
On the other hand, if no action is taken to control atmospheric carbon, 
and CO
2 
is indeed the causal agent triggering a more varied climate, the 
decision to do nothing will be irreversible. In contrast, the decision to 
limit fossil fuel use now can be revisited once the results of climate re-
search become more definitive. This option is reversible if at some later 
date it is revealed that atmospheric carbon is the product of warming 
and not the other way around. In the economics literature the benefit of 
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taking action now that may be revised later when updated information 
is available is referred to as quasioption value. 
The factors underlying this decision are the same as those that 
shaped the use of climate and weather information in the previous cost-
loss example. Carbon control is worthwhile if the losses are sufficiently 
high, the control costs low, and the a priori probabilistic assessment 
of the connection between CO
2 
and climate change is high. That is, 
the decision to curtail anthropogenic CO
2 
is optimal if C
control 
</L
disaster 
Panthropogenic. Despite its simplicity, the framework provides a valuable 
guide for debating climate policy. First, a good case can be made for 
taking action now despite the uncertainties regarding the causal mecha-
nism. Waiting until these uncertainties are resolved could be the least 
appealing option. The decision to act now hinges on the cost, the losses, 
and the current state of knowledge regarding the direction of the causal 
arrow—that is, the probability that the arrow representing causation 
points from anthropogenic CO
2 
to climate (i.e., anthropogenic CO
2 
is 
causing climate change) rather than from climate to CO
2
. Second, the 
framework properly draws attention to the role of anthropogenic CO
2 
rather than to warming itself. 
PROSPECTIVE VIEW OF LOSSES 
It is clear from the preceding retrospective that losses (either ob-
jectively measured or perceived by the decision maker) are crucial to 
managing natural hazards. However, what constitutes a loss and how 
losses should be measured remain murky. Before we look at losses in 
more detail, it is worth taking a moment to reflect on the possibility that 
the market may have already discounted for locational risk. In other 
words, the price of housing might already accommodate the location 
of the property in an area subject to some hazard. If it does, then there 
is no reason to proceed any further. There has been some debate about 
this, but in my opinion it is highly unlikely that prospective buyers are 
well informed about risks of any sort. Howard Kunreuther has spent the 
better part of his career arguing that decision makers make poor choices 
because they use simple heuristics. In some cases they totally ignore 
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low-probability events, and in others they overstate the likelihood of 
high-consequence events. The market for housing (and willingness to 
pay) reflects this. However, if market prices reflect considerable ig-
norance and misinformation, it is unwise to utilize them to formulate 
policy. The recent housing market collapse serves to illustrate this point 
quite nicely. Despite what orthodox economists claim for the market, 
I believe, at least for natural hazards, that housing prices provide little 
useful information regarding willingness to pay for safety. Loss stud-
ies are so important precisely because markets provide such unreliable 
information. 
So, what losses are we talking about and how should they be 
measured? As will be discussed shortly, loss consists of the obvious 
(damage to buildings, contents, infrastructure, as well as loss of life) 
and the not-so-obvious (loss of cultural icons, historic monuments, a 
sense of place, and the indirect economic dislocations stemming from 
damage). Table 4.1 provides a simple list. I will address each briefly and 
then move on to regional and national economic impacts, which I will 
address in more detail. 
Property Losses and Deaths 
There is a substantial body of work tying wind velocity, ground 
shaking, and flood depth to property damage and subsequent loss of 
life. Although empirically estimated damage functions contain a sub-
stantial error band, they seem to work fairly well, particularly when 
damages are aggregated over a wide area. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s HAZUS program (Hazards United States), a so-
phisticated geographic information system, incorporates such functions 
for a variety of building types and hazards. In my view, property loss 
is the least problematic of all the losses. Similarly, there appears to be 
an empirically verifiable linkage between fatalities and the number of 
structures destroyed, at least for sudden-onset events such as tornadoes 
and earthquakes. Thus damage and fatality seem reasonably predict-
able through available means. The same cannot be said about the other 
categories of loss I am addressing, including value of life. 
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The value of a life 
Although deaths are predictable, the value attached to each death 
remains an elusive concept. I realize that this is a highly contentious 
topic fraught with technical and ethical complexities. Having said that, 
I want to raise a few issues. Most important, disaster mortality and 
morbidity models account for statistical lives lost, not identified lives. 
No one worries about insurance companies that project loss of life and 
attempt to quantify those losses. An identified life is something quite 
different, however. No one would or should attempt to assess the value 
of an identified life. Second, if we are unwilling to attach a value to 
these so-called statistical deaths, then we might finesse the question 
by determining how much it costs to preserve a life through protective 
measures such as land use regulation and improved building codes. It 
is then up to the public to determine whether the costs are worth it. The 
benefits of hazard mitigation would have to be weighed against other 
life-saving options (e.g., dialysis, wellness programs). Although the 
problems inherent in estimating and valuing loss of life are formidable, 
they are relatively manageable. 
Loss of cultural icons and historic monuments 
While a solid foundation exists for the debate over mortality and 
direct damage to property, the state of knowledge regarding the other 
losses shown in Table 4.1 pales in comparison. Value is inherent in cul-
tural icons, historic monuments, and a sense of place. Hurricane Katrina 
did more than destroy the city of New Orleans. The nation lost a cul-
tural heritage that was rich in diversity and steeped in history. Much that 
has been written about post-Katrina New Orleans bemoans the changes 
wrought by the storm. The losses suffered go beyond the number of 
Table 4.1  An Analysis of Losses 
Mortality, morbidity, along with property damage are the best known. 
Loss of environmental services, cultural icons, historic monuments, and a 
sense of place are less well known and understood. 
Systemic risk and loss of regional economic activity are also not well under-
stood. 
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deaths and the damage to buildings inundated because of breached 
levees, and even beyond New Orleans itself to affect the nation as a 
whole. Despite the growing body of literature attempting to establish 
values for nonmarket losses, measurement of iconic value remains a 
problem. Icons and monuments have market values that are readily 
measurable through surveys and travel-cost methods. However, such 
techniques don’t reveal their existence value. Research on this rich and 
intriguing subject is still in its infancy. 
Systemic and indirect losses 
Systemic and indirect losses are also not well understood. The 
current financial panic has served to rivet attention on just how large 
contagion effects and their associated indirect impacts can be. Fur-
thermore, the current economic meltdown underscores an important 
point. That is, the loss anticipated by any one participant can turn out 
to be vastly different when interindustry linkages and uncertainty are 
considered. Or, as Gary Becker said in addressing the 2008 financial 
meltdown, “While financial specialists understand how individual as-
sets function, even they have limited understanding of the aggregate 
risks created by the system” (Becker 2008). 
This observation bears directly on the cost-loss framework devel-
oped earlier, and on willingness to pay for protection. The events of late 
2008 and early 2009 have underscored the point that an individual’s 
perceptions are often at odds with systemwide risks. Given this dis-
crepancy, it seems again unwise to rely on market forces to suggest a 
meaningful measure of willingness to pay for safety. I will spend the 
remainder of the paper on this topic, emphasizing the likely economic 
consequences of disaster, how to measure them (including why com-
monly utilized techniques fail), and why the results of some disasters 
differ significantly from those of others. 
Alternative Ways of Modeling the Regional Economic
Response to Shocks 
There is currently no clear consensus as to how supply shocks can 
be successfully modeled. Input-output models have been tried, as have 
a wide range of alternatives, including computable general equilibrium 
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models, econometric models, and even postevent surveys. They all 
leave something to be desired. A lot of what I will be discussing relies 
on a basic understanding of input-output models. A brief discussion of 
input-output basics is provided in Appendix 4A for those unfamiliar 
with the technique and its terminology. 
Input-output models were designed to explain how final demand 
changes ripple throughout a region’s (or nation’s) interconnected sec-
tors. The linkages are rather straightforward. An increase or decrease 
in demand for one sector’s production indirectly boosts or reduces de-
mand for ingredients supplied by other sectors. As a result, a one-dollar 
change in demand leads to more than one dollar’s change in production 
when all intermediate transactions are accounted for. Input-output mod-
els have one fatal limitation: they are incapable of addressing the types 
of bottlenecks commonly observed after disaster. These models have no 
way of accounting for the possibility that supplying sectors may lack 
the capacity to provide needed inputs (leading to forward-linked losses) 
or, conversely, that producing sectors may lack the capacity to absorb 
all that their suppliers wish to ship (causing backward-linked losses). 
Since the input-output technique implicitly assumes that there are 
no limits to production, it is incapable of treating the uneven set of 
supply constraints typically observed after disaster. It would be purely 
coincidental if the pattern of economic disruption emerging after a 
natural disaster matched the pre-event production pattern. Therefore, 
altering final demands to fit postdisaster production patterns would be 
problematic. 
The other techniques just mentioned also have limitations. Com-
putable general equilibrium models (CGEs) are an elaborate form of 
input-output, with an interindustry table at the core. CGEs permit fi-
nal demand substitutions as shortages materialize. Unfortunately, the 
estimates of substitution elasticities embedded in the CGEs are prob-
lematic at best, particularly for unique events such as natural disasters. 
Furthermore, in some cases where a public utility is impacted (such as 
a water treatment or supply system), there is no meaningful measure of 
substitutability. CGEs are less useful for that type of loss estimation. 
Finally, a shortcoming of both econometric models (particularly 
time series) and postdisaster surveys is that they are calibrated using a 
set of unique events. Time series techniques, like event analysis, look 
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at the difference between trends with and without a disaster. Although 
appealing on the surface, event analysis is applied to an event. Since it 
is an event, it reflects only the characteristics of that event: the disas-
ter relief policies in place, the pattern of destruction, the nature of the 
economy, and so on. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize from such 
an analysis to other potential events. Because of this limitation, event 
analysis may be useful for forensic studies, but not for policy analysis. 
A similar criticism applies to postevent surveys. What can one say be-
yond what the survey indicates about the loss sustained by a particular 
place, given that it was struck by a particular event at a time when a 
particular set of disaster relief policies applied? Very little. 
An Algorithm for Analyzing Supply Shocks 
An algorithm was developed at Colorado State University to ad-
dress the shortcomings of the approaches just discussed. As in the case 
of CGE, the algorithm takes a region’s interindustry linkages as its core. 
It then allows for excess capacity in each sector as a function of the 
region’s rate of unemployment. Furthermore, the algorithm augments 
internal production with the aid of imports from other regions. Finally, 
it allows for the stimulative effects of reconstruction spending and the 
fiscal drag caused by indebtedness. The algorithm then seeks out the 
best outcome (in terms of regional income) that rebalances the economy. 
The economy is rebalanced when all excess supplies or demands are
eliminated. See Figure 4.2 for a schematic of the rebalancing process. 
A simple numerical illustration 
I’ll use the example input-output table provided in Appendix 4A to 
analyze a few simple economic shocks. In the simplest shock each sec-
tor suffers a proportionate reduction in output. If a disaster eliminates 
50 percent of both sectors’ capacity, then output in sectors S1 and S2 
would be limited to 50 and 75, respectively. The outcome of such a 
constraint is self-evident. Eventually, shipments to each of the sectors 
will shrink, as will income to households. They all decline by 50 per-
cent. Household spending for each of the two sectors’ products will also 
shrink by 50 percent. Exports are assumed to shrink proportionately 
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Figure 4.2  Rebalancing Algorithm 
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as well. The final result is self-evident: the economy will shrink by 50 
percent. 
This is of course the simplest of cases. Things get a bit more compli-
cated when the pattern of production is limited in some disproportionate 
way and reconstruction spending amplifies the effects of bottlenecks. In 
addition, shortages can be avoided through imports or utilizing excess 
capacity of the region’s factories. These are but a few of the options 
contained in the algorithm. 
One last note: the economy can rebalance at many levels. Even in 
the previous example, balance could have been achieved at 25 percent 
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of predisaster production or even at zero. It is important, therefore, that 
rebalancing occur in light of some objective. The one that makes the 
most sense is to rebalance in a way that maximizes the region’s post-
event income. However, a result that maximizes regional income may 
not be the one produced by market forces. Since I have called CGE into 
question (due to unreliable estimates of substitution elasticities, among 
other problems), I will defend the algorithm’s result as the best feasible 
outcome. This at least provides an envelope of outcomes that policy-
makers can use to compare different hazards or mitigation strategies. 
A few additional notes about the algorithm 
The CSU algorithm is based on a 20-sector interindustry table, 
while rebalancing is achieved by an iterative procedure where sectoral 
outputs are adjusted within the confines of postevent constraints and 
capacities. Adjustments proceed until the algorithm finds that all other 
feasible adjustment patterns yield an inferior level of regional income. 
The process is repeated each month throughout the period of recovery, 
yielding a measure of how much the region’s income is impacted. Fi-
nally, the algorithm tracks shifts in interregional trade as rebalancing 
alters the region’s import-export mix. In addition, it accounts for finan-
cial liabilities incurred both nationally and regionally. Liabilities are 
amortized and household demand is adjusted accordingly. The entire 
process is complex but has been tested and proved to yield reasonable 
results. A full discussion of the process is beyond the scope of the chap-
ter, but the outlines of a typical result provide some useful insights into 
how a stricken economy is likely to rebound. 
A Prototypical Pattern of Economic Recovery 
Figure 4.3 shows what is typically observed after a disaster. Initial-
ly there is some disruption of income flows and a decline in spending. 
Then, as reconstruction begins and damaged sectors are restored, the 
economy rebounds until gains are observed. In most instances the re-
building stimulus produces an economic boom exceeding the predisaster 
level of activity. Eventually recovery is complete and reconstruction 
spending dries up. If reconstruction is financed externally (via insur-
ance or federal aid), regional income can be expected to subside to the 
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Figure 4.3  Prototypical Regional Loss Pattern 
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pre-event level. If, however, the region is forced to draw upon savings 
or borrow, the added debt burden acts as a drag on future income, since 
households and local government are forced to offset the debt by cur-
tailing spending. Total loss is simply the discounted sum of the stream 
of losses and gains, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
The national pattern looks similar. Disruption ripples to surround-
ing regions via shifts in imports and exports, the use of extraregional 
construction talent, and the liabilities incurred nationally. 
Hurricane Katrina: An Illustration of How the Model Works 
Direct damage to the Gulf region as a result of Hurricane Katrina 
has been estimated at around $200 billion (give or take $50 billion). 
This seemingly fuzzy estimate is in fact rather precise given that re-
gional and national economic losses have yet to be tabulated. I took 
this opportunity to exercise the algorithm in order to come up with an 
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estimate of what Katrina cost New Orleans Parish and the country as 
a whole. As expected, parish income fell sharply after the storm. Dis-
ruptions to tourism, oil and gas operations, and barge traffic rippled 
throughout the region. This decline was partially offset by an immedi-
ate injection of spending for relief and recovery. At the same time that 
New Orleans proper was in a state of collapse, two conflicting forces 
that impacted the economies of neighboring regions were set in motion. 
First, the New Orleans economy was so damaged that some of the relief 
and reconstruction stimulus leaked to surrounding economies. That is to 
say, outside construction talent and other related imports were brought 
into the city to supplement what survived the storm. Economies outside 
New Orleans benefited as a result. Second, as the New Orleans econ-
omy shrank, normal imports into the region declined as well. Figure 
4.4 shows the results of the CSU simulation. The upper line shows the 
recovery path for New Orleans proper, while the lower line provides an 
estimate of the total loss to both New Orleans and the rest of the nation. 
Figure 4.4  Economic Loss Inside and Outside New Orleans (Delayed 
Reconstruction) 
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Figure 4.5  The Economic Impact of Katrina Contrasted with Andrew 
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One might ask why the New Orleans economy suffered so much. 
To help answer this question, the economic repercussions of Hurricane 
Andrew on Miami–Dade County were calculated using the algorithm. 
Figure 4.5 shows the results. In contrast to Katrina, Andrew produced 
little long-term impact, a difference attributable to four factors. First, 
Katrina caused about five times the damage. That alone would explain 
much of the difference. Second, the New Orleans economy is signifi-
cantly smaller than the Miami-Dade economy, which could cope with 
bottlenecks by drawing upon a larger internal excess capacity. Third, 
since Andrew’s winds were the primary cause of damage, property in-
surance covered most of the loss. Because normal homeowners policies 
exclude flooding, little of the flood loss (the primary source of dam-
age from Katrina) was insured. Finally, New Orleans faced a housing 
shortage, so it was difficult to attract outside reconstruction talent. Fur-
thermore, the city became embroiled in a contentious debate concerning 
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how to deal with the ongoing flood hazard. The resulting reconstruction 
delays still limit the amount of rebuilding that has occurred. 
FINAL REMARKS 
This chapter has been divided into retrospective and prospective 
parts. The first part emphasized a few key ideas that, with the aid of 
hindsight, seem to be logical extensions of water resources economics 
and the economics of information. Having said that, I am struck by the 
power of these ideas. I believe that even the simplest of cost-loss mod-
els offers valuable insights that are too often lost on policymakers. The 
confused debate over climate change policy serves to buttress my point. 
The most puzzling aspect of the literature of the 1960s and 1970s is that 
so little effort was devoted to categorizing and measuring losses, despite 
the fact that cost-loss models are worthless without a reasonable loss as-
sessment. Much of this early work was devoted to conceptualizing the 
problem, where loss was supposed to be self-evident. The second part 
of the chapter, the prospective view, suggested several topics that need 
additional attention. Finally, I took a controversial position regarding 
the use of survey techniques, time series analysis, and CGE. I hold that 
these methodologies have limited value for predicting how regions are 
likely to be impacted by unique events. More important, the economic 
climate has shifted drastically from the time when generous federal aid 
was available and little excess housing capacity existed. It is dangerous 
to rely on models that were calibrated using economic conditions that 
may no longer apply. 
 
 
 
Appendix 4A 
A Primer on Interindustry Analysis 
Input-output tables are the foundation of regional economics. As the name 
implies, an input-output table traces the flow of products from industry to in-
dustry and from industry to households, to government, and for export. It also 
traces the ingredients inherent in an industry’s production (it is, in effect, a 
recipe). Operational tables can contain as few as 10 sectors or as many as 360. 
Table 4A.1 shows a simple two-sector table. 
The columns represent the shipment of goods from industry to industry, to 
households, and as exports. The right-hand summation is the total shipped (in 
the case of each industry), the total income earned (in the case of households) 
and the total amount imported into the region (in the case of imports). The 
units shown are typically measured in dollars. So, using the row of the first 
sector, S1, to illustrate, $20 billion is shipped from the first sector to itself: 
for example, oil may be used to produce more oil. An additional $45 billion 
worth is shipped to the second sector, $30 billion to households, and $5 billion 
exported from the region. The total amount shipped from S1 is therefore $100 
billion. The numbers in the first column are interpreted differently. Sector 1’s 
total output is $100 billion (the bottom of column 1). Of this total, Sector 1 
contributes $20 billion and Sector 2 contributes $40 billion. Household income 
in the form of payments for labor and investments amount to another $20 bil-
lion of the total, and finally imports of $20 billion from elsewhere make up 
the remaining part of the total. The shaded area is referred to as interindustry 
demands. Note that gross shipments must equal supply (gross product) for the 
economy to be in balance. 
Any shock to this economy will begin with a restriction in supply, which 
then sets a number of adjustments in motion. Declining production means 
lower income for workers, which reduces household demand for consumer 
items. Declining production also results in bottlenecks in the production of 
other interrelated industries. Such restrictions feed back to the sector suffering 
the initial shock. Although somewhat simple to describe, an operational model 
requires a complex algorithm, which is briefly described in the main body of 
the chapter. 
83 
 84 Cochrane 
Table 4A.1  Example, Input-Output Table: A Typical Interindustry Table 
Gross 
S1 S2 Households Exports shipments 
S1 30 5 100 
S2 40 15 30 65 150 
Households 20 60 0 0 80 
Imports 20 30 20 0 70 
Gross product 100 150 80 70 400 
20 45 
NOTE: S1 = industry sector 1; S2 = industry sector 2. 
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5 
Private Solutions to Public Disasters 
Self-Reliance and Social Resilience 
Peter J. Boettke 
Daniel J. Smith 
George Mason University 
. . . What has so often excited wonder [is] the great rapidity with 
which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disap-
pearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war. An enemy 
lays waste a country by fire and sword, and destroys or carries 
away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it: all the inhabit-
ants are ruined, and yet in a few years after, everything is much as 
it was before. 
—John Stuart Mill (1848) 
It is often in the aftermath of the worst calamities of nature and war 
that the power of human ingenuity and resilience is most clearly dem-
onstrated. John Stuart Mill, writing in 1848, noted that observers were 
frequently amazed at the rapidity with which inhabitants of a devastated 
area were able to recover. It is at the very time when public and private 
infrastructure and formal institutions are at their weakest—following a 
public disaster—that civil society would be expected to collapse. Yet 
calamity after calamity has demonstrated the resounding ability of pri-
vate actors to coordinate recoveries from the most severe of crises. 
Unfortunately, not all catastrophes are followed by rapid or even 
complete recoveries. Slow or incomplete recoveries are attributable in 
part to the uncontrollable features of the disaster, such as its magnitude 
or its particular form. Mill argued that large-scale destruction of hu-
man capital hinders recovery because local knowledge is essential in 
coordinating a rapid recovery. A more important factor, especially for 
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economists and policymakers, is the presence of institutional features 
that can significantly impede the natural tendency of unfettered people 
to achieve a complete and rapid recovery following a disaster. 
Profit-seeking entrepreneurs are vital to any recovery process. En-
trepreneurs must be able to unrestrictedly allocate resources to their 
most urgent employments, as expressed by customers through prices. 
Any interference with the structure of prices distorts the signals that 
entrepreneurs receive, misdirecting or hampering their efforts. Misal-
location of resources can literally be a matter of life and death in the 
immediate aftermath of a natural disaster or war. Price ceilings dampen
the ability of profits to induce increased supply of needed goods and 
services, and they distort the ability of prices to signal consumers to 
ration and economize scarce resources. Poor policy unnecessarily 
blocks and inhibits the labor and capital adjustments necessary for a 
complete and timely recovery by distorting entrepreneurial calculation 
and preventing entrepreneurs from allocating resources to their most 
productive uses. 
Despite the interference of regulations and uncertainty brought 
about by government action, humankind has demonstrated a remark-
able resilience following a natural or man-made disaster. We argue that 
this is due to the civilizing and coordinating roles played by civil soci-
ety. For-profit companies, charities, and churches play a vital role in the 
recovery process. These organizations have proven to be the first and 
the best-equipped responders to disasters, jump-starting the recovery 
process. 
COMPOUNDING NATURE’S FURY WITH HUMAN FOLLY 
Humankind has shown an amazing resilience when it comes to 
overcoming nature’s fury. Yet when nature’s fury is compounded with 
human folly, this resilience may suffer, eroded by corruption, signal dis-
tortions, and regime uncertainty. Ironically, it is often well-intentioned 
people who create the folly that magnifies nature’s fury due to a misun-
derstanding of the way incentives affect human behavior. 
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We use the case of Hurricane Katrina to show what types of institu-
tions and policies are robust to natural disasters, allowing for maximum 
speed and totality of recovery. We show how natural disasters can 
magnify the adverse effects of poor institutions and policies already in 
place. Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana in August 2005, causing over 
$100 billion in property damage and 1,800 deaths (Chamlee-Wright 
and Rothschild 2007), making it one of the worst natural disasters to 
ever hit the United States. This destruction has been amplified by poli-
cies already in place, such as flood insurance and a corrupt levee board; 
by policies in the immediate aftermath, such as excessive layers of 
regulation; and in the long term through the creation of instability and 
uncertainty for investors. 
Even though entrepreneurs were burdened with excessive and in-
hibiting regulations and poor policy, civil society was still able to show 
an amazing resilience in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Corpora-
tions like Wal-Mart and Home Depot, as well as small businesses like 
gas stations, were able to respond quickly to the devastation, providing 
necessary goods and services that would allow more businesses and 
residents to come back to New Orleans. Profit-seeking entrepreneurs 
and private charities and churches played a central coordinating role in 
the aftermath of Katrina. 
Pre-Katrina 
The Army Corps of Engineers was entrusted with overseeing and 
constructing levees around Louisiana after the Great Flood of 1927, 
though the federal government had been overseeing the levees since 
creating the Mississippi River Commission in 1879 (Davis 2000). 
The Army Corps of Engineers was caught in conflicting layers of bu-
reaucracy, primarily between the demands and desires of the federal 
government and the local citizens and politicians of Louisiana. 
Three years prior to Katrina, McQuaid and Schleifstein (2002) is-
sued a report concluding that New Orleans’s inadequate levees would 
not withstand a direct hit by a hurricane (Horne 2006). John Barry 
(1998) wrote a book detailing the history of the Mississippi Flood of 
1927, especially focusing on the failures of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and local politicians to take flood control seriously. John McPhee 
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(1989) wrote a book detailing how the levees would eventually fail; Eric 
Berger, a science journalist, reported on the devastation that a direct hit 
on New Orleans would cause (Berger 2001; Brinkley 2006). Despite 
such warnings from these and other experts, no substantial measures 
were taken to fortify the weakened and often ill-constructed levees (van 
Heerdon and Bryan 2006). When Katrina hit, the Army Corps of Engi-
neers was managing a largely dilapidated system of levees insufficient 
to stand up to a storm of the magnitude of Katrina. Not only did the 
levees lack structural integrity, but the construction was also persis-
tently behind schedule: upgrades had been pushed back as long as 13 
years, leaving one section of flood work still unfinished when Katrina 
hit (Horne 2006). 
The poor state of the levees was primarily due to the corruption on 
the levee board.1 Adamantly and successfully resisting the advice of the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the levee board fortified frontal protection 
for the levees instead of focusing on an extensive network of pumps up 
to several miles inland (Horne 2006). This frontal protection—a sys-
tem of floodgates—came in at one-third the cost of the favored pump 
and levee arrangement. However, it required continuous maintenance 
by the levee board, a task board members were not willing to commit 
themselves to. 
Local politicians were able to funnel federal money earmarked for 
levee renovation and construction to benefit special-interest groups. The 
shipping industry successfully lobbied for harbor upgrades and canal 
dredging projects from this federal money, both projects that actually 
increased the chances of hurricane damage (Brinkley 2006). In addi-
tion, local politicians who controlled the Levee Board and the Sewage 
and Water Board resisted undertaking costly and unpopular but highly 
recommended projects in order to bolster voter support by devoting 
resources to more immediate problems facing New Orleans, such as 
corruption, schooling, and urban infrastructure problems (Brinkley 
2006; Cooper and Block 2006). 
With the levees standing 14 feet above the average water level of 
Lake Pontchartrain, locals believed themselves safe as long as the city 
pumps were working to take care of any spillovers. This belief, how-
ever, was predicated on the assumption that the levees would hold up. 
Charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross, were aware of the dan-
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ger that a large storm posed to these insufficient levees and refused 
to operate within the flood zone. The condition of the levees was bad 
enough that a significant number of the personnel in charge of managing 
the levees evacuated prior to the storm, leaving the levees understaffed 
(Horne 2006). Though the initial break in the levee was only 20 feet 
and could have been shored up with the heavy equipment and sandbags 
owned by the levee agency, levee employees did not respond and the 
break turned into a 200-foot gap. 
While local politicians were shirking their duty to maintain the 
system of levees, state and federal government officials were actively 
encouraging homeowners and businesses to reside in the disaster-prone 
areas threatened by the dilapidated levees. Subsidized flood insurance 
and the expectation of postdisaster relief brought about what econo-
mists call moral hazard problems in disaster-prone areas. Moral hazard 
problems occur when people are protected from incurring the full cost 
of their choices and thus make worse and more costly decisions than 
they would absent such protection. Lowering the cost of residing in 
areas with high flood and wind risk artificially increases the number of 
people and the amount of property in disaster-prone areas (Sutter 2008). 
In an unmolested market, increased insurance rates and the expectation 
of incurring storm damages would force residents to account for and 
bear the cost of living in disaster-prone areas. 
Furthermore, state governments have been notoriously resistant to 
letting insurance companies mandate mitigation efforts by customers 
in these high-risk areas. When cost-effective preventive measures are 
necessary in order to obtain insurance, an incentive exists to build more 
structurally sound buildings. Even such simple measures as install-
ing window shutters can significantly reduce the probability of wind 
damage. 
State governments interfere with insurance companies’ risk assess-
ments and premiums for various types of mitigation in two ways. First, 
several states in disaster-prone areas require state approval of mitiga-
tion discounts, allowing competing insurance companies and politically 
motivated elected officials to second-guess insurance companies’ de-
cisions. Second, some states, such as Louisiana, Florida, and North 
Carolina, require discounts for certain mitigation practices. Since in-
surance companies already have the incentives to offer discounts for 
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effective mitigation practices, government interference, when binding, 
requires allocation of resources to mitigation measures that have not 
been proven effective. Laws that require insurance companies to fund 
sham mitigation practices stem from political favors both to interested 
parties and to genuinely concerned politicians who do not have a full 
understanding of insurance markets. 
New Orleans’s long tradition of special-interest legislation, in 
addition to leading to poor levee maintenance and construction, also 
shackled entrepreneurs’ abilities to respond to consumers’ needs in 
the wake of the havoc created by Katrina. In postdisaster recoveries, 
such restrictions prove extraordinarily burdensome for two primary 
reasons. First, the bureaucratic process of applying for permits, inspec-
tions, and assistance is especially difficult when many public buildings 
are damaged and public employees displaced. Filling out the paper-
work required for engaging in various forms of business activities is 
a daunting process even when public infrastructure is not shut down 
or understaffed. Second, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, the return of 
people with local human capital is essential to the recovery process. En-
trepreneurs, vital for recovery, may become frustrated by a complicated 
bureaucratic process and may simply choose to not return following a 
disaster. At best, regulatory processes only slow down and prevent en-
trepreneurs from putting their human capital to immediate use. In order 
to attract residents and other business owners back to the affected areas, 
an initial set of enterprising business owners must return and provide 
basic goods and services. Residents and other business owners waiting 
for these basic goods and services to be available before returning are, 
over time, more likely to establish themselves in the cities they took 
refuge in, making it costlier to return. 
Occupational licensing, granted to construction unions to artificially 
increase wages, restricted construction experts from other states from 
setting up shop in the disaster-stricken areas to jump-start the rebuild-
ing process. The six-month waiting period mandated for a construction 
permit was not rescinded in the wake of the damage created by Katrina. 
To its credit, the city of New Orleans did suspend inspections on con-
struction projects, allowing, for instance, carpenters and electricians to 
inspect their own work. Historic preservation regulations also inhibited 
rebuilding in New Orleans. Draconian preservation laws were applied 
Private Solutions to Public Disasters 93 
in historic districts, making it difficult for contractors to quickly rebuild 
and restore historic buildings affected by severe flooding. 
Preexisting restrictions on the adult-to-child ratio for child care 
centers were also not relaxed following the storm (Chamlee-Wright 
2008a). To initiate progress toward recovery, entrepreneurs and busi-
ness owners needed places offering care and supervision for their 
children. Even two years after Katrina hit, only 94 of 275 day care cen-
ters in New Orleans had reopened. With so many damaged buildings 
and missing employees, the adult-to-child capacity restrictions meant 
that many parents were unable to focus completely on recovery efforts. 
The numerous residents who fled with their children to cities such as 
Houston and Atlanta found it hard to take on full-time employment due 
to similar restrictions in those cities. 
Zoning regulations and building codes also shackled entrepre-
neurs in their efforts to speedily reopen stores to offer basic services 
and goods. The opening of a health clinic was delayed by nearly six 
months because it was located in a residential zone and had building 
code violations such as a handicap ramp with hand rails on only one 
side. Similarly, a laundry had to wait weeks for an inspection after the 
building was completed and ready to open up. 
Layers of regulation and profit windfalls from postdisaster re-
lief create an institutional environment ripe for corruption. In 2004, 
Louisiana was ranked fortieth out of 50 states in the Pacific Research 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the States Index (Huang, McCormick, 
and McQuillan 2004) and had relatively high costs of conducting busi-
ness compared to other states. In addition, Louisiana was ranked the 
third most corrupt state in the nation in 2004 (Corporate Crime Reporter 
2004). 
During Katrina 
The folly already in place prior to Katrina, which drastically in-
creased the amount of damage the storm caused, was also compounded 
with folly during the storm and its immediate aftermath. While most 
economists are familiar with the concept of the tragedy of the commons, 
a term coined by the biologist Garrett Hardin, most are not familiar with 
the tragedy of the anticommons. The tragedy of the anticommons oc-
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curs when several government agencies have the ability to regulate and 
control a common area, creating unnecessary, and often repetitive and 
even conflicting, layers of bureaucracy. Additional layers of bureau-
cracy, especially following a disaster, can cost lives by slowing down 
the response times of entrepreneurs. In addition, complicated layers of 
bureaucracy, especially when combined with political windfalls from 
disaster relief, drastically increase the chances of venality. 
The relief efforts for Hurricane Katrina orchestrated by FEMA have 
been notoriously plagued by corruption and abuse. In fact, according 
to the Government Accountability Office, the cost of corruption and 
abuse for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita could reach $1.4 billion (Kutz 
and Ryan 2006). In a study on natural disasters and corruption, Leeson 
and Sobel (2008) found that every additional $1 per capita spent on 
disaster relief by FEMA increases corruption in the average state by up 
to 2.5 percent, due to the windfalls created by the programs. This sug-
gests that the states along the Gulf Coast might be notoriously corrupt 
precisely because they are frequently hit by natural disasters. Leeson 
and Sobel estimate that eliminating FEMA disaster relief would reduce 
corruption by more than 20 percent in the average state. In a separate ar-
ticle, Leeson and Sobel (2007) trace the origins of the corruption to the 
time-sensitive nature of disaster relief; increased oversight shows little 
promise in curbing this corruption because, in their words, “protocol 
will take a backseat when disasters actually strike.” 
When infrastructure and normal modes of communicating and or-
ganizing activity are slow, incomplete, and impeded by interference 
following a public disaster, the need to allow market prices to adjust 
to communicate information to the relevant actors becomes even more 
important. Hayek (1945) discusses the heavily dispersed nature of 
knowledge and the importance of a freely fluctuating price system as 
the most efficient system to coordinate economic activity across an ar-
ray of activities because of its ability to convey the specific knowledge 
of time and place to the relevant economic actors. With so many needs 
after a natural disaster, it is difficult, especially for an altruistic gov-
ernment agent operating in the field, to decide whose and what needs 
should be met first. Sobel and Leeson (2007) find that while private 
actors are able to respond to transient, decentralized information in a 
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timely manner following a disaster, public officials are forced to make 
decisions with, at best, scanty and outdated information. 
Price controls following a disaster are known for distorting price 
signals, which is counterproductive at a time when those signals are 
most needed to coordinate the allocation of resources to their most 
urgent employment. William Carden (2009) noted that emergency situ-
ations are inherently chaotic and that a well-functioning unmolested 
price system can significantly reduce the chaos. Price ceilings discour-
age economical consumption and take away the profit-seeking motive 
for entrepreneurs to find innovative ways of allocating resources where 
the demand is highest. 
Post-Katrina 
Continuous government interference in the market, policy rever-
sals, and varying responses to disasters create uncertainty for market 
actors. This uncertainty may inhibit entrepreneurial investment in 
current profit opportunities. Robert Higgs (1997) calls this process in 
which government adversely affects investment by not credibly adher-
ing to a set policy regime uncertainty. In the aftermath of a disaster, the 
stymieing effect of regime uncertainty on investment is magnified, as it 
paralyzes the entrepreneurship and investment necessary for a full and 
rapid recovery. Market actors, left in the dark concerning the nature and 
timing of goods and services to be provided by government agencies, 
cut back on much-needed investment. Government regulations, such 
as price controls, distort the signaling process and prevent the market 
adjustment that is at the very heart of economic efficiency. 
By focusing on standard postdisaster recovery procedures, public 
officials disregarded the necessary role of private actors in the recov-
ery process (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2008a). Focusing on procuring 
more federal dollars, imposing stronger regulations, and periodically 
implementing new recovery plans, policymakers intruded on the recov-
ery process, preventing entrepreneurs from rapidly returning to their 
businesses. In a structured set of neutral interviews, residents named 
barriers erected by government policies and programs, in particular 
those intended to assist redevelopment, as the biggest challenge they 
had faced since returning (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2007). 
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Despite these needless barriers, entrepreneurs exercised persistence 
and creativity to coordinate the start of a recovery. Population estimates 
for the New Orleans MSA show that its total population reached 86 
percent of pre-Katrina levels by July of 2008 (GNOCDC 2008), as 
shown in Table 5.1.2 Although the area remains far short of a full re-
covery, especially in the parishes most severely hit by Katrina, the data 
nonetheless reflects an impressive display of resiliency. This resilience, 
however, is largely due to private-sector responses, and not formulaic 
public-sector responses (Boettke et al. 2007). In fact, those areas where 
public-sector influence undermined private-sector response times show 
the least recovery progress. 
SELF-RELIANCE AND SOCIAL RESILIENCE 
According to Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, the primary prob-
lem residents of New Orleans faced in the recovery process was that of 
coordinating expectations (Gosselin 2005). If residents expected people 
to come back and work to bring about a recovery, then they would. On 
the other hand, if residents did not expect others to come back, they in 
fact would not come back, and the human capital necessary for recov-
ery would never materialize. Private corporations, such as Wal-Mart 
and Home Depot, and determined small business owners were able to 
solve Schelling’s coordination problem by being the first movers. By 
quickly getting their stores reopened and their employees back in town, 
these businesses were able to provide the basic goods and services that 
were necessary for other residents and business owners to come back to 
New Orleans as well. 
Through in-depth interviews she conducted in New Orleans, Emily 
Chamlee-Wright (2007; 2008b) found that private actors played a large 
role in coordinating a recovery through mutual assistance, commer-
cial cooperation, and private reestablishment of community resources. 
Residents with house damage and business owners who found their 
stores damaged or looted would not have been able to return immedi-
ately after Katrina to jump-start the recovery process without mutual 
assistance. Returning residents were able to coordinate a return with 
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Table 5.1  Population by Parish, New Orleans (LA) MSA 
Jefferson Orleans Plaquemines St. Bernard St. Charles St. John St. Tammany Total 
July 2005 450,848 455,046 28,565 64,890 50,116 45,568 217,367 1,312,400 
July 2006 422,222 210,768 21,610 13,924 51,868 47,647 223,863 991,902 
July 2007 440,339 288,113 21,597 33,439 51,892 47,678 226,263 1,109,411 
July 2008 436,181 311,853 21,276 37,722 51,547 46,994 228,456 1,134,029 
SOURCE: GNOCDC (2008). 
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others by committing to exchanging their different skills and remaining 
resources. A lumber store owner was able to trade room in his largely 
undamaged house for assistance in rebuilding his store, which had been 
badly damaged and looted. Chamlee-Wright also found that commer-
cial entities showed novel and extensive cooperation with each other in 
order to signal to evacuees that New Orleans would recover and that ba-
sic goods and services would be available to returning residents looking 
to start the recovery process. Companies were willing to offer harder-
hit companies generous terms of credit and even free supplies in order 
to help these other businesses open up to attract more residents back. 
Churches, such as the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church, were 
able to reestablish community services vital for attracting back the local 
knowledge necessary for a complete and timely recovery. 
The Doux-Commerce Thesis, put forth by the Scottish Enlighten-
ment thinkers, holds that commerce plays a key role in civil society: it 
is the very act of trading that civilizes a society. Through the process of 
exchange we find mutually beneficial margins that encourage coopera-
tion, and seeking to establish an honest reputation to facilitate future 
transactions gives business owners and their customers a motive to ex-
hibit desirable moral traits. In the chaotic aftermath of a disaster like 
Katrina, this civilizing role of reestablishing commerce is necessary for 
the recovery process. 
Although hindered by policies that exacerbated the toll of Katrina, 
private companies and organizations undertook efforts that significantly 
eased the severity of the disaster. Horwitz (2009) found that big-box 
retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, operating under the 
knowledge-generating and incentive-inducing influences of competi-
tion, were able to respond significantly faster than FEMA. The private 
companies managed to get supplies to where they were needed almost 
directly following the storm. Before Hurricane Katrina even made land-
fall, both chains had preemptively placed trucks, drivers, and supplies 
at strategic staging points, out of danger but close enough to rush in sup-
plies right after the storm passed. Wal-Mart, using its efficient supply 
chain, was able to get all but 15 of 89 damaged stores up and running 
within 10 days, supplying needed items to Katrina survivors. Within the 
first three weeks after the storm hit, Wal-Mart delivered almost 2,500 
truckloads of supplies to the affected areas, while Home Depot deliv-
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ered over 800 truckloads. Both organizations left local store managers 
with discretion so they could respond to local emergency situations. 
Several Wal-Mart managers were commended for providing free sup-
plies to devastated survivors of the storm. 
Churches and private charity organizations also played an important 
role in the recovery process following Hurricane Katrina. Chamlee-
Wright and Storr (2008b, 2009) do an in-depth cultural analysis of a 
Vietnamese-American community in New Orleans East, finding that 
the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church played a central role in the 
revival of the neighborhood surrounding the church. One of the most 
surprising features of their study is that the church is located in one of 
the most damaged areas of New Orleans, one that the Urban Land Insti-
tute claimed had little chance of recovery. Within a few weeks after the 
storm, parishioners were returning and taking the initial steps towards 
recovery. An astounding 90 percent of the residents around the church 
had returned by summer 2007, and 70 of the 75 Vietnamese-owned area 
businesses were up and running. Even compared to less-damaged areas, 
this was a remarkable recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
The destruction and upheaval caused by nature’s fury are often 
staggering. Throughout history, unfettered people have been able to 
overcome the worst tragedies of nature and war, displaying the amazing 
resilience and ingenuity of humankind. However, when governments 
impede the very process that allows the rapidity and completeness of 
recovery, civil society must overcome human folly as well as nature’s 
fury. Placing additional regulatory obstacles and destabilizing programs 
in the way of entrepreneurs severely compromises the ability of private 
actors to coordinate a complete and rapid recovery. 
It was civil society that forged the way in coordinating a post-
Katrina recovery. Entrepreneurs were able to overcome the obstacles 
created by the hurricane itself and by problematic government regu-
lation in order to provide the basic goods and services necessary to 
jump-start the recovery process. It was the initial commitments under-
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taken by businesses and private organizations, as well as the civilizing 
influence of the reestablishment of commerce, that attracted residents 
back to New Orleans, demonstrating, once again, the amazing resil-
ience of civil society in overcoming nature’s fury. 
Notes 
1. This corruption persisted even after Katrina hit, when the levee board president 
used the tragedy of Katrina to hand out lucrative contracts to family members, 
including his wife’s cousin and her son, and even cut himself a check that was 
$98,000 above the normal stipend (Horne 2006). 
2. The parishes of Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines dispute the 2008 figures, 
claiming that the U.S. Census Bureau has understated these numbers (GNOCDC 
2008). If undisputed 2007 figures are used instead of the 2008 figures, then the 
total population of the New Orleans MSA had reached 85 percent of pre-Katrina 
levels by July 2007. 
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The Socioeconomic
Impact of Tornadoes 
Daniel Sutter 
University of Texas–Pan American 
Kevin M. Simmons 
Austin College 
Tornadoes are nature’s most powerful and destructive storms, ca-
pable of producing winds in excess of 300 miles per hour, yet they 
are notoriously capricious, leveling one home and leaving the next un-
damaged. The United States experiences more than 1,200 tornadoes per 
year, and since 1900 over 15,000 lives have been lost in tornadoes. The 
deadliest tornado in U.S. history, the 1925 Tri-State Tornado, tracked 
across three states and killed 695 persons, devastating entire towns. 
Tornadoes have occupied a place in the national consciousness at least 
since the 1939 movie The Wizard of Oz, when a Kansas twister blew 
Dorothy and Toto to Oz. Every spring thousands of people spend weeks 
trekking across the Plains chasing tornadoes. 
How can economists or social scientists contribute to our knowl-
edge of tornadoes? While cloud dynamics and the technical properties 
of weather radars are outside these fields, economics can help us un-
derstand the impact of tornadoes on society. Economics can provide 
relevant evidence on several issues related to societal impacts: 
• Have tornadoes become less deadly over time? 
• If so, how much have the efforts of the National Weather Service 
(NWS) contributed to this? 
• What measures offer the greatest potential to reduce casualties in a 
cost-effective manner? 
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An understanding of the causes is necessary to reduce the impacts 
of severe weather. Just as physicians must understand the causes of ill-
ness to successfully treat patients, meteorologists require information 
about societal impacts. Attempts to reduce casualties not founded on 
solid analysis could prove unsuccessful or incur excessive costs. 
Tornadoes also provide evidence on some questions of significance 
to policymakers: 
• People sometimes have difficulty making sense of small risks of 
death and either overestimate or underestimate these risks (Camerer
and Kunreuther 1989; McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993). Is 
misperception of risk a problem with tornadoes? 
• Can an economic model of information help us understand peoples’
reactions to hazard warnings? 
• How prevalent is underpreparation for natural hazards? Hurricane 
Katrina has raised the issue of poor societal preparation for hazards 
to high salience for policy (Meyer 2006). 
Because of the broad reach of tornadoes (they have occurred in all 
states), their impacts depend on the preparations and actions of essen-
tially all Americans, a fact that underscores the importance of evidence 
regarding these events. 
This chapter analyzes the impact of tornadoes on the United States 
and is organized as follows. The next section reviews the aggregate 
impact of tornadoes on the nation, including three main components: 1) 
the cost of casualties, 2) the value of property damaged or destroyed, 
and 3) the cost of responding to tornado warnings. Overall the mone-
tized cost of tornadoes is $4.6 billion per year. We then discuss findings 
on the determinants of tornado casualties, and we use these findings to 
analyze how the impacts might be reduced. The final section offers a 
brief conclusion. 
THE SOCIETAL COST OF TORNADOES 
Tornadoes threaten life and limb, and they damage and destroy 
property. Tornado warnings are also costly, because people must dis-
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
The Socioeconomic Impact of Tornadoes  105 
rupt their daily activities to take shelter during a tornado warning. To 
provide perspective on the impact of tornadoes, we monetize the value 
of casualties, damages, and sheltering costs, based on U.S. averages for 
1996–2006. Damage is the easiest to monetize, and we use inflation-
adjusted property damage as reported by the NWS, which averaged 
$1.07 billion annually (in 2007 dollars).1 Note that 1996–2006 included 
the tornado with the greatest reported damage in U.S. history, the May 
3, 1999, Oklahoma City F5 tornado.2 
A total of 645 tornado fatalities occurred between 1996 and 2006, 
or 58.6 per year. Comparing fatalities with damage requires applica-
tion of a dollar figure for the lives lost. The value of a statistical life 
as revealed in market trade-offs constitutes a reasonable way to value 
lives for such public policy purposes.3 We use the value of a statistical 
life applied by the Environmental Protection Agency in a benefit-cost 
analysis of the Clean Air Act (EPA 1997). The EPA used a figure of 
$4.8 million in 1990 dollars, based on a meta-analysis of dozens of 
published studies. Adjusting this value for inflation yields a value of 
$7.6 million in 2007 dollars. The monetized value of tornado fatalities 
is thus $445 million per year. 
Tornadoes injured an average of 999 persons annually. Values of 
statistical injuries have been developed using market data, and the EPA
(1997) has applied monetary values for a variety of injuries. A difficulty 
arises in applying existing values to tornado injuries due to a dearth 
of information on the distribution of the severity of tornado injuries. 
Epidemiological studies in the aftermath of selected tornadoes provide 
some evidence on the severity of injuries, which overall are not very se-
vere. Brown et al. (2002), for example, found that 76 percent of injuries 
in the May 3, 1999, Oklahoma tornado outbreak did not require hos-
pitalization and that the average hospital stay was seven days. Carter, 
Millson, and Allen (1989) found that 83 percent of injuries in the May 
31, 1985, Ontario, Canada, tornado outbreak were minor, with an aver-
age hospital stay of 12.5 days. Given this evidence, we follow Merrell, 
Simmons, and Sutter (2005) and use a value of a statistical injury equal 
to 1 percent of the value of a statistical life, or $76,000. The monetary 
value of injuries is then $76 million per year. 
We turn next to the cost of tornado warnings, that is, the value of 
time spent under warnings. Although taking cover during a tornado 
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warning can save lives, the disruption of business or leisure activities 
is costly. Between 1996 and 2004, the NWS issued around 3,500 warn-
ings per year, which were in effect for an average of 41 minutes each.4 
We use the U.S. Census estimated population of the warned county 
and the duration of each warning to estimate person-hours spent under 
warnings. The average warned county had a population of 98,000, so 
an average of 234 million person-hours were spent under warnings an-
nually. For members of the workforce, the hourly wage measures the 
opportunity cost of time. We use the average civilian nonfarm hourly 
wage of $17.42 in 2007 (BLS 2007) to value employed persons’ time 
lost, and we value the time of individuals who are not employed, 52 
percent of the population, at half this amount. The weighted average 
value of time is $12.89, and the annual value of time spent under warn-
ings is $3.02 billion. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the impacts of tornadoes quantified here. The 
cost is $4.6 billion per year, and the value of time spent under warnings 
accounts for nearly two-thirds of this total, property damage 23 per-
cent, fatalities at just under 10 percent, and injuries less than 2 percent. 
Note that this total does not include societal impacts, such as business 
interruption, alternative living expenses, and external, community-wide 
impacts. Although tornado impacts on a metropolitan area are modest, 
major tornadoes can significantly impact small communities. In April 
2007, a tornado heavily damaged the business district of Tulia, Texas 
(population 4,700). The town’s only grocery store never reopened after 
the tornado, leaving residents with a 60-mile round trip drive to Ama-
rillo for grocery shopping (Martinez and Ewing 2008). 
Readers might find the large contribution of time under warnings 
to the total impact of tornadoes surprising. One way to put the costs of 
warnings in perspective is to consider how the cost of tornadoes would 
have differed in the 1920s. Brooks and Doswell (2002) estimate that 
the U.S. tornado fatality rate fell from 1.8 per million residents then to 
0.11 per million in 2000. If the higher 1920s rate occurred today, the 
nation would experience an average of 960 fatalities per year, not the 
59 actually observed since 1996. Applying the $7.6 million value of 
a statistical life yields a cost of fatalities of $7.3 billion annually; the 
NWS did not issue warnings in the 1920s, so there is no basis for com-
paring cost of time spent under warnings. The lethality of tornadoes has 
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Table 6.1  Annual Impact of Tornadoes 
Monetized value % of monetized 
Impact Amount ($ millions) impact 
Property damage — 1,070 23.2 
Fatalities 58.6 445 9.7 
Injuries 999 76 1.6 
Time under 234 million 3,020 65.5 
warnings person-hours 
Total 4,610 100.0 
NOTE: Damage and casualties are averages for 1996–2006, time under warnings an 
average for 1996–2004. The valuation of lives lost, injuries, and time under warnings 
is discussed in the text. 
SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) tornado 
fatality location data, available from the NOAA by permission. 
been so greatly reduced that responding to warnings now represents the 
largest part of the cost of tornadoes. The total cost is substantially lower 
today because tornadoes are less deadly. 
WHAT ARE THE DETERMINANTS OF
TORNADO CASUALTIES? 
An analysis of tornado casualties reveals several significant patterns 
discussed in this section. The figures cited are from a regression analy-
sis of tornado fatalities and injuries from 1986 to 2004. The data set has 
been constructed by the authors using the Storm Prediction Center’s 
(SPC) national tornado archive, the NWS’s tornado warning verifica-
tion records, and U.S. Census data.5 The unit of observation is the state 
tornado segment, because the SPC archive reports separate entries for 
multistate tornadoes. For simplicity we will usually just say tornadoes 
and not state tornado segments in the text. Appendix 6A discusses the 
details of the regression model and precise variable definitions, and 
Table 6A.1 reports the full results. 
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Most Tornadoes Are Not Killers 
Only 347 of the almost 21,000 tornadoes in our data set resulted in 
one or more fatalities, and 1,988 resulted in one or more injuries. That 
is, 98 percent of tornadoes had no fatalities, and 91 percent caused no 
injuries. The risk to life and limb posed by tornadoes is quite concen-
trated in powerful storms. The most powerful tornadoes are rated F4 or 
F5 on the Fujita scale of tornado damage.6 Nine of the ten F5 tornadoes 
and 42 percent of F4 tornadoes between 1986 and 2004 killed at least 
one person, and these tornadoes accounted for 43 percent of fatalities. 
The 41 tornadoes that resulted in five or more fatalities (less than 0.2 
percent of the total) accounted for half of all fatalities. 
Tornadoes rated F3 or stronger are much more likely to result in fa-
talities or injuries. Table 6.2, constructed from the regression analysis, 
reports fatalities and injuries by tornadoes of different F-scale ratings 
relative to an F0 tornado. Expected fatalities are about 27,000 times 
more likely with an F5 tornado than with an F0, and injuries are almost 
2,000 times more likely in F5 tornadoes. Both fatalities and injuries 
increase fairly consistently with each F-scale category increase. 
Location, Location, Location 
Many observers have noted the vulnerability of mobile homes to tor-
nadoes (American Meteorological Society 1997; Brooks and Doswell
2002; Golden and Adams 2000; Golden and Snow 1991). Figure 6.1 re-
ports tornado fatalities by location as tracked by the NWS for the years 
Table 6.2  Tornado Casualties by Fujita Scale Rating 
F-scale category Fatalities Injuries 
F1 15 11 
F2 105 65 
F3 545 178 
F4 2,644 692 
F5 26,630 1,808 
NOTE: The values in the table are the ratio of expected fatalities or injuries in a tornado 
of each F-scale category rating relative to an otherwise equivalent F0 tornado. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 6.1  Tornado Fatalities by Location (%) 
2.14.6 
43.2 
31.1 
4.6 
9.0 
5.3 
Mobile homes 
Permanent homes 
Businesses 
Vehicles 
School/church 
Outdoors 
Unknown/other 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from NOAA tornado fatality location data. 
1985–2007.7 More fatalities occurred in mobile homes (43 percent)
than any other location. Permanent homes, which include single-family 
homes and apartments, rank second at 31 percent, followed by vehicles 
at 9 percent, schools and churches, businesses, and outdoor or other 
locations at about 5 percent each. The proportion of fatalities in manu-
factured homes is disproportionately high. These structures constituted 
only 7.6 percent of U.S. housing units in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 
2000), but the fatality rate for manufactured homes is at least ten times 
that of permanent homes. Regression analysis confirms the dependence 
of casualties on the housing stock. An increase of one standard devia-
tion in mobile homes as a proportion of county housing units increases 
expected fatalities by 36 percent and expected injuries by 26 percent. 
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Timing Matters 
Timing significantly affects casualties, including time of day, day 
of the week, and month of the year. Tornadoes during the evening and 
overnight hours are significantly more likely to kill or injure people. 
Figure 6.2 reports an index for casualties by time of day based on 
the regression analysis. We divide the day into five time periods, the 
overnight hours (midnight to 6 a.m.), morning (6 a.m. to noon), early 
afternoon (noon to 4 p.m.), late afternoon (4 p.m. to 8 p.m.), and late 
evening (8 p.m. to midnight). The index sets fatalities and injuries from 
an early afternoon tornado equal to 100, and represents casualties from 
tornadoes at other times relative to an early afternoon tornado. Fatalities 
for overnight tornadoes exceed those of early afternoon tornadoes by a 
factor of nearly 2.5 and those for late evening tornadoes by a factor of 
Figure 6.2  Time of Day and Tornado Casualties 
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more than 2. A similar pattern is observed for injuries, but the amplitude 
of the time of day effects are not as great; injuries are 43 percent and 32 
percent higher overnight and in the late evening, respectively, than for 
a comparable early afternoon tornado. 
Tornado casualties also vary widely by month. Figure 6.3 presents 
an index of fatalities and injuries by month derived from the regres-
sion analysis. The index equals 100 for both fatalities and injuries in 
February, the month with the deadliest tornadoes. The difference in 
lethality across months is quite substantial, as a tornado in February 
yields more than 14 times the fatalities of an otherwise equal tornado 
in July. Tornadoes are less deadly in the spring and summer months 
(with the exception of August) than tornadoes in the late fall or winter. 
Injuries exhibit the same basic pattern, except that again the variation 
is substantially less than for fatalities (injuries in January tornadoes ex-
ceed those in May tornadoes by a factor of 2.5). The low casualty rates 
Figure 6.3  Tornado Casualties by Month 
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in May, June, and July benefit the nation, since these months have the 
largest numbers of tornadoes, while the high lethality in November, 
December, January, and February applies to relatively few tornadoes. 
Although a difference in intensity of storms not fully captured by the 
F-scale variables may be thought to drive the result, the strongest torna-
does occur in the spring months. Hours of darkness might explain some 
of the variation over months, because tornadoes that occur after dark 
are more dangerous (see Ashley, Knmenec, and Schwantes 2008, who 
control for the exact time of sunset). But variation in casualties across 
months is much greater than the variation across the day, so darkness 
probably cannot explain much of the variation over the year. Surprise 
might drive this result; residents may not expect tornadoes during the 
winter, and thus are not alert for and ready to respond to a warning. 
In contrast, during the spring residents might suspect that an ominous 
thunderstorm could produce a tornado. Surprise would need to affect 
warning responses, since the regressions control for tornado warnings. 
The day of the week also affects fatalities. Intuition suggests that 
casualties might be higher on either weekends or weekdays. On week-
ends people might be busy with recreation and leisure activities and 
not closely following the weather and weather warnings, while week-
day tornadoes could occur during evening rush hour traffic jams. The 
regression analysis finds that weekend tornadoes are more dangerous: 
expected fatalities and injuries are 40 percent and 8 percent higher, 
respectively, than for tornadoes during the week, although only the fa-
talities result attains statistical significance. 
The Efforts of the National Weather Service 
Protecting persons is part of the mission of the NWS, and tornado 
warnings have been issued since the 1950s to try to reduce casualties 
(Doswell, Moller, and Brooks 1999). The NWS installed WSR-88D 
(Doppler) radars at Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) across the coun-
try between 1992 and 1997. The radars, adapted from military use, 
allow much better resolution of wind fields in severe storms. Viewers of 
weather coverage on television are probably familiar with the Doppler 
radar image of the “hook echo” of a tornado. Simmons and Sutter (2005) 
analyzed the effect of Doppler radar on tornado warnings and casualties 
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by using the radar installation date for each WFO to determine which 
tornadoes occurred after installation of the new radars. Over the period 
from 1986 to 1999, Doppler radar increased the percentage of storms 
warned for from 35 to 60 percent and the mean lead time from 5.3 to 9.5 
minutes; it also reduced the percentage of false alarm warnings from 
79 to 76 percent. The new radars also reduced expected fatalities by 45 
percent and expected injuries by 40 percent. We update the casualties 
analysis with these regressions, including more years of tornadoes and 
more county-level control variables. 
We also investigate the role of tornado warnings on casualties. Spe-
cifically, we focus on whether a longer lead time reduces casualties, or 
whether instead there is an optimal lead time for a warning. Although 
responding to a tornado warning does not take long, for example, in 
contrast with evacuation for a hurricane, issuing the warning is just 
one part of the warning process. The warning must be disseminated to 
residents in harm’s way via television, radio, tornado sirens, the Inter-
net, or other channels, including phone calls from friends or relatives. 
Dissemination takes time, creating a need for longer lead times. We 
can determine from NWS tornado warning verification records whether 
each tornado was warned for or not. We have explored several ways to 
model warnings, including an indicator variable for whether a warning 
was issued for the tornado and the lead time on the warning in minutes 
(Simmons and Sutter 2008a). Here we focus on a set of dummy vari-
ables for lead times in the ranges of 1 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 20, 21 
to 30, and 31 or more minutes. The lead time is specifically the number 
of minutes between the time the warning was issued and the beginning 
of the tornado.8 Creating intervals allows the marginal effect of lead 
time to vary in a possibly irregular manner. 
Figure 6.4 presents the effect of lead time on fatalities and injuries. 
We again use an index to display the effect, with the index set equal 
to 100 for tornadoes with no warning or a warning lead time of zero 
minutes. An index value less than 100 indicates that lead time reduces 
casualties. Tornado warnings reduce injuries at all lead time intervals, 
with the largest reductions occurring in the 11 to 15 and 31+ minute 
intervals—42 percent and 44 percent, respectively. The reductions in 
injuries in the other lead time intervals range from 23 to 33 percent, and 
although the lead time variables are statistically significant, the differ-
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Figure 6.4  Warning Lead Time and Casualties 
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ences between the intervals are not generally statistically significant. 
Thus warnings reduce injuries, but the marginal effect of lead time is 
essentially zero after 15 minutes. 
The situation is different for fatalities. Lead times up to 15 minutes 
reduce fatalities by 19 percent, 51 percent, and 31 percent in the 1 to 
5, 6 to 10, and 11 to 15 minute intervals, respectively. But lead times 
greater than 15 minutes increase fatalities relative to no warning, and by 
a sizable (and statistically significant) amount: 57 percent, 49 percent, 
and 11 percent for the 16 to 20, 21 to 30, and 31+ minute intervals, 
respectively. Some of these fatalities may occur because residents re-
act to long lead times by taking actions that increase their risk relative 
to those taken when there is no warning. In addition, long lead times 
sometimes result when a warning is issued but not canceled and a tor-
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nado eventually occurs in the warning area; residents may not consider 
that such warnings convey the same degree of risk as those issued for an 
imminent tornado. As Simmons and Sutter (2008a) discuss, the increase 
in fatalities for long lead times reflects a handful of well-warned-of and 
particularly deadly tornadoes. A contributing factor is that powerful tor-
nadoes tend to occur during large tornado outbreaks, and consequently 
are well warned of. We do not observe how many fatalities might result 
if the most powerful tornadoes occurred without warning. Furthermore, 
the warnings for some of these killer tornadoes may not have been 
disseminated to residents. For example, consider the 1987 Saragosa, 
Texas, tornado, which had a lead time of 22 minutes and resulted in 30 
deaths. As Aguirre (1988) discusses, the fatalities occurred in an immi-
grant community where residents watched Spanish-language television 
networks that did not broadcast the warning, and thus they were effec-
tively unwarned about the tornado. 
While tornado warnings alert residents to danger, most warnings, 
because they are issued in advance of the tornado, turn out to be false 
alarms. The national false alarm ratio (FAR) was 0.744 in 2004, mean-
ing that tornadoes did not occur in the warned county in three out of 
four cases. When warnings do not come to pass, the cry-wolf effect 
might apply: that is, residents might dismiss future warnings as false 
alarms, reducing the effectiveness of warnings that do precede torna-
does. A higher FAR reduces the value of the information contained in 
warnings, and should at some point reduce warning response. Yet a 
false alarm effect has been difficult to uncover: Barnes et al. (2007) find 
that “evidence for the cry-wolf effect in natural hazards research . . . has 
not been forthcoming” (p. 1142). 
The extensive NWS tornado warning verification records allow 
a careful test of the effect of false alarms on tornado casualties, and 
by implication warning response. A complication arises because false 
alarms are nonevents, while tornadoes are events. It is not clear which 
tornado warnings, as regards both false alarms and verified warnings, 
should apply to constructing an FAR for different tornado events. If 
all warnings nationwide apply to all tornadoes, there will be no cross-
sectional variation in FARs, and we would be forced to try to disentan-
gle the effect of changes in the national FAR from a time trend. Warning 
performance, however, varies substantially across the nation as well as 
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over time, and thus we use local, recent warnings to calculate an FAR 
in our analysis. Specifically, we use warnings issued in the state struck 
by a tornado over the previous 12 months to calculate an FAR that we 
use as a control variable in our regression analysis.9 
We find strong evidence of a false alarm effect, consistent with 
economic models of the value of information. Ahigher state FAR signifi-
cantly increases both fatalities and injuries. An increase of one standard 
deviation in the FAR (which is 0.117) increases expected fatalities by 
10 percent and injuries by 9 percent. The national FAR declined after 
the NWS installed Doppler weather radars, so some of the reduction in 
casualties attributed above to Doppler radar (perhaps 10–20 percent of 
the 30–45 percent reduction) appears to have resulted from decreased 
false alarms. We have also calculated recent, local FARs using NWS 
Weather Forecast Office County Warning Areas and TV markets as de-
fined by the A. C. Nielsen Company over one- and two-year intervals 
for robustness. We find a similar false alarm effect using these alterna-
tive FAR definitions (Simmons and Sutter 2009). 
The dependence of casualties on time of day may constitute indirect 
evidence of the effectiveness of tornado warnings. Tornado warnings 
help reduce casualties only if people respond to them, and residents are 
probably less likely to receive warnings issued at night when they are 
asleep. Thus some portion of the lower fatalities and injuries for day-
time tornadoes may be due to the lifesaving effects of tornado warnings. 
The Demographics of Tornado Vulnerability 
Economists have found that safety is generally a normal or luxury 
good: as people become wealthier and secure the necessities of life, 
they look to reduce risks of premature death. For natural hazards, 
Hurricane Katrina highlighted the converse of this proposition, the vul-
nerability of low-income households. Recent research has documented 
a negative relationship between income and natural hazards fatalities 
across countries (Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2005; Kahn 2005). 
Higher-income households could reduce tornado risk in several ways: 
by purchasing higher-quality homes (or not residing in manufactured 
homes), installing in-home tornado shelters, and purchasing NOAA
weather radios or other emergency alert systems. Wealthier communi-
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ties might be more likely to invest in tornado sirens and emergency 
management and emergency medical services. 
Yet county-level income does not appear to reduce tornado fa-
talities or injuries. Our previous research (Simmons and Sutter 2005, 
2008a) has shown that tornado paths through areas with higher median 
incomes have significantly greater fatalities and injuries, contrary to 
expectations. We include extra control variables in the regressions re-
ported here, and the statistical significance of income is diminished, 
although an increase of one standard deviation in median income still 
increases expected fatalities and injuries by 8 to 9 percent. The income 
effect we found previously may be due to urbanization. Our previous 
and current regressions include population density, which as we would 
expect increases casualties since the number of persons in the path 
of a tornado affects the likelihood of casualties. Our regressions here 
also include the rural proportion of county population, as characterized 
by the Census Bureau; a larger rural population significantly reduces 
both fatalities and injuries. Urban areas have higher incomes than rural
areas, and so the positive effect of income on casualties may be a re-
sidual consequence of a population effect. 
Tornadoes seem to run counter to several other common elements 
of natural hazards vulnerability. The elderly are considered an at-risk 
population, and this vulnerability might be particularly acute for torna-
does, as the elderly may have difficulty hearing sirens or an approaching 
tornado and quickly moving to shelter without assistance. Yet a larger 
proportion of county residents over age 65 are associated with signifi-
cantly reduced fatalities and injuries. Injuries also decrease with larger 
portions of residents under 18 and male residents. Poverty is normally 
associated with greater vulnerability, and here we have mixed evidence: 
an increased county poverty rate increases (although not significantly) 
expected fatalities and reduces expected injuries. But poverty likely af-
fects the propensity of a household to live in manufactured housing, 
and this definitely increases vulnerability. Education is also related to 
vulnerability. A low level of education as indicated by the proportion of 
residents over age 25 who did not graduate from high school increases 
both fatalities and injuries. But the proportion of persons with a four-
year college degree does not affect casualties. Long commuting times 
might also affect vulnerability to tornadoes, particularly since many tor-
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nadoes occur during the evening rush hour. We find some evidence of 
the vulnerability of commuters, as a higher proportion of residents with 
a commute over 30 minutes significantly increases fatalities but does 
not affect injuries. 
HOW MIGHT TORNADO IMPACTS BE REDUCED? 
Our analysis of tornado impacts can assist in evaluating alterna-
tives for reducing impacts. Economics provides numerous examples of 
policies that fail to achieve their goal or even have unintended negative 
consequences. Several options exist for trying to reduce tornado im-
pacts, and our analysis can help evaluate the comparative advantages 
and possible interactions between these alternatives. Based on our anal-
ysis we offer four insights on reducing tornado impacts. Note that the 
potential gain in reduced casualties from one measure falls when other 
measures are simultaneously employed. For example, the United States 
currently experiences about 60 tornado fatalities per year. A measure 
that reduces fatalities by 25 percent would currently save about 15 lives 
per year. If another measure first reduces fatalities to 40 per year, the 25 
percent reduction in fatalities now saves 10 lives per year, and so the 
benefits of the measure fall by one-third. Thus our statements about po-
tential casualty reductions are all based on recent casualties and assume 
no other measures are employed. 
Tornado Warnings 
As previously discussed, the value of time spent under warnings 
represents a significant portion of the societal cost of tornadoes. A re-
cent NWS innovation will significantly reduce the amount of time spent 
under warnings. The NWS introduced Storm Based Warnings (SBWs) 
for tornadoes (and other types of severe weather) nationwide in October 
2007. SBWs warn for a polygon area near the tornado circulation, not 
an entire county. In tests the new warnings reduced the area warned by 
70 to 75 percent compared with county warnings, with no compromise 
of safety since residents actually at risk from the possible tornado are 
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still warned (Looney 2006; Jacks and Ferree 2007). The new warnings 
will significantly benefit society, although the savings of time sheltering 
depends on how many people actually responded to county warnings. 
Assuming a 50 percent response rate to county warnings and a 70 per-
cent reduction in warned area, SBWs will reduce the value of time spent 
sheltering by $1 billion per year (Sutter and Erickson, forthcoming). 
SBWs could help reduce tornado casualties as well, since more precise 
and hence valuable information in the new warnings should improve 
response. Counties are large relative to tornado damage paths: the area 
of the typical county struck by tornadoes is about 1,000 square miles, 
compared to a mean tornado damage area of 0.3 square miles.10 Thus 
the old county warnings provided relatively little detail on the loca-
tion of a possible tornado. By conveying a higher level of risk for the 
warned area, SBWs might make residents more likely to abandon a 
manufactured home, as the NWS recommends, and increase the value 
of NOAA weather radios and commercial emergency alert systems. The 
technology exists to convey even more precise information on the lo-
cation of a tornado—for instance, through street-level storm tracking 
currently provided by some television stations. 
Improved lead time for unwarned tornadoes can also reduce casual-
ties. An optimal warning lead time reduces fatalities and injuries by 50 
percent and 42 percent, respectively, relative to no warning. Between 
2000 and 2004, 46 percent of tornadoes occurred with a warning lead 
time of five minutes or less. These tornadoes are underwarned for, in 
that our analysis shows that longer lead times should reduce casualties. 
Optimal warning for these tornadoes would reduce fatalities and injuries 
by an additional 21 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Given current 
warning technology, these tornadoes could not be warned for without 
increasing the FAR, and that would increase casualties. Improving lead 
time performance without increasing the FAR would require new tech-
nology or algorithms that shift the trade-off between detection and false 
alarms (see Brooks 2004 for a depiction of this trade-off). 
On the other hand, we find no evidence that increasing lead times 
beyond 15 minutes would benefit society. In fact, longer lead times 
perversely result in more fatalities than a tornado without a warning. 
Although we think that this result may be anomalous, it does not follow 
that we would be likely to find a further reduction in fatalities beyond 
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that observed in the 6 to 10 minute interval. And for injuries the marginal
benefit of lead time beyond the 11 to 15 minute interval is essentially 
zero. This diminishing return probably occurs because residents can re-
spond to a tornado warning—take cover in an interior room or storm 
shelter if available—quite quickly. Time is needed to disseminate a 
warning, but our results suggest that everyone who is likely to receive 
a warning has received it within 10 or 15 minutes. Thus our analysis of 
casualties leads us to expect that increased lead times beyond 15 min-
utes would not yield significant benefits to society. 
Tornado Shelters: Rarely Cost-Effective 
Engineers have designed above-ground safe rooms and below-
ground shelters capable of protecting residents from even the strongest 
tornadoes. Below-ground shelters retail for $2,000 to $2,500, while safe 
rooms cost in excess of $5,000. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) included tornado shelters in its National Mitiga-
tion Strategy in the 1990s and issued performance criteria for shelters 
(FEMA 1999). FEMA and the state of Oklahoma collaborated on the 
Oklahoma Saferoom Initiative to provide rebates to homeowners in-
stalling a shelter or safe room. 
The evidence suggests that tornado shelters are not a cost-effective 
way to reduce permanent home casualties. Merrell, Simmons, and Sut-
ter (2005) and Simmons and Sutter (2006) calculated the cost per life 
saved for shelters using historical casualties, predicted casualties from 
a regression model, and casualties per home struck by tornadoes. All 
three methods yield fairly consistent estimates for permanent homes; 
for instance, the cost per life saved in Oklahoma, at the heart of Tornado 
Alley, was over $50 million, which greatly exceeds market-revealed 
values of a statistical life (typically under $10 million). We illustrate the 
arithmetic with the historical fatality totals for Oklahoma, which expe-
rienced 263 tornado fatalities between 1950 and 2007, or 4.5 per year. 
In-home shelters can be expected to prevent only the 31 percent of fa-
talities that occur in permanent homes (see Figure 6.1). If all permanent 
home fatalities could be prevented, shelters would prevent 1.4 deaths 
per year.11 The cost of equipping all of the more than one million single-
family homes in the state with a shelter (at $2,000 per shelter) is over 
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$2 billion. The resulting cost per life saved in this calculation is $57 
million. As another way of understanding this result, 55 percent of per-
manent home fatalities occur in F4 and F5 tornadoes. Violent tornadoes 
occur too infrequently even in Tornado Alley to justify economically 
such an expenditure, regardless of the potentially fatal consequences. 
Hardening targets is an ineffective way to reduce permanent home 
fatalities. 
Reducing Manufactured Home Vulnerability 
Reducing the vulnerability of manufactured homes is crucial to re-
ducing tornado casualties. Although tornado shelters are unlikely to be 
cost-effective in permanent homes, the cost per life saved for mobile 
homes is less than $10 million in the most tornado-prone states. And the 
cost per life saved could be even lower with cost-sharing for shelters in 
manufactured home parks. Schmidlin, Hammer, and Knabe (2001) re-
port that manufactured home parks do in fact offer community shelters 
as an amenity for residents. Simmons and Sutter (2007) find that lots 
in parks in Oklahoma with shelters rent at a 5 percent premium, which 
approximately covers the cost of a community shelter as estimated by 
FEMA (2000). Thus tornado shelters may help with the mobile home 
problem, but they are only part of the answer, and will be less effective 
for the majority of homes not located in a park. 
Manufactured homes can also be made more wind-resistant. The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1994 amended the 
HUD code for manufactured housing to include wind load requirements 
in areas subject to high winds. Although intended to reduce hurricane-
related damage (to which end the rule has been effective; see Grosskopf 
2005), the wind load provisions appear to reduce tornado risk as well. 
Simmons and Sutter (2008b) examined the aftermath of the February 
2007 tornadoes in Lake County, Florida, which killed 21 persons, all in 
manufactured homes. A key factor in fatalities was whether the home 
was totally leveled, as characterized by county officials: 16 of the 17 
fatalities for which home condition could be ascertained occurred in 
leveled homes. Manufactured homes built to the wind load provisions 
were 79 percent less likely to be leveled than homes built before the 
HUD code went into effect. No fatalities could be documented in the 
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newer homes, and the reduction in the probability of a home being lev-
eled implies that in time fatalities could be reduced by as much as 70 
percent. Of course, whether these results extrapolate to other tornadoes 
(either stronger or weaker) is an open question, but improved construc-
tion may help mitigate the mobile home problem. 
Tornadoes after Dark 
Tornadoes are significantly more dangerous at night than during the 
day. Casualties could be reduced if the lethality of nighttime tornadoes 
could be brought in line with tornadoes during the day. Between 1986 
and 2004, 177 and 116 fatalities and 2,871 and 2,217 injuries occurred 
in late evening (8 p.m.–midnight) and overnight (midnight–6 a.m.) tor-
nadoes, respectively. If these tornadoes were only as dangerous as early 
afternoon tornadoes, 155 fatalities and 1,308 injuries would have been 
avoided. Overall this would reduce fatalities by 16 percent and injuries 
by 7 percent. 
A strategy to reduce this vulnerability depends on exactly why 
nighttime tornadoes are so lethal, which is an area of ongoing research. 
Three alternative explanations seem plausible. First, the warning pro-
cess might be less effective for nighttime tornadoes. That is, fewer 
people might receive these warnings because they happen to be asleep, 
as mentioned above. Second, and closely related, the response to night-
time warnings could differ. For instance, people might seek visual 
confirmation of a tornado before reacting, and the difficulty of seeing 
tornadoes at night might make people less likely to respond. Finally, the 
nighttime effect might be a consequence of the greater vulnerability of 
manufactured homes, since residents are more likely to be at home at 
night than during the day.12 If the vulnerability to tornadoes after dark is 
due to less effective warnings, emergency alert systems or more refined 
warnings might reduce this vulnerability. If nighttime fatalities are an 
extension of the mobile home problem, the HUD wind load provisions 
or tornado shelters in mobile home parks might address the problem. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our investigation has identified several aspects of the distribution 
of tornado casualties and the relative likelihood of casualties. A handful 
of powerful (F3 or stronger) tornadoes, often clustered on super tornado 
outbreak days, account for a large fraction of total casualties. But the 
distribution of fatalities or injuries by F-scale does not tell us in which 
category society could most easily reduce casualties. We have found 
that tornadoes that strike mobile homes or after dark or on weekends or 
during the fall or winter months produce more casualties. If casualties 
in these circumstances could be reduced to the comparable rate in per-
manent homes for weekday tornadoes during the spring season, the toll 
from tornadoes would be reduced considerably. But overall casualties 
are not currently the largest component of the societal cost of tornadoes. 
Because tornadoes have become less deadly over the years, property 
damage and the cost of responding to warnings now account for the 
bulk of their societal impact. The introduction of Storm Based Warn-
ings by the NWS will reduce time spent under warnings by perhaps 70 
percent. 
Our quantitative, large data set analysis also reveals some promis-
ing directions for qualitative, survey, or case study analysis. Large data 
set statistical analysis excels at identifying patterns in vulnerability but 
does not necessarily allow us to pinpoint the cause of the vulnerability. 
A relatively small number of tornadoes account for many of the fatali-
ties and injuries that drive our regression results; detailed case studies 
could help reveal whether special circumstances or details about the 
dissemination of warnings not readily captured by control variables 
contributed to the loss of life. Future qualitative research could help 
to address some of the casualty disparities. For instance, surveys could 
explore whether people respond differently to tornadoes at night or dur-
ing the fall and winter months. Additional quantitative and qualitative 
research will be needed to reduce the societal impacts of tornadoes in a 
cost-effective manner. 
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Notes 
We are grateful for continued financial support from NOAA’s National Severe 
Storms Laboratory, the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, and the Natural Haz-
ards Center at the University of Colorado. 
1. Information on property damage, and on injuries and fatalities resulting from tor-
nadoes in the following paragraphs, is from NOAA’s National Weather Service 
Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Historical Severe Storm Database, http://www.spc
.noaa.gov/wcm/index.html#data. 
2. Brooks and Doswell (2001) present damage totals for past tornadoes adjusted for 
inflation, population growth, and changes in national wealth. The May 3, 1999, F5 
tornado ranks eleventh in their adjusted damage calculations. 
3. For a discussion of the concept of a statistical life and a survey of estimates from 
the market, see Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (2000). 
4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tornado Warning 
Verification Archive (StormDat), available from NOAA by permission. 
5. The SPC archive can be accessed online at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/archive. 
6. The Fujita scale rates tornado damage from F0 (weakest) to F5 (strongest). An F0 
is a minimal tornado that causes light damage; an F5 tornado causes “incredible” 
damage, including well-built homes swept off their foundations and cars thrown 
more than 100 meters. A description of the Fujita scale and the Enhanced Fujita 
scale can be found at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/f-scale.html. 
7. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tornado Fatality Lo-
cations, available from NOAA by permission. 
8. By convention, the NWS counts a case where a tornado warning is issued after the 
tornado is on the ground as a warned tornado with a lead time of zero. We had pre-
viously separated out zero lead time tornadoes as an extra category, but the effect 
of a zero lead time warning was very close to (and statistically indistinguishable 
from) no warning. 
9. These regressions omit tornadoes for which no warnings were issued in the state in 
the prior 12 months, since the FAR in these instances is undefined. 
10. Authors’ calculation using NOAA’s National Weather Service Storm Prediction 
Center (SPC) Historical Severe Storm Database, http://www.spc.noaa.gov/wcm/ 
index.html#data. 
11. And even then shelters would prevent all in-home fatalities only if residents al-
ways take shelter before the tornado hits. 
12. Note that residual mobile home vulnerability could also explain the greater lethal-
ity of tornadoes on weekends. 
 
 
 
	
 
  
 
 
Appendix 6A 
The impacts on tornado casualties discussed throughout this chapter are 
from a regression analysis of casualties. This appendix describes the details of 
the regression models. Fatalities and injuries take on nonnegative integer val-
ues; that is, the number of persons killed in a tornado can equal 0, 1, 2, or more, 
with a large number of zero observations. Ordinary least squares regression 
fails to take into account the truncation of casualties at zero, and thus instead 
a Poisson regression model is applied to this count data. The Poisson model 
(Greene 2000, pp. 880–886) assumes that the dependent variable y
i 
is drawn 
from a Poisson distribution with parameter λi , or 
Prob(Yi = yi) = e
−λi × λi
yi/yi!, yi = 0, 1, 2, . . . 
The parameter λi of the distribution is assumed to be a log-linear function 
of the independent variables xi, or ln(λi) = β′ × xi. The Poisson regression model 
assumes equivalence of the conditional mean of y
i 
and its variance; violation 
of this condition is known as overdispersion. The negative binomial regression 
model (Greene 2000, pp. 886–888), a generalization of the Poisson model, is 
recommended when the data exhibit overdispersion. Diagnostic tests consis-
tently indicate that injuries but not fatalities are overdispersed. Consequently 
we estimate fatalities with Poisson models and injuries with negative binomial 
models. 
Our models include three categories of variables, describing character-
istics of the tornado, the tornado path, and NWS efforts to reduce casualties. 
The models also include, but we do not report, year dummy variables. The 
year variables control for nationwide changes over time, such as the advent 
of the Internet as a channel to communicate warnings, and any possible year-
to-year variation in warning response. The tornado characteristic variables are 
as described in the text, and model the rating of the tornado on the F-scale of 
tornado damage, the time of day, month, and whether the tornado occurred on 
a weekend. We also include the length of the damage path in miles. 
The storm path variables control for the economic and demographic char-
acteristics of the area struck by the tornado. The variable labels in Table 6A.1 
are self-descriptive. The variables are constructed using census data for the 
counties reported as in the storm path. For a tornado that struck more than one 
county, the tornado path variables average the observations for each county in 
the storm path. The path variables for a specific year are based on linear in-
terpolation from the decennial censuses. For tornadoes after 2000, population 
125 
 	   
 
126 Sutter and Simmons 
density is calculated using the census annual population estimates, while other 
variables use linear interpolation with county data from the 2006 American 
Community Survey when available. Mobile homes as a proportion of housing 
units by county was not reported in census publications prior to 1990, so for 
1986–1989 tornadoes, the values from the 1990 census are used. We also in-
clude an interaction term between path length and population density, because 
a long-track tornado through a highly populated area might affect casualties 
differently from an increase in either of these variables separately. 
The NWS variables are a dummy variable for tornadoes that occurred af-
ter installation of Doppler radar and tornado warning. The Doppler variable 
equals 1 if the tornado occurred on or after the date on which Doppler radar 
was installed in the NWS Weather Forecast Office with warning responsibility 
for the first tornado in the storm’s path. Since warnings are issued by county, 
a tornado that strikes several counties may yield several valid warnings. We 
apply the warning for the first county in the storm path. The tornado warning 
variables are dummy variables that indicate whether the lead time in minutes 
for the warning (if any) for the first county in the storm path was in this inter-
val. The False Alarm Ratio (FAR) variable is the proportion of warnings issued 
in the state struck by the tornado in the prior 12 months that were false alarms 
(i.e., that did not verify, as defined by the NWS). Table 6A.1 reports one speci-
fication of the casualties regressions with the Doppler radar variable but no 
warning variables, and one specification with the warning variables but not the 
Doppler variable. The Doppler radar specifications test for an impact of radar 
installation on casualties, which could be due to better warning for tornadoes 
or improved warning response. 
Table 6A.1 reports the raw regression coefficients and standard errors. To 
interpret the coefficients as discussed in the text, the antilog of the coefficient 
must be taken. Thus to calculate the marginal effect of a dummy variable with 
coefficient βk from the table, the percentage change in expected casualties is 
100 × (exp[βk] − 1). The percentage change in expected casualties due to a one 
standard deviation increase in variable k, σk , in variable k is 100 × (exp[βk × σk] 
− 1). Note that for a set of mutually exclusive categories (F-scale categories, 
day parts, months of the year), one of the dummy variable categories must be 
omitted for the model to be estimated. The impact of the included variables is 
then measured relative to that of a tornado in the excluded category: overnight 
for day parts, July for month, and F0 for F-scale. Table 6A.1 also indicates 
the statistical significance of each of the coefficient estimates at two different 
levels, 10 percent and 1 percent, in a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero. 
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Table 6A.1  Regression Analysis of Tornado Fatalities and Injuries 
Fatalities 
(Doppler, 
no warning)a 
Fatalities 
(warning, 
no Doppler)a 
Injuries 
(Doppler, 
no warning)a 
Injuries 
(warning, 
no Doppler)a 
−0.354* −0.581*** 
(0.240) (0.174) 
0.784* 0.702*** 
(0.353) (0.262) 
−0.223* −0.396*** 
(0.134) (0.123) 
−0.727*** −0.363*** 
(0.145) (0.119) 
−0.369* −0.538*** 
(0.160) (0.127) 
0.446*** −0.257* 
(0.132) (0.137) 
0.336*** −0.265* 
(0.114) (0.119) 
0.0879 −0.582*** 
(0.134) (0.124) 
−0.808*** −0.903*** −0.0882 −0.0536 
(0.174) (0.174) (0.144) (0.140) 
−0.846*** −0.891*** −0.359*** −0.436*** 
(0.132) (0.131) (0.126) (0.123) 
−0.664*** −0.592*** −0.323*** −0.386*** 
(0.124) (0.121) (0.121) (0.118) 
−0.154 −0.147 −0.0816 −0.161 
(0.133) (0.131) (0.137) (0.134) 
0.334*** 0.313*** 0.0793 0.0853 
(0.0847) (0.0836) (0.0704) (0.0688) 
1.45*** 1.03*** 0.521*** 0.536*** 
(0.391) (0.352) (0.192) (0.186) 
2.70*** 2.19*** 0.332 0.372* 
(0.366) (0.323) (0.210) (0.201) 
1.89*** 1.42*** 0.305* 0.236 
(0.353) (0.311) (0.161) (0.154) 
1.49*** 0.993*** 0.0702 0.0554 
(0.348) (0.307) (0.140) (0.136) 
(continued) 
Doppler 
FAR 
Lead 1–5 min. 
Lead 6–10 min. 
Lead 11–15 min. 
Lead 16–20 min. 
Lead 21–30 min. 
Lead 31+ min. 
Morning 
Early afternoon 
Early evening 
Late evening 
Weekend 
January 
February 
March 
April 
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Table 6A.1  (continued) 
Fatalities Fatalities Injuries Injuries 
(Doppler, (warning, (Doppler, (warning, 
no warning)a no Doppler)a no warning)a no Doppler)a 
May 
June 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Density 
Mobiles 
Income 
Rural 
Nonwhite 
Male 
Under 18 
Over 65 
Commute 30+ min. 
No high school 
1.44*** 
(0.341) 
0.944* 
(0.375) 
2.48*** 
(0.366) 
1.68*** 
(0.420) 
2.16*** 
(0.393) 
2.10*** 
(0.354) 
2.20*** 
(0.392) 
0.000251 
(0.000995) 
3.67*** 
(0.660) 
0.00865 
(0.00915) 
−1.40*** 
(0.212) 
−0.898* 
(0.367) 
2.42 
(2.47) 
1.53 
(1.81) 
−3.94* 
(1.69) 
2.19*** 
(0.413) 
1.81* 
(0.791) 
1.12*** 
(0.298) 
0.506 
(0.336) 
2.07*** 
(0.323) 
1.05*** 
(0.387) 
1.60*** 
(0.357) 
1.70*** 
(0.313) 
1.74*** 
(0.355) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
4.04*** 
(0.654) 
0.0118 
(0.0091) 
−1.57*** 
(0.218) 
−1.03*** 
(0.363) 
2.17 
(2.40) 
1.53 
(1.74) 
−5.56*** 
(1.65) 
2.30*** 
(0.458) 
1.45* 
(0.786) 
−0.408*** 
(0.129) 
−0.187 
(0.132) 
−0.161 
(0.169) 
−0.0892 
(0.172) 
0.0360 
(0.173) 
0.269* 
(0.153) 
0.0023 
(0.241) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0007) 
2.79*** 
(0.529) 
0.0077 
(0.0083) 
−0.598*** 
(0.155) 
0.657* 
(0.313) 
−6.54*** 
(2.02) 
−5.19*** 
(1.37) 
−5.54*** 
(1.11) 
0.361 
(0.351) 
3.07*** 
(0.662) 
−0.473*** 
(0.125) 
−0.226* 
(0.129) 
−0.0645 
(0.162) 
−0.109 
(0.168) 
0.0064 
(0.169) 
0.317* 
(0.150) 
0.0795 
(0.234) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
3.07*** 
(0.526) 
0.0159* 
(0.0081) 
−0.616*** 
(0.153) 
0.593* 
(0.306) 
−6.59*** 
(1.99) 
−5.83*** 
(1.34) 
−5.59*** 
(1.08) 
0.0932 
(0.381) 
3.63*** 
(0.646) 
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Table 6A.1  (continued) 
Fatalities 
(Doppler, 
no warning)a 
Fatalities 
(warning, 
no Doppler)a 
Injuries 
(Doppler, 
no warning)a 
Injuries 
(warning, 
no Doppler)a 
College −0.244 
(0.840) 
−1.41* 
(0.836) 
−0.0540 
(0.694) 
−0.0097 
(0.683) 
Poverty rate 1.48 
(1.16) 
1.75 
(1.27) 
−2.43* 
(1.03) 
−2.06* 
(1.01) 
Length 0.1002*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.347*** 
(0.0592) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0006) 
Length × density 0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
F1 2.73*** −10.5*** 2.40*** 0.672 
(0.374) (1.71) (0.0810) (1.30) 
F2 4.65*** 4.17*** 
(0.365) (0.101) 
F3 6.30*** 5.18*** 
(0.364) (0.154) 
F4 7.88*** 6.54*** 
(0.368) (0.255) 
F5 10.19*** 7.50*** 
(0.387) (0.867) 
Intercept −10.5*** 
(1.83) 
0.282 
(1.35) 
# observations 20,605 20,605 
Log likelihood −1,797 −9,400 
NOTE: Fatality estimates use Poisson regression models and injuries use negative 
binomial models with standard errors in parentheses. *significant at the 0.10 level 
(two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
a See Appendix 6A for the distinction in the two calculations of fatalities and injuries. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from SPC, NWS, and U.S. census data. 
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Cyclones, 10, 20 
Dacy, Douglas C., as disaster economics 
pioneer, 66 
Day care centers, post-Katrina, 93 
Disaster economics, 65–82 
historical pioneers in, 65–67 
impact of, 1–5 
prospective view of losses in, 71–82 
(see also Regional economic 
response models) 
retrospective research on, 67–71, 82 
Disaster expectations, 3–4, 15, 39–40, 
62n23 
changes in, and their economic 
effects, 43–48, 56–58 
implications of, for public policy, 
56–60 
individual and market responses to, 
41–43 
insurance and external effects of, 
51–56, 59–60 
land use and mitigation with, 49–51, 
58–59 
Disaster forecasts, 15 
deciding to take action or not upon, 
67–70, 68f 
hazard management and, 4, 24–26, 
46–47 
Disaster mitigation, 9–34 
analysis of, 4, 22–26, 94 
as balance of costs and losses, 66–67 
cost-effective strategies for, 6, 10, 
22–24, 23t, 26 
economic losses with, 79–82, 80f, 81f 
FEMA and national strategy for, 120 
insurance and, 2, 9, 20–22, 26–29, 
34n2, 91–92 
land use and, 49–51, 58–59 
reestablishing commerce as, 98–99, 
100 
Disaster recovery 
economic growth with, 44–45, 78–79,
79f 
expectations of, 96–98 
facilitation of, 10, 94 
market prices and controls in, 94–95 
predictive pace of, 5, 65–66 
private sector and, 5–6, 20, 51, 92–93,
96, 98–100 
Disasters, 82 
casualties/fatalities from, 6, 7, 10, 72 
definitions, 39, 60n9 
expected vs. unexpected, 4, 39–40 
frequency of, 1–2, 3, 6, 9, 15, 70, 94, 
103 
types of losses in, 4, 6, 53–56, 
61nn20–21, 73–74, 73t, 79f 
unanticipated, 48, 57–58 
See also Man-made disasters; Natural
disasters 
Doppler radar installations, 112–113, 116 
Doux-Commerce Thesis, 98 
Earthquakes 
casualties in, 10, 72 
insurance nonparticipants in high-risk
areas with, 51 
post-, economic consequences in 
Alaska, 44, 66 
property values and, 56 
public hazard awareness of, 25–26, 
42, 60nn4–5 
U.S., and insured losses, 13, 16t 
Economic growth 
carbon dioxide emissions reduction 
and effect on, 70–71 
disasters’ relationship to, 3–4, 44–48, 
60nn6–7 
Economic losses, 4, 6 
as disaster-insured, 12–20, 12f, 14f,
16t–17t, 19t, 34–35n4 
mitigation of, and risk perception, 2, 
9, 20–21, 24–26 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
	 	  
 
 
  
   
 
 
   	  
  
 
  
 
 
 
Index 137 
Economic losses, cont. 
modeling regional economic response
to shocks, 74–82 
EPA. See U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 
European weather-related losses, 16t–17t 
F-scale. See Fujita scale 
False alarm ratio (FAR), 115–116, 119, 
124n9, 126, 127t 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) 
floods and, 30–31, 35n10 
HAZUS program of, 72 
Katrina relief and, 94 
tornado shelters in National 
Mitigation Strategy of, 120 
Financial crises 
interindustry linkages and, 74–78, 
77f, 83, 84t 
threat of, as catastrophe, 9–10, 39 
Fires, 14f, 43 
Flood forecasts, decision to act or not 
upon, 67–69, 68f 
Floods 
casualties from, 16t 
climate probability of, and hazard 
protection, 69 
insurance for, 2, 13, 30–32, 34n3, 55, 
57, 66 
levee construction and, 5, 66, 90–91 
paying for safety from, 26, 91 
Florida 
government assistance for hurricane 
losses in, 43 
hurricane losses in, 10, 13, 18, 19t,
31, 44, 81, 81f 
insurance regulation in, as high-risk 
state, 3, 91–92 
mitigation and reduced hurricane 
losses in, 22–24, 23t 
tornado fatalities in, 121 
Floyd (hurricane), 17t 
Frances (hurricane), 13, 17t 
Fujita scale (F-scale), tornado-damage 
categories on, 105, 108, 108t, 112,
121, 123, 124n6, 129t 
Georges (hurricane), 17t 
Georgia, as Katrina-survivor destination, 
93 
German disasters, casualties in, 16t, 66 
Global climate change, 35n7 
beliefs in, 60–61n10 
disaster forecasts and, 4, 69–71 
effect of carbon dioxide emissions 
reduction on economic growth, 
70–71, 82 
weather-related disasters and, 2, 18, 
20, 46 
GNOCDC. See Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center 
Government roles 
disaster assistance as, 4, 27, 33, 43, 
49, 57–58, 62n23, 82 
failures of, 9–34, 94–95 
induce long-term insurance markets 
as, 2–3, 30–32 
levee construction as, 26 
presidential disaster declarations as, 
47, 62n23 
See also City governments; State 
governments 
Greater New Orleans Community Data 
Center (GNOCDC), area 
population numbers and, 96, 97t,
100n2 
Gustave (hurricane), 10, 17t 
Hail forecasts, action choices upon, 69 
Haitian earthquakes, casualties in, 10 
Hazard management 
announced risk levels in, 42–43, 119 
(see also Storm-Based Warnings 
[SBWs]; Tornado warning 
systems) 
cost vs. loss trade-offs in, 4, 66–67, 
69 
insurance principles and, 9, 20–22 
underpreparation for, 104 
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Hazards United States (HAZUS) 
program, 72 
High-risk areas, 72 
charitable organizations in, 90–91 
coastal regions as, 10, 20 
government policies for, 3, 49–51, 
58–59, 62n26 
population concentration in, 15, 20, 
97t 
Historical losses, postdisaster, 4, 73–74, 
92–93 
Home Depot (firm), reestablishing 
commerce by, 96, 98–99 
Homeowners insurance, 26–27, 31–32 
Housing market values 
beach property damages from storms 
and, 53–56, 61nn20–22 
excess capacity and, 82 
influence on disaster loss level, 15, 
45, 47, 48, 60n8 
paying for safety in high-hazard areas
and, 4, 41, 71–72 
Housing stock types, tornado fatalities 
by, 108–109, 109f, 120–122 
Houston, Texas, as Katrina-survivor 
destination, 93 
HUD. See U.S. Dept. of Housing and 
Urban Development 
Human behavior 
challenges of, compounded with 
nature’s fury, 24–26, 33, 61n19, 
88–96 
corruption as, 88–89, 90, 93, 100n1 
self-reliance as, 87, 96 
social resilience as, 87–88, 100 
venality as, 94 
Human deaths, natural disaster causes of, 
10, 103, 105, 106–109, 109f, 121 
Human injuries, statistical value assigned 
to, 105 
Human life 
cost in, and postdisaster bureaucracy, 
94 
cost per, saved in mobile homes, 121 
statistical value assigned to, 6–7, 41, 
73, 105, 124n3 
Hurricane Andrew, 10, 13, 16t, 19t, 44 
contrasted with Katrina, 81, 81f 
Hurricane Hugo, 7, 9, 13, 16t, 19t 
Hurricane Katrina, 89–100 
casualties from, 10, 89 
city government and, 26, 33, 82 
contrasted with Andrew, 81, 81f 
cost of, 18, 19t, 44–45, 73–74, 79–81,
80f, 89 
during, and governments, 93–95 
insured losses from, 13, 16t 
low-income households in, 116 
post-, recovery, 5–6, 92–93, 95–96, 
95–100, 100nn1–2 
pre-, and governments, 89–93, 104 
Hurricane Rita, 16t, 94 
Hurricanes, 2, 43, 70 
insured losses from, 10, 16t–17t, 19t 
miscellaneous named, 10, 13, 
16t–17t, 19t 
top 20 U.S. costs from, 18, 19t 
Ike (hurricane), 10, 16t 
Illinois, urban commuting congestion in, 
50, 61n16 
Information economics, insight from, 4, 
82, 104 
Infrastructure collapses, as man-made 
disasters, 14f 
Insurance 
disaster, models, 34n2, 48, 51–53 
price of, and risk, 2, 3, 9, 20–21, 41, 
60n2 
(see also Safety, paying for) 
principles of, and disaster mitigation, 
2, 9, 20–22 
regulation of, 3, 91–92 
types of 
(see e.g., Long-term insurance; 
Homeowners insurance) 
Insurance markets 
disaster expectations for, 3–4, 15, 41, 
60n2 
government role in, 2–3, 9–34 
Ivan (hurricane), 13, 16t, 19t 
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Japanese natural disasters, 16t, 17t, 56 
Jeanne (hurricane), 13, 17t 
Kansas, tornadoes and, 103 
Kansas City, Missouri, commuting 
congestion in, 50, 61n15 
Kates, Robert, as disaster economics 
pioneer, 66–67 
Katrina (hurricane). See Hurricane 
Katrina 
Kunreuther, Howard C., as disaster 
economics pioneer, 66, 71 
Land development 
beach property damages from storms, 
53–56, 61nn20–22 
disaster expectations and mitigation 
upon, 49–51, 58–59, 61nn14–17 
disaster-prone areas and, 3–4, 5, 18, 
26, 33, 91 
market values and, 4, 15, 45, 62n26 
Lave, Lester, retrospective work of, 67 
Long-term insurance, 2–3, 26–32 
Louisiana 
cities in 
(see New Orleans, Louisiana) 
corruption in, 89, 90, 93 
hurricane losses in, 10, 19t 
(see also Hurricane Katrina) 
insurance regulation in, as high-risk 
state, 91–92 
Maass, Arthur, as disaster economics 
pioneer, 66–67 
Man-made disasters 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide and, 
70–71 
in new era of catastrophes, 13–14, 14f 
recovery from, 65–66 
See also specific kinds, e.g., Terrorism 
Manufactured homes 
construction regulations for, 7, 121–
122 
tornado fatalities in, 108–109, 109f,
124n12 
Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic 
Church, New Orleans, 
reestablishing community services
by, 98, 99 
Massachusetts hurricanes, losses in, 19t 
Mill, John Stuart, quoted, 65, 87, 92 
Mining accidents, as man-made disasters,
14f 
Mississippi hurricanes, losses in, 10, 19t 
Missouri, urban commuting congestion 
in, 50, 61n15 
Mobile homes. See Manufactured homes 
Moral hazard 
in land development, 49–51, 61nn14–
17 
protection from full cost of choices 
as, 91 
as Samaritan’s dilemma, 49, 58, 
61n14 
Myanmarian cyclones, casualties in, 10 
National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) 
assistance from, 49, 57, 62n25 
beachfront properties in, 54–56 
as opportunity to create long-term 
insurance markets, 2, 30–32, 34 
participation in, 31, 51, 61n18 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 
storm data from, 107t, 124n1, 
124nn4–5, 124n7 
See also agencies of, e.g., National 
Weather Service (NWS) 
National Weather Service (NWS) 
Doppler radar installations by, 112–
113, 116 
tornado warning systems of, 6, 113–
116, 114f, 124n8, 125, 126, 
127t–129t 
Natural disaster syndrome, human 
behavior challenges and, 24–26, 
33, 61n19, 104 
Natural disasters, 44 
human deaths by, 10, 103, 105, 106–
107, 121 
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Natural disasters, cont. 
human population concentrations and,
10, 15 
in new era of catastrophes, 12–20, 33,
34–35n4 
protection from, as balance of costs 
and losses, 66–67 
recovery from, 65 
(see also under Hurricane Katrina,
post-, recovery) 
relative frequency of, 1–2, 9, 94, 103 
weather-related events as 
(see specifics, e.g., Floods; 
Hurricanes; Tornadoes) 
Nelson, Richard, retrospective work of, 
67 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
city government in, 5, 26, 82, 90, 91, 
92–93 
Katrina property damages in area, 26, 
73–74, 80–82, 80f, 81f 
levee construction in, 33, 35n10, 
89–90, 100n1 
population concentration in, MSA, 
96, 97t, 100n2 
Vietnamese-American community in, 
98, 99 
New York (state) hurricanes, losses in, 
19t, 23t 
NFIP. See National Flood Insurance 
Program 
NOAA. See National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 
Nobel laureates, 1, 7, 96 
North Carolina, 19t, 91–92 
Nuclear attack potential, terrorism as 
catastrophe with, 9–10 
NWS. See National Weather Service 
Oklahoma 
Oklahoma City, tornadoes in, 105, 
124n2 
statistical value assigned to human 
life in, 6–7 
tornado shelters in, 120–121, 124n11 
Pandemic threat, as catastrophe, 9–10 
Private sector 
long-term insurance contracts with, 3,
28–29 
post-disaster recovery and, 5–6, 20, 
51, 87–88, 92–93, 96, 98–100 
Public policy 
disaster insurance and, 59–60 
high-risk areas and, 3, 49–51, 58–59, 
62n26 
implications for disaster expectations 
of, 56–60 
information economics insight for, 4, 
82, 104 
regime uncertainty and, 95 
Radio, tornado warnings on, 119 
Red Cross (organization), high-risk areas 
and, 90–91 
Regional economic response models 
CGEs as, 74–75, 76, 78, 82 
econometric models as, and 
algorithms to address their 
shortcomings, 73–74, 76–77, 77f 
Hurricane Katrina and, 79–82, 80f,
81f 
input-output models as, 75, 76–78, 
83, 84f 
prototypical pattern of disaster 
recovery in, 78–79, 79f 
Rhode Island hurricanes, losses in, 19t 
Risk 
assessment of, 10, 25, 52–53, 61n19, 
104 
insurance principles and, 2, 9, 20–22, 
34n1, 41, 60n5 
state policies about, 3 
Russell, Clifford, as disaster economics 
pioneer, 66–67 
Saferoom Initiative, Oklahoma tornado 
shelters as, 120–121, 124n11 
Safety, paying for, 4, 26, 41, 71–72, 91, 
116–117 
Saffir-Simpson scale, hurricane severity 
categories on, 18, 19t 
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Samaritan’s dilemma, moral hazard as, 
49, 58, 61n14 
SBWs. See Storm-Based Warnings 
Schelling, Thomas, on recovery 
expectations, 96 
SFHAs. See Special Flood Hazard Areas 
South Carolina hurricanes, losses in, 13, 
19t, 23t 
South Korean typhoons, casualties in, 17t 
Southeast Asian tsunamis, casualties in, 
10 
SPC. See Storm Prediction Center 
Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), 
NFIP and, 31, 51 
State governments 
coastal planning authority of, 49 
insurance regulation by, 3, 21, 91–92 
real estate regulation by, 42 
See also specific states, e.g., Florida; 
Louisiana; North Carolina 
Stigler, George, quoted, 1 
Storm-Based Warnings (SBWs), 
potential of, 6, 118–119 
Storm Prediction Center (SPC), as 
archive, 107, 124n1, 124n5 
Storms 
areas prone to, and moral hazard, 91 
definition, 18 
global climate change and, 46 
losses from, 16t–17t, 103 
wind and wave damages from, 53–56,
61nn20–22, 81 
Television, tornado warnings on, 112, 
115–116, 119 
Terrorism 
cumulative, event numbers, 60n1 
economic effects of, 34n2, 48, 57–58,
61n11, 62n24 
insurance for, 34n2 
as man-made disaster, 9–10, 14f, 16t,
33 
Texas 
hurricane losses in, 18, 19t, 22–24, 23t 
as Katrina-survivor destination, 93 
tornado losses in, 106, 115 
Tornado shelters 
casualties/fatalities and, 6–7 
cost-effectiveness of, 120–121, 124n11 
Tornado warning systems 
cost of time spent under, 6, 105–106, 
107t, 123, 124n4 
false alarms, 115–116, 119, 124n9, 
126, 127t 
as NWS effort to reduce casualties, 
6, 113–116, 114f, 124n8, 125, 126,
127t–129t 
SBWs from NWS, 118–119, 123 
Tornadoes 
casualties in, 72, 103, 104–105, 
124n1, 125, 127t–129t 
demographics of vulnerability to, 
116–118, 123, 128t–129t 
determinants of casualties from, 
107–118 
F-scale damage categories for, 105, 
108, 108t, 112, 121, 123, 124n6, 
129t 
location of fatalities from, 108–109, 
109f, 121 
reducing impacts of, 118–122, 123 
societal cost of, 6–7, 103–107, 123 
time of fatalities from, 110–112, 110f,
111f, 116, 123, 124n12 
Trade 
commerce in disaster mitigation, 96, 
98–99, 100 
interindustry linkages and, 74–78, 
77f, 83, 84t 
market prices and controls in, 94–95 
Trade-offs 
cost vs. loss, in hazard management, 
4, 66–67, 69 
detection vs. false alarm, in tornado 
warnings, 119 
Tragedy of the anticommons, 93–94 
Tsunamis, 2, 10 
Typhoons, Asian losses from, 16t, 17t, 18 
Urbanization 
commuting congestion and, 50, 
61nn15–16 
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Urbanization, cont. 
influence on disaster loss level, 15, 
18, 20, 117 
land values and, 45 
public policy and, 3, 49–51, 58–59, 
62n26 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, levee-
reservoir system of, 66, 89–90 
U.S. Census Bureau, 100n2, 126 
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), regulations 
from, 7, 121–122 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), value of a statistical life 
from, 105 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 
earthquake warnings from, 42 
U.S. landfalls of named hurricanes, 7, 10,
16t–17t, 18, 19t 
U.S. laws and legislation, 49, 105 
Vehicles 
commuter vulnerability to tornadoes, 
117–118 
tornado fatalities in, 109, 109f 
urban commuting congestion of, 50, 
61nn15–16 
Venality, 94 
Vermont floods, losses in, 31 
Virginia hurricanes, losses in, 19t 
Wal-Mart (firm), reestablishing 
commerce by, 96, 98–99 
Water resource economics, insights from, 
4, 66, 82 
White, Gilbert, as disaster economics 
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Wilma (hurricane), 16t, 19t 
Wind storms. See Storms 
Winter, Sidney, retrospective work of, 67 
Winter storms. See Storms 
Wizard of Oz (film), 103 
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